scholarly journals SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND THE SAME OLD CONSTITUTION*

2011 ◽  
Vol 14 (2 & 3) ◽  
pp. 2005
Author(s):  
Ronalda Murphy

The Reference re Same-Sex Marriage1 is not a major opinion on the rights of same-sex couples in Canada, but it is nonetheless an important and fascinating case. There are only a few lines that are about the “rights” of same-sex couples. Did the Supreme Court of Canada “duck” the issue? Was the Court carefully gauging how much or little political capital it had and making a political decision to say as little as possible on this topic? The Court certainly displayed strategic brilliance, but it did not do so in the name of avoiding the “political” hot topic of same-sex marriage. It is factually difficult to maintain the view that the Supreme Court of Canada is loath to enter into this political debate. It has been the lead social institution in Canada in terms of responding to the claims of gays and lesbians to equality in law,2 and it has never been shy of dealing with topics simply because they involve controversial political issues.3 Rather, the Court’s brilliance lies in its minimalist and almost weary tone. This approach had the effect of taking the wind out of the sails of those opposed to same-sex marriage: the same-sex advocates definitely win the constitutional race, but they do so because according to the Supreme Court, there is no provincial constitutional headwind that can stop them. In short, provinces can complain all they want about the federal position in favour of same-sex marriage, but the wedding will go on despite and over their objections to the ceremony.

1969 ◽  
pp. 393
Author(s):  
Ron Levy

"Expressive harms " are rights violations that may arise from governmental expression through laws or state action, even absent material or otherwise tangible harms. Same-sex marriage provides an example: having won rights to most marriage- related economic benefits in M. v. H., gays and lesbians nevertheless fought for state recognition of their marriages in Halpern v. Canada The author delineates three conceptions of expressive harms. Among these are what may be termed "direct dignity harms"; on this conception, some forms of state expression exert effects upon human dignity without intermediate steps (for example, stereotyping) or ultimate material consequences (for example, exclusion from benefits). The author provides, in particular, an account of direct-dignity expressive harms and relates this account to the equality jurisprudence of s. 15 of the Charter. Finally, the author shows how the Supreme Court of Canada has implicitly incorporated expressive insights within s. 15, but suggests that the Court has done so with some incoherence. By failing to make explicit its reliance on several expressive and other rationales, the Court has produced an equality test with requirements derived from various conflated equality approaches, rendering the test unnecessarily onerous for some claimants.


Author(s):  
E. Patrick Johnson

This chapter probes the narrators’ deep and enduring emotional and romantic attachments to other women, primarily by focusing on stories of dating and marriage. Johnson’s interlocutors recall: stories of how they met their partners, memories of particular dates, their family’s responses to their relationships, and, for some of them, how and when they decided to pursue marriage. Importantly, Johnson notes that all of these interviews took place before the Supreme Court case that legalized same-sex marriage across the nation in 2015. Despite the legal limits of partnership in Southern states, several of these women chose to remain in the region. Their choices reflect the need to think expansively about the possibilities for queer life for Black women in the South.


Author(s):  
Wendy A. Adams

SummaryThe distinction between formal and essential validity in Anglo-Canadian choice of law regarding marriage is an illogical bifurcation that unnecessarily invalidates same-sex relationships contracted in foreign jurisdictions. The Supreme Court of Canada has recently reformulated certain rules of private international law, taking into account both the constitutional and sub-constitutional imperatives inherent in a federal setting and the need for order and fairness when co-ordinating diversity in the face of increasing globalization. Reform of the choice of law rules regarding the validity of foreign marriages should proceed accordingly with the result being that a marriage valid where celebrated is valid everywhere. No principled reason exists to deny recognition to same-sex relationships validly contracted in other jurisdictions, nor to differentiate between the rights and obligations arising from the legal status of same-sex and different-sex relationships.


2019 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 153-178 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charlotte Smith

Some scholars, faced with the apparent conflict between the Church of England's teaching on marriage and the idea of equal marriage embraced by the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013, have focused on the implications of that Act for the constitutional relationship between Church, State and nation. More frequently, noting the position of the Church of England under that Act, academics have critiqued the legislation as an exercise in balancing competing human rights. This article by contrast, leaving behind a tendency to treat religion as a monolithic ‘other’, and leaving behind the neat binaries of rights-based analyses, interrogates the internal agonies of the Church of England as it has striven to negotiate an institutional response to the secular legalisation of same-sex marriage. It explores the struggles of the Church to do so in a manner which holds in balance a wide array of doctrinal positions and the demands of mission, pastoral care and the continued apostolic identity of the Church of England.


Author(s):  
Emily R. Gill

Tension has long existed in the United State between the equality claims of LGBT individuals, on the one hand, and free exercise claims by those who hold that compelling equal treatment violates their convictions, on the other. This tension increased, however, after the United States Supreme Court extended marriage equality to same-sex couples nationwide. Equality advocates hold that antidiscrimination laws simply allow LGBT individuals to enjoy the same rights as others. Many religious advocates, however, believe that they are being prohibited from living out the implications of their conscientious beliefs. Neutrality between these conflicting claims cannot be achieved, as policies that appear neutral to one group appear non-neutral to the other. Private voluntary organizations are one site of conflict. Although private organizations should not typically be forced to reflect the values of the larger society, not all organizations are similarly situated within it. Groups such as the Boy Scouts should be able to exclude at will. Public authority does not itself always support the values of free and equal citizenship, and organizations may evolve over time as the Scouts itself has done. Organizations that exist within larger entities, however, fall into a different category. The Supreme Court was correct to uphold Hastings Law School in forcing the Christian Legal Society as a registered student organization to admit all comers. These groups also represent the values of a public entity and can continue to operate as independent entities if they so choose. The provision of services in connection with same-sex weddings and commitment ceremonies has been another site of conflict. In Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop (2015), the Supreme Court found narrowly that bakery owner Phillips could refuse to create cakes for same-sex wedding celebrations, as the state of Colorado had displayed animus toward Phillips’s religious beliefs. Commercial establishments, however, are public accommodations and generally should not be allowed to discriminate against customers on the basis of their identities. Discrimination against the activity or conduct of formal commitment is also discrimination against the identity or status of a same-sex couple. These kinds of cases do not admit of neutral solutions. Some suggest that those with religious reservations could advertise that they do not serve same-sex couples, but this is reminiscent of Jim Crow in the post–Civil War South. Jurisdictional pluralists suggest that the government designate a sphere of noninterference as a jurisdictional boundary that it will not cross. Thus individuals and associations with religious commitments would be free to pursue these interests with minimal interference. However, a prior authoritative structure must exist to define the nature and scope of this jurisdiction, just as the Constitution defines the relationships between the national government and the states. Applications for religious exemptions should not be treated more generously when they conflict with LGBT equality concerns than with equality claims based on race or gender. Although religious individuals and groups should be able to exercise their religious convictions within their areas of competence, in a liberal society and state they cannot define the limits of these areas.


2013 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 83-86
Author(s):  
Philip Morris

In his April Presidential Address the Archbishop focused on two issues: the Report of the Review Group chaired by Lord Harries and same-sex marriage. His concern with the Review is that ‘it is possible to get so bogged down or hung up on some of the details of the Provincial Review that there is a danger in dismissing all of it because one disagrees with some of the points it makes’. He regretted that churches with ordained clergy ‘have been tempted to assume that all ministry is vested in an omnicompetent professional minister’ and reminded his listeners that the basic sacrament of the Church was not ordination but baptism. His concern with the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Bill was that clergy who would not conduct same-sex marriages needed protection, yet the Church itself needed to be allowed to conduct such marriages if it decided to do so in future. He felt that the Church ‘needed to have a discussion as to whether we want to continue having this special status in law as far as marriage is concerned’.


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