scholarly journals PIERCING THE VEIL – A DODO OF A DOCTRINE?

2013 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 241-254
Author(s):  
Alistair Alcock
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Begging The Question ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Piercing The Corporate Veil ◽  
English Law ◽  
The Veil ◽  
Do So

In the course of the 2012/13 legal year, the Supreme Court has had to consider the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil twice, in VTB Capital plc v Nutritek International Corpn (VTB),  and more recently in Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd (Prest). On both occasions, the Court was in effect asked to remove the whole doctrine from English Law, but narrowly failed to do so, begging the question, does the doctrine really serve any purpose now? Let me start with Prest. 

Equity and certainty in contract law

Acta Juridica ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 141-176
Author(s):  
F Brand
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Contract Law ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
High Court ◽  
Contractual Relationships ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Court Of Appeal ◽  
Do So

The role of abstract values such as equity and fairness in our law of contract has been the subject of controversy for a number of years. In 2002 the Supreme Court of Appeal took the position that these values do not constitute self-standing grounds for interfering with contractual relationships. Despite this being consistently maintained by the SCA in a number of cases, some High Court judges deviated from this position on the basis that they were permitted to do so by some minority judgments and obiter dicta in the Constitutional Court. The uncertainty thus created has fortunately now been removed by the judgment of the Constitutional Court in Beadica v The Trustees for the Time being of the Oregon Trust.

scholarly journals Disclosure in Centre for Child Law v the Governing Body of Hoërskool Fochville

2017 ◽  
Vol 20 ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
Michael Tsele
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Public Interest ◽  
High Court ◽  
Governing Body ◽  
Foreign Law ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Children's Interests ◽  
Court Of Appeal ◽  
Do So

When a party refers to evidentiary material in the course of litigation, ordinarily this party is under an obligation to make this evidence available to his opponent, particularly when called upon to do so. However, over the years various principles have developed which make this obligation subject to certain limitations. The Fochville cases dealt with a situation where a party to litigation sought to withhold certain information from its adversary, notwithstanding the fact that the material had been relied upon as a ground for the institution of the litigation. This note critiques the judgments of the High Court and in particular the Supreme Court of Appeal in this dispute. In so doing, it draws on useful foreign law to argue that the Supreme Court of Appeal's judgment was an unfortunate one in that the court failed to clarify with reasonable precision the circumstances in which a party to litigation involving children's interests may legitimately resist disclosing evidence to his adversary, in which the party resisting disclosure invokes the principle of public interest immunity. In this regard, the note concludes that the High Court's overall approach to the issue is to be preferred.       

scholarly journals SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND THE SAME OLD CONSTITUTION*

2011 ◽  
Vol 14 (2 & 3) ◽  
pp. 2005
Author(s):  
Ronalda Murphy
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Social Institution ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Same Sex ◽  
Political Debate ◽  
Same Sex Marriage ◽  
Political Issues ◽  
Same Sex Couples ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Do So

The Reference re Same-Sex Marriage1 is not a major opinion on the rights of same-sex couples in Canada, but it is nonetheless an important and fascinating case. There are only a few lines that are about the “rights” of same-sex couples. Did the Supreme Court of Canada “duck” the issue? Was the Court carefully gauging how much or little political capital it had and making a political decision to say as little as possible on this topic? The Court certainly displayed strategic brilliance, but it did not do so in the name of avoiding the “political” hot topic of same-sex marriage. It is factually difficult to maintain the view that the Supreme Court of Canada is loath to enter into this political debate. It has been the lead social institution in Canada in terms of responding to the claims of gays and lesbians to equality in law,2 and it has never been shy of dealing with topics simply because they involve controversial political issues.3 Rather, the Court’s brilliance lies in its minimalist and almost weary tone. This approach had the effect of taking the wind out of the sails of those opposed to same-sex marriage: the same-sex advocates definitely win the constitutional race, but they do so because according to the Supreme Court, there is no provincial constitutional headwind that can stop them. In short, provinces can complain all they want about the federal position in favour of same-sex marriage, but the wedding will go on despite and over their objections to the ceremony.

scholarly journals Filling the Hole in Indonesia’s Constitutional System: Constitutional Courts and the Review of Regulations in a Split Jurisdiction

2018 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 27
Author(s):  
Tim Lindsey
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Civil Law ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
Constitutional Review ◽  
The Real ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Constitutional System ◽  
Do So

The Indonesian constitutional system contains a serious flaw that means that the constitutionality of a large number of laws cannot be determined by any court. Although the jurisdiction for the judicial review of laws is split between the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court, neither can review the constitutionality of subordinate regulations. This is problematic because in Indonesia the real substance of statutes is often found in implementing regulations, of which there are very many. This paper argues that that is open to the Constitutional Court to reconsider its position on review of regulations in order to remedy this problem. It could do so by interpreting its power of judicial review of statutes to extend to laws below the level of statutes. The paper begins with a brief account of how Indonesia came to have a system of judicial constitutional review that is restricted to statutes. It then examines the experience of South Korea’s Constitutional Court, a court in an Asian civil law country with a split jurisdiction for judicial review of laws like Indonesia’s. Despite controversy, this court has been able to interpret its powers to constitutionally invalidate statutes in such a way as to extend them to subordinate regulations as well. This paper argues that Indonesia’s Constitutional Court should follow South Korea’s example, in order to prevent the possibility of constitutionalism being subverted by unconstitutional subordinate regulations.

18. Theft

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Ormerod ◽  
Karl Laird
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Detailed Review ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Common ◽  
English Law

In English law, offences related to dishonesty are governed by the Theft Acts 1968 and 1978, the Theft (Amendment) Act 1996, and the Fraud Act 2006. These Acts are not a restatement of the common law and its numerous statutory additions but they do provide a code of the most important offences of dishonest dealing with the protection of property (with the notable exception of forgery and conspiracy to defraud). This chapter deals with the offence of theft. It offers a detailed review of the concept of dishonesty in light of the recent redefinition of that concept by the Supreme Court in Ivey v Genting Casinos.

New Directions in Mexican Legal History

1994 ◽  
Vol 50 (4) ◽  
pp. 461-465 ◽  
Author(s):  
Silvia Marina Arrom
Keyword(s):  
New Mexico ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Mexico City ◽  
Legal System ◽  
Legal History ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
New Directions ◽  
Lower Courts ◽  
Court Proceedings ◽  
Do So

These three articles, originally presented as papers at the 1992 American Historical Association meetings, represent a new direction in Mexican legal history. Whereas most legal histories have concentrated on a textual analysis of the law, these articles go beyond the laws to explore how they were implemented (as in Charles Cutter's and Michael Scardaville's pieces) and how they were made (as in Linda Arnold's piece). To do so the authors supplement printed sources with rich and previously neglected materials from local court proceedings, police logs, and supreme court archives. Taken together, the articles present a fascinating picture of how the Mexican legal system worked in practice, be it through the provincial courts of New Mexico, the lower courts of Mexico City, or the Supreme Court visitas of prisons.

Enforcement of Divorce Judgments in Jewish Courts in Israel: The Interaction Between Religious and Constitutional Law

2012 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-68 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yehiel S. Kaplan
Keyword(s):  
Policy Analysis ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Human Dignity ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
The State ◽  
Coercive Measures ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
State Of Israel ◽  
Do So

In the State of Israel, Rabbinical courts are granted sole jurisdiction in the adjudication of marriage and divorce of Jews. In these courts, the husband presents the divorce writ of Jews, the get, to his wife on the occasion of their divorce at the end of the adjudication process. When Jews sue for divorce in Rabbinical courts, the courts occasionally determine that the man should grant his wife a get or that the wife should accept the get granted by her husband. Sometimes one spouse disobeys the ruling. Although the Rabbinical courts occasionally impose sanctions in an attempt to enforce divorce judgments, they are generally reluctant to do so. The implementation of inappropriate measures can lead to the conclusion that a given divorce is in fact a legally ineffectual coerced divorce. Consequently, the Jewish courts occasionally delay the imposition of these sanctions out of concern that inappropriate coercive measures invalidate the get, rendering the couple still legally married. The Supreme Court of Israel has ruled, though, that the Rabbinical courts in Israel should act in light of the constitutional principles in Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom. However, the Supreme Court of Israel has not clearly or specifically addressed the balance between the rights and obligations of the husband and wife in the process of enforcing divorce judgments, neither before nor after the enactment of the of the two important constitutional Basic Laws enacted in 1992. A detailed policy analysis of the sanctions against recalcitrant spouses in Rabbinical courts in Israel—in light of the principles of Jewish and constitutional law in the country—has not yet been undertaken. The aim of this essay is therefore to present the appropriate formula pertaining to the imposition of sanctions against recalcitrant spouses given the principles of Jewish and constitutional law. The formula is presented in light of constitutional law in Israel. However, it is also applicable in other countries with similar constitutional legislation, such as Canada, where legislation sometimes allows for the civil enforcement of Jewish divorce.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document