LOST LEGACY OF “SOLIDARITY ”

2021 ◽  
Vol 563 (2) ◽  
pp. 18-27
Author(s):  
Dariusz Zalewski
Keyword(s):  
Negative Liberty ◽  
Positive Sense ◽  
Positive Liberty ◽  
Basic Argument

The text is about “Solidarność” legacy and includes two types of liberty: negative and positive. Basic argument says, that “Solidarność” achieved historic success in a sphere of negative liberty, but they didn’t make it in positive sense, which was quickly forgotten after 1989. Positive liberty oblivion accompanied fears of former “Solidarność” leaders, who had taken the lead of system’s reformation, worried that NSZZ “Solidarność” upholding of workers interests will destroy done system’s changes too.

Freedom in mass values: egocentric, humanistic, or both? Using Isaiah Berlin to understand a contemporary debate

2011 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 241-262 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gina Gustavsson
Keyword(s):  
Negative Freedom ◽  
Isaiah Berlin ◽  
Contemporary Debate ◽  
New Approach ◽  
Common Assumption ◽  
Legal Norms ◽  
Negative Liberty ◽  
Confirmatory Factor ◽  
Positive Liberty ◽  
The Common

Does an increasing emphasis on individual freedom in mass values erode or revitalize democratic societies? This paper offers a new approach to this debate by examining it through the lens of Isaiah Berlin, and his distinction between positive and negative freedom. I show that, contrary to the common assumption among scholars who study mass values regarding freedom, these do not consist of one dimension but two: negative and positive freedom. I also show that, while valuing negative liberty clearly leads a person to become more morally permissive and more condoning of non-compliance with legal norms, valuing positive liberty does not seem to have the same effects at all; in fact, it shows the very opposite relationship with respect to some of these attitudes. Thus, it matters what kind of freedom people value. The results rely on confirmatory factor and regression analyses on World Values Survey data from ten affluent Western countries in 2005–2006.

The Nature and Value of Liberty

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jason Brennan
Keyword(s):  
Negative Liberty ◽  
Positive Liberty

How do libertarians define “liberty”? Philosophers say there are two major kinds of liberty: negative liberty and positive liberty. We often use the words “liberty” or “freedom” to refer to an absence of obstacles, impediments, or constraints. Philosophers call this negative liberty....

Positive Freedom

2021 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Political Theory ◽  
Social Values ◽  
Social Recognition ◽  
Multiple Perspectives ◽  
Physical Control ◽  
Positive Freedom ◽  
Negative Liberty ◽  
Positive Liberty ◽  
Political Value

Freedom is widely regarded as a basic social and political value that is deeply connected to the ideals of democracy, equality, liberation, and social recognition. Many insist that freedom must include conditions that go beyond simple “negative” liberty understood as the absence of constraints; only if freedom includes other conditions such as the capability to act, mental and physical control of oneself, and social recognition by others will it deserve its place in the pantheon of basic social values. Positive Freedom is the first volume to examine the idea of positive liberty in detail and from multiple perspectives. With contributions from leading scholars in ethics and political theory, this collection includes both historical studies of the idea of positive freedom and discussions of its connection to important contemporary issues in social and political philosophy.

scholarly journals Republican Elements in the Liberalism of Fear

2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (2-2018) ◽  
pp. 209-221
Author(s):  
Samantha Ashenden ◽  
Andreas Hess
Keyword(s):  
Critical Discussion ◽  
Political Obligation ◽  
Modern Democracy ◽  
Negative Liberty ◽  
American Citizenship ◽  
Positive Liberty ◽  
Negative Rights ◽  
Political Conditions ◽  
Virtuous Life

Judith Shklar’s liberalism of fear is distinct from other liberalisms; it gains its unique imprint and quality through a long and consistent engagement with, and critical discussion of, republicanism. Her account of the contemporary relevance of notions of virtues and vices, justice and injustice, the questions of rights, representation, citizenship and democracy all point to older republican influences. However, Shklar also knew that unreconstructed republicanism and republican ideas of the virtuous life were no longer applicable to modern societal and political conditions. This becomes especially clear in her discussion of Rousseau and in her study Ordinary Vices. The irreducibly pluralist and individualist nature of modern democracy have made it inconceivable that we would all agree on what the virtuous life consists in. Shklar’s emphasis on positive liberty, critically directed against Isaiah Berlin’s argument that negative rights and negative liberty are at the heart of modern liberalism; her insistence on the need for a common spirit as distilled in her study of Montesquieu; the need for equality in terms of voting and earning as stressed in American Citizenship; and finally her discussion of the changing nature of both loyalty and political obligation in her last Harvard lectures, are all indicative of the republican elements that can be detected in her barebones liberalism.

Emersonian Strategies: Negative Liberty, Self-Reliance, and Democratic Individuality

1994 ◽  
Vol 48 (4) ◽  
pp. 440-479
Author(s):  
Cyrus R. K. Patell
Keyword(s):  
Common Denominator ◽  
Single Individual ◽  
Individual Choice ◽  
American Democracy ◽  
Negative Liberty ◽  
Positive Liberty ◽  
The Many ◽  
The One ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Communal Institutions

Emersonian political thought subjects the term "individualism," which was invented in Europe as a description of the defects of Enlightenment thought and used by Tocqueville pejoratively as a critique of American democracy, to a process of idealization that enables it to appropriate concepts that might other-wise be conceived as oppositional to it. Emersonianism inherits Locke's negative conception of freedom as freedom from restraint, but claims that negative liberty inevitably transforms itself into a form of positive liberty that nurtures communal institutions. From Emerson himself to George Kateb today, Emersonians have relied upon a methodological individualism in which they shift the ground of inquiry from culture and society to the individual and traslate moments of social choice into moments of individual choice. This methodological strategy is a literal application of the motto e pluribus unum, which expresses the idea that the American nation is formed through the union of many individuals and peoples. In the hands of the Emersonians the customary sense of this motto is reversed: they move from the many to the one, to the single individual, paring away differences in order to reach a common denominator that will allow them to make claims about all individuals. At the heart of their endeavor is the belief that the health of the nation depends on its ability to respect and protect the individuality of each of its citizens.

Smith, Rousseau and the True Spirit of a Republican

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dennis C. Rasmussen
Keyword(s):  
Moral Life ◽  
Negative Liberty ◽  
Positive Liberty ◽  
Good For ◽  
The Individual ◽  
The Way

This chapter explores the meaning of Adam Smith’s claim that Jean-Jacques Rousseau embodied ‘the true spirit of a republican carried a little too far’, ultimately concluding that Smith was not referring to Rousseau’s ‘republican’ or ‘positive’ conception of liberty but rather to his claim that commerce is invariably corrupt and corrupting. It also explores these thinkers’ conceptions of liberty, arguing that their views are nearly diametrically opposed, but not (only) in the way that is generally assumed. On the level of politics, as is well known, Smith advocated negative liberty while Rousseau advocated positive liberty. Yet on the level of the individual Smith regarded a kind of positive liberty—namely, self-command—as a necessary component of a moral life, while Rousseau regarded negative liberty as a supreme good for those who are sufficiently free of destructive passions that they will refrain from abusing it.

scholarly journals A superação da concepção liberal de liberdade em Hannah Arendt

2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 202-214
Author(s):  
Edson kretle Santos ◽  
Ricardo Corrêa de Araujo
Keyword(s):  
Hannah Arendt ◽  
Political Freedom ◽  
Isaiah Berlin ◽  
Negative Liberty ◽  
Positive Liberty

Este artigo pretende confrontar duas noções acerca da noção de liberdade, temática central na Filosofia Política. De um lado, partiremos de algumas reflexões do liberalismo político, onde no primeiro momento, exploraremos a obra Dois Conceitos de Liberdade (Two Concepts of Liberty), de Isaiah Berlin. Para esse autor a liberdade negativa (negative liberty - “estar livre de”) e, não a liberdade positiva (positive liberty - “estar livre para”), deve ser a maior preocupação dos corpos políticos, ou seja, o Estado deve existir para evitar que a liberdade individual seja reduzida pela própria interferência do Estado ou de outros sujeitos. De encontro a essa ideia, e ancorados em Arendt, desejamos sustentar que um dos grandes problemas do liberalismo político é a não ação (negative liberty), isto é, a falta de participação do cidadão nos assuntos e nas decisões políticas. Ao mostrar isso, defenderemos em Arendt o papel central da liberdade positiva (political freedom) da ação e da fala, e, consequentemente, a possibilidade de um republicanismo cívico como alternativa ao isolamento e apatia políticas gestados pela liberdade burguesa, uma vez que, para Arendt, a aposta de Berlin e da tradição liberal são insuficientes para pensarmos os acontecimentos da política contemporânea. Palavras-chave: Política; Liberdade; Liberalismo; Cidadania; Arendt.

Freedom and Equality

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elizabeth Anderson
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Private Property ◽  
Free Society ◽  
Negative Freedom ◽  
Private Property Rights ◽  
Negative Liberty ◽  
Positive Liberty ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Republican Liberty ◽  
Core Features

Freedom and equality are often viewed as conflicting values. But there are at least three conceptions of freedom-negative, positive, and republican-and three conceptions of equality-of standing, esteem, and authority. Libertarians argue that rights to negative liberty override claims to positive liberty. However, a freedom-based defense of private property rights must favor positive over negative freedom. Furthermore, a regime of full contractual alienability of rights-on the priority of negative over republican freedom-is an unstable basis for a free society. To sustain a free society over time, republican liberty must take priority over negative liberty, resulting in a kind of authority egalitarianism. Finally, the chapter discusses how the values of freedom and equality bear on the definition of property rights. The result is a qualified defense of some core features of social democratic orders.

2. Liberty

2019 ◽  
pp. 25-47
Author(s):  
Ian Carter
Keyword(s):  
Private Property ◽  
Recent Literature ◽  
Economic Equality ◽  
Choice Making ◽  
Negative Liberty ◽  
Positive Liberty

This chapter examines the concept of liberty. There are different rival interpretations of liberty. These interpretations can be discussed in terms of a well-known distinction: that between negative and positive liberty. Negative liberty is the absence of something: normally, the absence of external obstacles imposed by other human agents. Positive liberty is the presence of something: the exercise of our choice-making capacities in ways that put us in control of our own lives. Much of the recent literature on liberty has focused on a new challenge to these conceptions of liberty. The challenge comes from thinkers inspired by the neo-roman or republican idea of liberty as the antithesis of slavery. Republicans define liberty as the absence of domination. Meanwhile, some libertarians, who hold that liberty is best realized through the protection of private property and contract, have argued that liberty is always limited by the pursuit of economic equality.

Sophie de Grouchy, The Tradition(s) of Two Liberties, and the Missing Mother(s) of Liberalism

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eric Schliesser
Keyword(s):  
Eighteenth Century ◽  
Moral Issues ◽  
Political Issues ◽  
Liberal Tradition ◽  
Negative Liberty ◽  
Late Eighteenth Century ◽  
Late Eighteenth ◽  
Positive Liberty ◽  
Negative Rights ◽  
History Of

This chapter demonstrates how Sophie de Grouchy (1764–1822) anticipates the famous modern-day distinction between positive and negative liberty in her late eighteenth-century writings. It is argued that, on these grounds, De Grouchy deserves a rightful place in the history of the liberal tradition, a tradition that is typically depicted as the exclusive province of men. To support this claim, this chapter examines De Grouchy’s ideas in comparison with Rousseau’s and Adam Smith’s views on justice and property rights. This sets the context in which De Grouchy introduces her distinction between positive and negative rights, a distinction that maps onto the modern-day divide between negative and positive liberty. It is shown how, in her writings, political issues of rights and justice intersect with moral issues to do with virtue and with the proper education of virtuous citizens who are also free.

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