Enforcement of Divorce Judgments in Jewish Courts in Israel: The Interaction Between Religious and Constitutional Law

2012 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-68 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yehiel S. Kaplan
Keyword(s):  
Policy Analysis ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Human Dignity ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
The State ◽  
Coercive Measures ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
State Of Israel ◽  
Do So

In the State of Israel, Rabbinical courts are granted sole jurisdiction in the adjudication of marriage and divorce of Jews. In these courts, the husband presents the divorce writ of Jews, the get, to his wife on the occasion of their divorce at the end of the adjudication process. When Jews sue for divorce in Rabbinical courts, the courts occasionally determine that the man should grant his wife a get or that the wife should accept the get granted by her husband. Sometimes one spouse disobeys the ruling. Although the Rabbinical courts occasionally impose sanctions in an attempt to enforce divorce judgments, they are generally reluctant to do so. The implementation of inappropriate measures can lead to the conclusion that a given divorce is in fact a legally ineffectual coerced divorce. Consequently, the Jewish courts occasionally delay the imposition of these sanctions out of concern that inappropriate coercive measures invalidate the get, rendering the couple still legally married. The Supreme Court of Israel has ruled, though, that the Rabbinical courts in Israel should act in light of the constitutional principles in Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom. However, the Supreme Court of Israel has not clearly or specifically addressed the balance between the rights and obligations of the husband and wife in the process of enforcing divorce judgments, neither before nor after the enactment of the of the two important constitutional Basic Laws enacted in 1992. A detailed policy analysis of the sanctions against recalcitrant spouses in Rabbinical courts in Israel—in light of the principles of Jewish and constitutional law in the country—has not yet been undertaken. The aim of this essay is therefore to present the appropriate formula pertaining to the imposition of sanctions against recalcitrant spouses given the principles of Jewish and constitutional law. The formula is presented in light of constitutional law in Israel. However, it is also applicable in other countries with similar constitutional legislation, such as Canada, where legislation sometimes allows for the civil enforcement of Jewish divorce.

Leading Decisions of the Supreme Court of Israel and Extracts of the Judgment

1997 ◽  
Vol 31 (4) ◽  
pp. 754-802 ◽  
Author(s):  
Omi
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Human Dignity ◽  
Supreme Court Decision ◽  
Court Decision ◽  
District Court ◽  
Conditional Release ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Law ◽  
State Of Israel

Ganimat v. The State of Israel (1995) 49(iv) P.D. 589.The appellant was indicted in the Jerusalem Magistrate Court for two incidents of car theft. His detention was requested on the grounds that he posed a “danger to society”. The Magistrate Court agreed to his arrest, holding that a custom has been established whereby custody may be justified in crimes which have become “a nationwide scourge”, including car theft. The District Court rejected the appeal. The appellant was granted permission to appeal the decision in the Supreme Court (decision of Dorner J. and Barak J.; Cheshin J. dissenting) and his conditional release was ordered. However, it was decided to hold Special Proceedings in order to discuss some of the important issues raised by the case. The principal constitutional question raised by the case was whether the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty influences the interpretation of the existing law, in the present case, the law of arrest as regulated by the Law of Criminal Procedure.

The Israeli Unfinished Constitutional Revolution: Has the Time Come for Protecting Economic and Social Rights?

2004 ◽  
Vol 37 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 299-345 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yoram Rabin ◽  
Yuval Shany
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Hard Core ◽  
Social Rights ◽  
Cultural Rights ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Status ◽  
Interpretive Strategies ◽  
The Right

AbstractThis article addresses the constitutional discourse surrounding the status of economic and social rights in Israel. It examines the principal interpretive strategies adopted by the Supreme Court with regard to the 1992 basic laws (in particular, with respect to the right to human dignity) and criticizes the Court's reluctance to apply analogous strategies to incorporate economic and social rights into Israeli constitutional law. Potential explanations for this biased approach are also critically discussed. The ensuing outcome is a constitutional imbalance in Israeli law, which perpetuates the unjustified view that economic and social rights are inherently inferior to their civil and political counterparts, and puts in question Israel's compliance with its obligations under the International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. At the same time, encouraging recent Supreme Court decisions, particularly the YATED and Marciano judgments, indicate growing acceptance on the part of the Court of the role of economic and social rights in Israeli constitutional law, and raise hopes for a belated judicial change of heart concerning the need to protect at least a ‘hard core’ of economic and social rights. Still, the article posits that the possibilities of promoting the constitutional status of economic and social rights through case-to-case litigation are limited and calls for the renewal of the legislation procedures of draft Basic Law: Social Rights in the Knesset.

The Application of Presumptions to the Derivative forms of an Offence

1968 ◽  
Vol 3 (4) ◽  
pp. 562-578 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. Z. Feller
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
The State ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Legal Problems ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
State Of Israel

Both the facts of The State of Israel v. Siman Tov, and the solution adopted in that case by the Supreme Court, raise, it is felt, a number of legal problems which warrant particular attention.The respondent, Siman Tov, owner of a grocer's shop, sold goods worth IL. 6,000 on credit to someone called Pressman. When Siman Tov requested payment from Pressman, the latter offered him U.S. $4,000 which Siman Tov was to deposit with a third party of his own choice in return for a loan of IL. 12,000, on the understanding that Siman Tov would deduct the money owing to him from this last sum and hand over the balance of IL. 6,000 to Pressman. Siman Tov accepted the offer and received from Pressman a package containing 4,000 ostensibly genuine dollar banknotes. He then approached a neighbour, Binat, who agreed to accept the dollars as security for a loan of the equivalent sum in Israeli pounds. On examining the package and finding that the dollars were counterfeit, Binat returned them to Siman Tov and refused to go on with the transaction. Siman Tov for his part had believed the notes to be genuine until Binat's disclosure.

Historical Adjudication: Courts of Law, Commissions of Inquiry, and “Historical Truth”

2000 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 559-606 ◽  
Author(s):  
Asher Maoz
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Jesus Christ ◽  
The State ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Commissions Of Inquiry ◽  
Historical Truth ◽  
State Of Israel

When the State of Israel was established and the Supreme Court inaugurated in Jerusalem, dozens of Christian clerics implored President Smoira to allow the Supreme Court, as the successor of the Great Sanhedrin, the supreme Jewish court during the time of Roman rule, to retry Jesus Christ and thereby rectify the injustice caused to him.

The Impact of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty on the Law of Criminal Procedure and Evidence

1999 ◽  
Vol 33 (3) ◽  
pp. 678-719 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eliahu Harnon
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Human Dignity ◽  
Criminal Procedure ◽  
Social Background ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Law ◽  
Constitutional Right ◽  
Law Of Evidence ◽  
The Impact

In March 1992, Israel's Parliament, the Knesset, enacted Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. Some believe that this Basic Law has created a constitutional revolution in Israel, while others feel this view to be exaggerated. In any event, there is general agreement that the Basic Law, with its 13 brief sections, has effected many significant changes in numerous areas of law.It is well known that criminal procedure and some parts of the law of evidence are particularly sensitive to constitutional changes. To what extent is this also true in Israel as a consequence of the Basic Law and interpretations given to it?More particularly, what precisely does the Basic Law say, and what has the Supreme Court inferred from the principles of human dignity and liberty beyond the express provisions of the Basic Law? What influence does the Basic Law exert on new legislation and indeed on legislation preceding the enactment of the Basic Law itself? May one expect that the Supreme Court will adopt the idea that the Basic Law embodies an exclusionary rule of evidence obtained in breach of a constitutional right? These, and other relevant questions, will be discussed below. First, however, we shall refer briefly to the legal and social background of the Basic Law.

The Constitutionalization of the Israeli Legal System as a Result of the Basic Laws and its Effect on Procedural and Substantive Criminal Law

1997 ◽  
Vol 31 (1-3) ◽  
pp. 3-23 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aharon Barak
Keyword(s):  
Criminal Law ◽  
Case Law ◽  
The State ◽  
Constitutional Democracy ◽  
Human Right ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Constitutional Revolution ◽  
State Of Israel ◽  
Normative Value

In March 1992, Israel underwent a Constitutional Revolution. In March 1992, two new Basic Laws were passed: Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation and Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. Under these new Basic Laws, several human rights — among them Dignity, Liberty, Mobility, Privacy, Property — acquired a constitutional force above the regular statutes. Most of these rights were already protected, prior to the constitutionalization. While a few were protected by the legislator, most were protected by the case law of the Supreme Court, developed by some of our greatest judges since the establishment of the State. The main difference made by the Basic Laws is the strengthening of the normative value of these rights. A regular Knesset (Parliamentary) statute can no longer infringe upon these rights, unless it fulfils the requirements of the Basic Laws (the ‘limitation clause’) namely, it befits the values of the State of Israel, it was passed for a worthy purpose and the harm caused to the constitutional Human Right is proportional to the purpose. Thus, we became a constitutional democracy.

Fantasies of Liberalism and Liberal Jurisprudence: State Law, Politics, and the Israeli Arab-Palestinian Community

2000 ◽  
Vol 34 (3) ◽  
pp. 425-451 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gad Barzilai
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Human Dignity ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Legal Culture ◽  
Social Needs ◽  
Judicial Activism ◽  
New Era ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
The Social ◽  
The Supreme Court

Some thirty years after the Bergman decision, Israel's constitutional structure and legal culture are still not responsive to minority needs or, more broadly, to the social needs of deprived communities. The liberal language and judicial review of Knesset legislation that were empowered by Bergman have not reconciled this problematic discrepancy between jurisprudence and social needs.The Bergman ruling signified the onset of a new era in Israel jurisprudence — the era of liberalism, in that it generated the notion of judicial counter-majoritarianism as the center, however problematic, of democracy. It was a modest ruling and a careful one, dwelling only on procedural deficiencies as cause for judicial abrogation of parliamentary legislation. Later on, after 1992, and propelled by the spirit of judicial activism, the Supreme Court adopted a more expansive judicial policy. It asserted the need for much more active judicial review of the substance of Knesset legislation and even the possibility of annulling it if it fell within the provisions of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom and the Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation.

Exile within the United States

1965 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 22-29
Author(s):  
Brent T. Lynch
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Public Policy ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
The United States ◽  
The State ◽  
Prison Inmates ◽  
Federal Constitution ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Executive Agency

The Utah Board of Pardons, an executive agency, releases some Utah prison inmates by an order of "conditional termina tion," which directs the recipient to leave the state immediately and remain away permanently. The Supreme Court of Utah has recently held this order to be valid and constitutional, a ruling attacked by this article, which cites cases wherein rights guaranteed by the federal Constitution are violated. Public policy, sound penology, and constitutional law all militate against use of conditional termination.

Nine The President and the Judiciary

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fisher Louis
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
National Security ◽  
The State ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Advisory Opinions ◽  
State Secrets ◽  
Do So

This chapter discusses the following: the case of Marbury v. Madison (1803) which has been cited as evidence that the Supreme Court has the authority to not only strike down the acts of Presidents, Congress, and the states but to do so permanently; independent presidential judgment; advisory opinions; nominating judges, recess appointments; FDR's court-packing; national security and judicial deference; and the state secrets privilege.

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