scholarly journals Politics of Immigration and Language: The Case of Pakistani Residents in Spain

2018 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 36
Author(s):  
María Isabel Maldonado García
Keyword(s):  
Language Proficiency ◽  
Jewish People ◽  
Spanish Language ◽  
Council Of Europe ◽  
Specific Group ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Government ◽  
Nationality Law

The new Spanish nationality law requires a certain level of Spanish language proficiency for the application of Spanish nationality. The law, which is on the Official State Bulletin (BOE-Boletin Oficial del Estado) N. 167, Section I, Page 58, 149 and which was drafted on the 14th of July, 2015, came in effect on the 15th of October, 2015. The new regulation outlined the new requirements for the immigrants to be able to become Spanish citizens. The law was mainly targeted towards the descendants of those Jewish people who were thrown out of Spain in 1492 in an effort of the Spanish government to normalize relations. Nevertheless, all new applicants are somehow affected by it since a minimum knowledge of Spanish language is required, (level DELE A2 according to the Common European Framework of Reference for languages (CEF; Council of Europe, 2001 & Little (2005)) and a certain cultural and constitutional knowledge as well, to be measured by additionally passing the CCSE exam. These exams, according to the law, are to be administered by Instituto Cervantes, the official Institute of Spanish language of the Government of Spain. This paper aims to study the repercussions and new effects the law is having on the Pakistan Instituto Cervantes Examination Center in terms of enrollments as well as the effects on a specific group of immigrants themselves; the immigrants from Pakistan.

scholarly journals Impelementasi Kebijakan Pemerintah dalam Mengoptimalkan Kinerja Pegawai Negeri Sipil untuk Meningkatkan Kualitas Pelayanan Jaminan Kesehatan Nasional-Badan Penyelenggara Jaminan Sosial Kesehatan

2018 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 275-292
Author(s):  
Aloi Kamarasyid
Keyword(s):  
Human Resource ◽  
National Health ◽  
Regional Hospital ◽  
The Common ◽  
Bureaucratic Structure ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Government ◽  
Civil Government

The program of government is ruled by an organization which is pointed out to perform as the first target. But there are not programs of government has not been maximumly ruled by the organization which is pointed. The program of guarantee of national health of the board of social guarantee at The Common Hospital of South Bangka Hospital, Regional Hospital of Pangkalpinang, Bhakti Timah Hospital Pangkalpinang hasn’t succeeded maximum. It is caused by the medical workers haven’t been suitable, the sum of doctors are not enough, the facilities haven’t been enough, a few of socialisations about the programs. It is needed the policy of the government to manage the programs so the service of heath can be touched for all people of South Bangka, Pangkalpinang according to the law of Republic of Indonesia number 24 in the year 2011, the regulation of minister of the heath of Republic of Indonesia number 28 in the year 2014. The policy of government is influenced by four of communication factors, human resource, disposition, and bureaucratic structure, whereas the work of civil government officers to give a service of guarantee of national health, the board of social guarantee at The Common Hospital of South Bangka, The Regional Hospital of Pangkalping, and The Bhakti Timah Hospital hasn’t been ability, motivation, and maximum chance. The utility of the writing to see the work of civil government officers in giving a service of national guarantee, the board of social guarantee.

Where We Are, and How We Got Here

2001 ◽  
Author(s):  
William M. Lewis
Keyword(s):  
North America ◽  
Federal Government ◽  
Public Attitude ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Government ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Free People ◽  
Wetland Regulation ◽  
Wetland Policy

English is a subtle language with many words that offer fine shades of meaning, but it also can be blunt and unequivocal. Dictionaries were not made for words such as hairdo, ballpark, or pigpen. The law, however, as practiced by Americans, can mutate the meaning of even the humblest word. If the law concerns itself with pigpens, then we must know whether a pigpen still exists when the pigs are removed and, if so, for how long. We must know if a pen originally built for cattle can become a pigpen if occupied by pigs and if pigpens are the same in all parts of the nation. In short, we must have federal guidance, regional interpretations, legal specialists, and technical authorities on pigpens. So it is with wetlands. The chapters of this book will show how troublesome the definition of wetlands has become since the federal government began regulating them. In the meantime, it will suffice to define wetlands informally as those portions of a landscape that are not permanently inundated under deep water, but are still too wet most years to be used for the cultivation of upland crops such as corn or soybeans. Wetlands, in other words, coincide pretty well with the common conception of swamps, marshes, and bogs. Government has had its hand in wetlands for about 150 years. Between the 1850s and 1970s, the federal government was intent on eliminating wetlands. Since then, it has been equally intent on preserving them. An individual who behaved in this manner would seem at least irresponsible. Many critics of federal wetland policy have in fact given the government a sound thrashing for its inconsistency, but the shift from elimination to protection of wetlands has continued nevertheless. Blaming government is the duty of a free people, and also good sport. Even so, the obvious truth about wetland regulation is that government has merely reflected a change in public attitude toward wetlands. Most Americans now believe that wetlands should be saved throughout the nation, except possibly on their own property. Americans did not always feel this way. Most European colonists of North America came from homelands that were essentially tame.

Doctrine of Desuetude –Addressing the Constitutional Minefield

2016 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 35-48
Author(s):  
Tripathi Yah ◽  
Singh Rupali
Keyword(s):  
Considerable Confusion ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Law ◽  
Common Man ◽  
The Government ◽  
Insight Into ◽  
Law Commission ◽  
Technical Terms

Ever since India became independent in 1947, major reforms have taken place with respect to many aspects of our day-to-day life. Despite this, several of the laws so passed have not adequately led to the advancement of our country. In addition, statutes are often complex, and therefore cannot be understood by the common man. Ironically, the laws that are enacted for the betterment of the citizens are structured and compiled in such a manner, so as to lead to circuitous statutes laden with several technical terms, discouraging the same very people of the country from taking any legal recourse. The law commission has come out with many far-reaching reports to repeal numerous irrelevant laws, which have given rise to considerable confusion in the minds of citizens as well as the litigants. However, the government has not been very proactive on this front, taking shelter under Article 372 of our Constitution which provides the basis for the continuation of such redundant laws. Most of these laws no longer serve their original purposes, given the change in context. This article highlights the problems that are caused by such laws. Further, it gives an insight into the applicability of the doctrine of desuetude and how the judiciary has favoured its applicability to simplify matters relating to the functioning of these laws.

scholarly journals The Common Law of War

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jens David Ohlin
Keyword(s):  
Natural Law ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Armed Conflicts ◽  
Law Of War ◽  
Early American ◽  
American Law ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Law ◽  
Military Commissions ◽  
The Government

In recent litigation before U.S. federal courts, the government has argued that military commissions have jurisdiction to prosecute offenses against the "common law of war," which the government defines as a body of domestic offenses, such as inchoate conspiracy, that violate the American law of war. This Article challenges that definition by arguing that stray references to the term "common law of war"in historical materials meant something completely different. By examining the Lieber Code, the writings of early natural law theorists, and early American judicial decisions, this Article concludes that the "common law of war" referred to a branch of the law of nations that applied during internal armed conflicts, such as civil wars with non-state actors. This body of law was called "common," not because it was extended or elaborated by the common law method of judge-applied law, but rather because it was "common" to all mankind by virtue of natural law, and thus even applied to internal actors, such as rebel forces, who were not otherwise bound by international law as formal states were. By recapturing this lost definition of the common law of war, this Article casts some doubt on the U.S. government's position that military commissions have jurisdiction not only over international offenses, but also domestic violations of the law of war.Published: Jens David Ohlin, "The Common Law of War," 58 William & Mary Law Review (2016)

created by the common law rule were addressed by Parliament in the Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943, considered below, but the unjust enrichment principle is also relevant in other respects in determining whether a particular event is capable of frustrating a contract. If the decision to treat a contract as frustrated might give one of the parties an undue advantage this may operate as a justification for refusing to treat the contract as frustrated. For example, in Tamplin SS Co v Anglo-Mexican Petroleum Products Co Ltd, an oil tanker was chartered for a period of five years, but was subject to government requisition when the charterparty still had nearly three years to run. In the circumstances, there was no prejudice to the charterers, since the government compensation payable to the charterers exceeded the agreed hire charges. However, the owners of the ship claimed that the contract was frustrated. The House of Lords held, by a narrow majority, that the contract was not frustrated. One explanation for the action of the owners is that they wanted to secure the increased benefit of the government compensation in replacement for the lower hire charges. In this case, it is readily understandable that the majority of the House of Lords preferred not to allow the owners to benefit in this way at the expense of the charterers. Remedies, unjust enrichment and frustration Money paid or payable before the date of frustration

1995 ◽  
pp. 382-382
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
Petroleum Products ◽  
Law Reform ◽  
Unjust Enrichment ◽  
House Of Lords ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Government ◽  
Undue Advantage ◽  
Oil Tanker

6. The royal prerogative and constitutional conventions

Public Law ◽  
2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Stanton ◽  
Craig Prescott
Keyword(s):  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Common Law ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Head Of State ◽  
Constitutional Conventions ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Uk

This chapter explores the historical, legal, and political nature of the Crown and the royal prerogative. The rule of law requires that the government act according to the law, which means that the powers of the government must be derived from the law. However, within the UK Constitution, some powers of the government are part of the royal prerogative, as recognised by the common law. The concepts of the Crown and the royal prerogative mean that although the Queen is Head of State, it is generally the ministers who form the government that exercise the prerogative powers of the Crown. For this reason, many prerogative powers are often referred to as the ‘ministerial prerogatives’, and the few prerogative powers still exercised personally by the monarch, are referred to as the ‘personal prerogatives’.

6. The royal prerogative and constitutional conventions

Public Law ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 203-258
Author(s):  
John Stanton ◽  
Craig Prescott
Keyword(s):  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Common Law ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Head Of State ◽  
Constitutional Conventions ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Uk

This chapter explores the historical, legal, and political nature of the Crown and the royal prerogative. The rule of law requires that the government act according to the law, which means that the powers of the government must be derived from the law. However, within the UK Constitution, some powers of the government stem from the royal prerogative, as recognized by the common law. The concepts of the Crown and the royal prerogative mean that although the Queen is Head of State, it is generally the ministers who form the government that exercise the prerogative powers of the Crown. For this reason, many prerogative powers are often referred to as the ‘ministerial prerogatives’, and the few prerogative powers still exercised personally by the monarch, are referred to as the ‘personal prerogatives’.

Norfolk County Archives Reel 191/4 -Grand Jury Charges 1749–1767. MC 36/171, 484 x 1

1992 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
pp. 353-382
Keyword(s):  
The Body ◽  
First Principle ◽  
Grand Jury ◽  
Royal Family ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Revolution

I am desird by the Court & in the Absence of the Recorder it is my Duty to give you in Charge those Matters referr'd to in ye Oath you have just now taken & to remind you of the Duty & nature of ye Service you are now ingag'd in, & of such Parts of our Constitution as relate thereto & this present [p.1 v] Assembly in Conformity to an Ancient Custom which does great Honour to his Majesty & his Government by permitting thus publickly & in his own Courts the Equity Justice & Extent of it to be inquir'd into, & a Sort of Appeal to be made to you & all here present for the Reasonableness of our Subjection & Correspondance betwixt the Government & Governed People [f. 2.] not to be found in any other Country or indeed practicable in any, but where the Extent of ye Royal Prerogative & the Obedience of the Subject is Limitted & Ascertain'd by the Law of the Land & where the King holds his Authority by the glorious noblest Tenure that of Protecting the Rights & Liberty's of his People, that this was always intended by our [f. 2 v] Constitution is Evident from the Nature of it, but never three together hardly two & seldom any one of our former Kings or rather their profligate Minions have been contented with this Sacred & Most Honorable Post appears from all our Historys agree in so that it is owing to the Glorious Brave Struggles of our Ancestors in former Ages particularly in the last & more especially in the latter part of it [f.3] that we have had this happiness during four successive Reigns & ever Since the Revolution continu'd in this happy Situation for they When on this Condition and for this very purpose they gave the Crown to our Glorious Deliverer and such of the then Royal Family as were coud answer this End & in default of the Issue by them to his Majesty & his descendants being the next Protestants in the Royal Line By that Act of Settlement referr'd to in our Oath of Allegiance and by which [f. 3 v] this Succession became & is the first Principle of our Constitution in Church & State, which can be preserv'd under none, if not under a Race of Kings made so for this express purpose, By our Constitution in Church I mean as well those Laws made for Restoring & preserving to our Dissenting Brethren the common Rights of Mankind to [f. 4] Worship Almighty God in such manner as appears to them most worthy of him, so as their principles and & practice be not dangerous to Society, & which are now happily a part of our Constitution, as well, as those made for the Honour & Protection of the Established ye most Excellent & pious Form of Worship Establish'd in our National Churches, By our Constitution in State no Body [f. 4. v] can mistake me that I mean the Body of Laws by which this Nation under his Majesty is Govern'd in its Civil consider'd distinct from its Religious concerns & particularly that part of them call'd the Crown Law which we are here assembled to inforce in this Jurisdiction as a Court of Oyer & Terminer & General Gaol Delivery.

Summi fastigii vocabulum: the Story of a Title

1979 ◽  
Vol 69 ◽  
pp. 28-34 ◽  
Author(s):  
W. K. Lacey
Keyword(s):  
Common People ◽  
Roman World ◽  
Exact Date ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Government ◽  
New Formula

Tacitus described tribunician power (tribunicia potestas, trib. pot. hereafter) as the title of the highest pinnacle (sc. of power) in the Roman world (summi fastigii vocabulum), and Augustus counted his years of trib. pot. from 23 B.C. So much may be stated with confidence and without dispute. In 23 B.C. however trib. pot. was introduced quietly, so quietly that the exact date of the law by which it was conferred (if it was conferred in 23 B.C.) is unknown; and the title itself made so little impact on contemporary opinion that the reaction of the common people of Rome, for whose protection Tacitus says Augustus took the power, was negative—so negative that they spent the next five years trying to re-elect Augustus to the consulate which he had resigned at or about the time that the era of trib. pot. began. We must conclude that the conferment of trib. pot. (if there was any ceremony at all in 23 B.C.) was not made the subject of a great celebration designed to win popular acclaim for this new institution (if it was a new one), nor was it immediately advertised widely as a new formula for the government of the Roman world.

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