scholarly journals Filling the Hole in Indonesia’s Constitutional System: Constitutional Courts and the Review of Regulations in a Split Jurisdiction

2018 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 27
Author(s):  
Tim Lindsey
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Civil Law ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
Constitutional Review ◽  
The Real ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Constitutional System ◽  
Do So

The Indonesian constitutional system contains a serious flaw that means that the constitutionality of a large number of laws cannot be determined by any court. Although the jurisdiction for the judicial review of laws is split between the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court, neither can review the constitutionality of subordinate regulations. This is problematic because in Indonesia the real substance of statutes is often found in implementing regulations, of which there are very many. This paper argues that that is open to the Constitutional Court to reconsider its position on review of regulations in order to remedy this problem. It could do so by interpreting its power of judicial review of statutes to extend to laws below the level of statutes. The paper begins with a brief account of how Indonesia came to have a system of judicial constitutional review that is restricted to statutes. It then examines the experience of South Korea’s Constitutional Court, a court in an Asian civil law country with a split jurisdiction for judicial review of laws like Indonesia’s. Despite controversy, this court has been able to interpret its powers to constitutionally invalidate statutes in such a way as to extend them to subordinate regulations as well. This paper argues that Indonesia’s Constitutional Court should follow South Korea’s example, in order to prevent the possibility of constitutionalism being subverted by unconstitutional subordinate regulations.

scholarly journals LEGAL PROBLEMS OF DUALISM OF JUDICIAL REVIEW SYSTEM IN INDONESIA

2016 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Pan Mohamad Faiz
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Current System ◽  
Legal Issues ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Review System ◽  
Constitutional Review ◽  
Legal Problems ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Laws And Regulations

Indonesia implements dualism of judicial review system because there are two different judicial institutions that are granted the authority to review laws and regulations, namely the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court. This research aims to analyse the problems caused by the dualism of judicial review system. It found two main legal problems of the current system. First, there is an inconsistency of decisions concerning judicial review cases for the same legal issues decided by the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court. Second, there is no mechanism to review the constitutionality of People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) decisions and regulations under the level of law. Based on these findings, this research suggests that the authority to review all laws and regulations should be integrated under the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court.Keywords: Constitutional Court, Constitutional Review, Judicial Review

Equity and certainty in contract law

Acta Juridica ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 141-176
Author(s):  
F Brand
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Contract Law ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
High Court ◽  
Contractual Relationships ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Court Of Appeal ◽  
Do So

The role of abstract values such as equity and fairness in our law of contract has been the subject of controversy for a number of years. In 2002 the Supreme Court of Appeal took the position that these values do not constitute self-standing grounds for interfering with contractual relationships. Despite this being consistently maintained by the SCA in a number of cases, some High Court judges deviated from this position on the basis that they were permitted to do so by some minority judgments and obiter dicta in the Constitutional Court. The uncertainty thus created has fortunately now been removed by the judgment of the Constitutional Court in Beadica v The Trustees for the Time being of the Oregon Trust.

The Right to Assisted Dying: Constitutional Jurisprudence and Its Impact in Canada, Germany and Austria

ICL Journal ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Kerstin Braun
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Supreme Court Decision ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Assisted Dying ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
The Right ◽  
Constitutional Jurisprudence

Abstract Many states are grappling with the regulation of assistance in suicide and ending the life of another upon their request. Initially punishable in most countries, a growing number of jurisdictions have now introduced permissive frameworks decriminalising, to varying degrees, rendering assistance in dying. Other countries, however, have proceeded with the criminal prohibition and several courts have upheld the lawfulness of the respective criminal laws during human rights and constitutional challenges. Yet, the Supreme Court of Canada in 2015, the German Federal Constitutional Court in February 2020 and the Austrian Constitutional Court in December 2020 have respectively declared unconstitutional and void national criminal laws prohibiting rendering assistance in dying. This article first outlines the criminal law framework relating to assisted dying in Canada, Germany and Austria. It subsequently analyses the judgments before pondering their impact on the legal landscape in the three countries. The article concludes that while the Canadian Supreme Court decision appears to have had a significant impact on the introduction of subsequent legislation in Canada, the effects of the Constitutional Courts’ judgments seem much more subdued in Germany and are yet to unfold in Austria.

The Concentrated and Hybrid Models of Judicial Review

2021 ◽  
pp. 27-38
Author(s):  
Steven Gow Calabresi
Keyword(s):  
Complex System ◽  
Latin America ◽  
Hybrid Model ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Civil Law ◽  
Hybrid Models ◽  
Judicial System ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
The Government

This chapter examines the two models of judicial review that exist in the civil law countries: the Concentrated Model and the Hybrid Model. The Concentrated Model of judicial review is built around the idea that what judges do when they enforce constitutions and Bills of Rights is inherently political and nonjudicial. For this reason, a separate Constitutional Court is created outside the ordinary judicial system, and is the only entity with the power of judicial review. The power of judicial review of Constitutional Courts is conceived as being a power to make the law and not simply to interpret it. Hence, a Constitutional Court in a civil law country is, essentially, a fourth branch of the government. Meanwhile, many countries, especially in Latin America, have developed distinct Hybrid Models of judicial review. The country of Brazil can be considered as the archetypal Hybrid Model. Brazil’s Hybrid Model of judicial review consists of a very complex system full of institutional mechanisms that are meant to enforce the Constitution. The Brazilian system combines features from both the Concentrated and the Diffuse Models hence the term Hybrid Model.

scholarly journals MODEL PENGUJIAN PERATURAN PERUNDANG-UNDANGAN SATU ATAP MELALUI MAHKAMAH KONSTITUSI

2018 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 247
Author(s):  
Sholahuddin Al-Fatih
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Regulatory Testing ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
New Ideas ◽  
The Republic ◽  
Bureaucratic Reform

Post-reform of the role of judicial institution is run by two institutions namely the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court. The duties and authorities of the two institutions are regulated in the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia 1945 and the act that addresses the three institutions more specifically. Several powers possessed by the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court, one of them is the authority to judicial review. The Constitutional Court is authorized to review the act on the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia 1945, while the Supreme Court is authorized to review under the Act on the above legislation.The unfairness of the regulatory testing function is feared to trigger bureaucratic inefficiency. Based on data released by the Supreme Court Clerk, it was recorded during 2016 that the Supreme Court received 18,514 cases, including the Hak Uji Materi (HUM) subject to legislation under the Act. While the number of cases of judicial review of the Constitutional Court in 2016-2017 amounted to only 332 cases. Therefore, it is necessary to conduct a bureaucratic reform and provide new ideas related to the model of one court of judicial review in Indonesia. So that in this paper will be discussed deeply about problematic of judicial review in Indonesia and the authority of the Constitutional Court to review the act under one roof with SIJURI mechanism.

scholarly journals A Participação da Sociedade Civil na Escolha dos Ministros do Supremo Tribunal Federal

2018 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Eduardo Silva Luz ◽  
José Eduardo Sabo Paes
Keyword(s):  
Civil Society ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Latin American ◽  
Comparative Method ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Economic Analysis Of Law ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
Civil Society Participation ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Distrito Federal

A PARTICIPAÇÃO DA SOCIEDADE CIVIL NA ESCOLHA DOS MINISTROS DO SUPREMO TRIBUNAL FEDERAL  CIVIL SOCIETY PARTICIPATION IN THE SELECTION OF SUPREME COURT JUDGES   Eduardo Silva Luz*José Eduardo Sabo Paes**  RESUMO: O presente artigo possuí a precípua missão de analisar o atual procedimento de escolha dos integrantes do Supremo Tribunal Federal, realizando um estudo aprofundado quanto aos critérios estabelecidos no texto constitucional, que devem ser obedecidos pelo chefe do executivo, quando da indicação do Ministro da Corte Constitucional. Ademais, será analisado se é possível à participação direta da sociedade civil nesse processo de indicação do membro da Corte, com a finalidade de termos processo mais democrático e transparente. A metodologia utilizada para a consecução dos objetivos citados será revisão bibliográfica de textos brasileiros e latino-americanos, que realizam estudos quanto a cortes constitucionais e jurisdição constitucional, aliado a isto utilizaremos o método comparado para analisar o procedimento de escolha dos membros dos tribunais superiores em outros países da América Latina. Ao final do artigo pretende-se oferecer propostas para uma maior democratização do processo de escolha dos membros do STF de forma a propiciar a participação da sociedade civil neste processo. PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Escolha. Supremo Tribunal Federal. Sociedade Civil. Ministros. ABSTRACT: This article shall possess the primary mission of analysing the current procedure of choice for members of the Supreme Court, conducting an in-depth study of the criteria set out in the constitutional text, which must be obeyed by the Chief Executive, when choose the Ministry of Constitutional Court. In addition, it will be parsed if is possible the direct participation of civil society in the process of appointment of the Member of the Court, with the purpose of having more democratic and transparent process. The methodology used to achieve these objectives will be a bibliographical review of Brazilian and Latin American texts, which will carry out studies on constitutional courts and constitutional jurisdictions. In addition, we will use the comparative method to analyze the procedure for selecting the members of the higher courts in other Latin American countries. At the end of the article, we intend to offer proposals for a greater democratization of the process of choosing the members of the Supreme Court in order to provide civil society participation in this process. KEYWORDS: Selection. Supreme Court. Civil Society. Judges.  SUMÁRIO: Introdução. 1 O STF – Evolução Histórica e Critérios de Seleção. 1.1 Nomeação dos Ministros do Supremo Tribunal Federal nas Constituições. 1.2 Critérios Abertos. 2 Sociedade Civil no Brasil. 3 Análise Comparada. 3.1 Argentina. 3.2 Bolívia. 3.3 Chile. 4 A Possibilidade da Participação da Sociedade Civil na Composição do Supremo Tribunal Federal. Considerações Finais. Referências._________________________* Mestrando em Direito pelo Programa de Pós-Graduação em Direito da Universidade Católica de Brasília (UCB), Distrito Federal. Pesquisador Bolsista CAPES. Editor-Assistente da Economic Analysis of Law Review. ** Doutor e Mestre em Direito pela Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Espanha. Professor Programa de Pós-Graduação em Direito da Universidade Católica de Brasília (UCB), Distrito Federal.  

scholarly journals KEDUDUKAN KOMISI YUDISIAL DALAM SISTEM PENYELENGGARAAN PENGAWASAN KODE ETIK HAKIM PASCA PUTUSAN MK NO 43/PUU-XIII/2015

2016 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 15
Author(s):  
Heru Nuswanto ◽  
Amri P. Sihotang,
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Code Of Conduct ◽  
Regulatory System ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Court Ruling ◽  
Basic Principles ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Republic ◽  
Constitutional System ◽  
Sense Of Justice

<p>Kedudukan komisi yudisial sebagai pengawas system peradilan di Indonesia di rasa sangat penting untuk menjadikan system peradilan di Indonesia professional dan berintegritas. Persoalan kemudian hadir pasca putusan <a href="http://kepaniteraan.mahkamahagung.go.id/kegiatan/1181-putusan-mk-no-43-puu-xiii-2015-proses-seleksi-hakim-tingkat-pertama-tidak-perlu-melibatkan-ky">MK No 43/PUU-XIII/2015</a> dimana dalam putusan menjadikan Komisi Yudisial tidak lagi sebagai pihak yang ikut serta mengawasi perekrutan hakim tingkat pertama. Padahal dalam system ketatanegaraan jika lembaga komisi yudisial peran dan fungsinya dibatasi akan menjadikan mahkamah agung sebagai lembaga absolute dalam kekuasaan yudikatif.</p><p>.</p><p>Pasca putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi <a href="http://kepaniteraan.mahkamahagung.go.id/kegiatan/1181-putusan-mk-no-43-puu-xiii-2015-proses-seleksi-hakim-tingkat-pertama-tidak-perlu-melibatkan-ky"> No 43/PUU-XIII/2015</a> tidaklah menjadi penghambat Komisi Yudisial dalam melakukan penegakan kode etik. Bahkan pada sisi lain Komisi Yudisial harus mampu melakukan penerobosan penafsiran bahwa putusan tersebut semata-mata memberikan ruang dan kedudukan Komisi Yudisial untuk merespon upaya kemerdekaan kekuasaan kehakiman yang secara mandiri dan merdeka akan tetapi harus sesuai real nilai-nilai pancasila dan Undang-Undang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia dengan menempatkan Komisi Yudisial yang nantinya akan menguji idependensi hakim-hakim yang merupakan hasil seleksi dari Mahkamah Agung secara ketat dalam menjalankan tugas dan fungsinya sesuai dengan prinsip-prinsip dasar kode etik yang telah telah dicanangkan sesuai dengan peraturan perundang-undangan yang berlaku.</p><p>Status of the Judicial Commission as the regulatory system in the sense of justice in Indonesia Sangat system makes for a review of integrity and professional judiciary in Indonesia. Present Problems then after the Constitutional Court ruling No. 43/PUU-XIII/2015 Where hearts Judicial Commission Decision making is NOT Again as parties Yang Participate oversee the recruitment of judges of first instance. Whereas hearts constitutional system if Institution Role and functions of the Judicial Commission shall be limited to make the Supreme Court as the Institute for Judicial power absolute hearts.</p><p>Post a Constitutional Court decision No. 43/PUU-XIII/2015 does not become an obstacle to the Judicial Commission in enforcing the code of conduct. Even on the other side of the Judicial Commission should be able to make a breakthrough interpretation that the decision merely provides the space and the position of the Judicial Commission to respond to the efforts of the independence of judiciary is independent and free but must be corresponding real values of Pancasila and the Constitution of the Republic Indonesia by placing the Judicial Commission which will examine idependensi judges were selected from the Supreme Court strictly in performing their duties and functions in accordance with the basic principles of the code of conduct that has been implemented in accordance with the legislation in force.</p>

scholarly journals KAJIAN YURIDIS TERHADAP PENEGASAN HIEARAKI PERATURAN PERUNDANG-UNDANGAN DI INDONESIA DALAM PERSPEKTIF STUFEN THEORIE

2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 95
Author(s):  
Muhammad Yusrizal Adi Syaputra
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Legal System ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
House Of Representatives ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
State Institutions ◽  
Binding Force ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Legal Uncertainty

Rule lower against the rules of higher then lower regulation it can test the material (judicial review) to be canceled entirely or partially canceled. The assertion of hierarchy intended to prevent overlap between legislation that could give rise to legal uncertainty. Position regulations set by the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) House of Representatives (DPR), the Regional Representatives Council (DPD), the Supreme Court (MA), the Constitutional Court (MK), the Supreme Audit Agency (BPK), Commission Judicial (KY) , Bank Indonesia (BI), the Minister, the Agency, Organization, or commissions, in the Indonesian legal system recognized by Act No. 12 of 2011 either were born because of higher regulatory mandate and within the scope and authority of the minister. Thus, no doubt that the regulations set by state institutions, have binding force that must be obeyed by the parties set forth therein. While the Regulations issued policy also recognized as an Freies Ermessen in the execution of its duties and functions.<br /><br />

scholarly journals Penerapan Asas Audi Alteram Et Partem Pada Perkara Judicial review Di Mahkamah Agung

2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 37
Author(s):  
Asep Syarifuddin Hidayat
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Judicial Power ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
The Public ◽  
Trial Process ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Impact

Abstract.Article 13 paragraph 1 of Act Number 48 of 2009 concerning Judicial Power states that all court hearings are open to the public, unless the Act says otherwise. Therefore, a judicial review trial must be open to the public. If the trial process of the judicial review is carried out in a closed manner, it can be considered a legal defect, because it is contrary to Article 13 paragraph (3) of the Law. The Law of the Supreme Court is not regulated that the judicial review is closed, because in the judicial review there is a need for openness or principle of audiences of parties or litigants must be given the opportunity to provide information and express their opinions, including the defendant as the maker of Legislation invitation under the law, so that the impact of the decision will need to be involved.Keywords: Judicial Review, Audi Alteram Et Partem Principle, Supreme Court, Constitutional Court Abstrak.Pasal 13 ayat 1 Undang-Undang Nomor 48 Tahun 2009 tentang Kekuasaan Kehakiman menyebutkan semua sidang pemeriksaan pengadilan terbuka untuk umum, kecuali Undang-Undang berkata lain. Oleh karena itu,  judicial review persidangan harus dilakukan terbuka untuk umum. Apabila proses persidangan judicial review ini dilakukan secara tertutup, maka dapat dinilai cacat hukum karena bertentangan dengan Pasal 13 ayat (3) Undang-Undang tersebut. Undang-Undang Mahkamah Agung pun tidak diatur bahwa persidangan judicial review bersifat tertutup, karena dalam judicial review perlu adanya keterbukaan atau asas audi alteram et partem atau pihak-pihak yang berperkara harus diberi kesempatan untuk memberikan keterangan dan menyampaikan pendapatnya termasuk pihak termohon sebagai  pembuat Peraturan Perundang-Undangan di bawah Undang-Undang sehingga akan terkena dampak putusan perlu dilibatkan.Kata Kunci: Judicial Review, Asas Audi Alteram Et Partem, Mahkamah Agung, Mahkamah Konstitusi.

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