Punitive Administrative Sanctions After the Treaty of Lisbon: Does Administrative Really Mean Administrative?

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 156-176
Author(s):  
Markus Kärner

This article analyses the dichotomy between administrative and criminal sanctions in European Union law and aims to establish which limits do the policy goals of the European Union set for the national transposition of administrative sanctions as opposed to criminal sanctions. The article discusses the difficulties in differentiating between administrative and criminal sanctions and gives an overview of the evolution of the European Union sanctioning system from the early competence disputes to the rationale behind the post-Lisbon parallel harmonisation of criminal and administrative sanctions. The final part of the article uses these findings along with the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice to ascertain the key requirements for transposing European Union administrative sanctions into national law, namely whether the policy goals of the European Union require the formal non-criminal classification of the sanction as a way of negative harmonisation of criminal law.

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Bridgette K. McLellan

<p>European Union citizenship was established by the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992. Intended to fall within the exclusive prerogative of the Member States, it soon became clear that the autonomy of Member States to determine matters relating to nationality would be restricted by the ever-expansive reach of the European Court of Justice. As such, the European Court of Justice transformed the law on citizenship in the 2010 case of Rottmann where measures affecting or depriving the rights conferred and protected by the European Union were held to fall within the scope ratione materiae of European Union law. While Rottmann affirmed the law as to the deprivation of European Union citizenship, it left unanswered the question whether the acquisition of nationality also falls within the scope of European Union law. This paper aims to identify and analyse the law arising post-Rottmann to determine whether the acquisition of nationality could fall within the scope of European Union law. It shall then analyse whether fundamental principles of European Union law, namely the principle of proportionality, could be applied in order to regulate the conditions imposed by Member States in relation to the acquisition of nationality.</p>


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Bridgette K. McLellan

<p>European Union citizenship was established by the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992. Intended to fall within the exclusive prerogative of the Member States, it soon became clear that the autonomy of Member States to determine matters relating to nationality would be restricted by the ever-expansive reach of the European Court of Justice. As such, the European Court of Justice transformed the law on citizenship in the 2010 case of Rottmann where measures affecting or depriving the rights conferred and protected by the European Union were held to fall within the scope ratione materiae of European Union law. While Rottmann affirmed the law as to the deprivation of European Union citizenship, it left unanswered the question whether the acquisition of nationality also falls within the scope of European Union law. This paper aims to identify and analyse the law arising post-Rottmann to determine whether the acquisition of nationality could fall within the scope of European Union law. It shall then analyse whether fundamental principles of European Union law, namely the principle of proportionality, could be applied in order to regulate the conditions imposed by Member States in relation to the acquisition of nationality.</p>


2021 ◽  
Vol 27 (3) ◽  
pp. 249-256
Author(s):  
Georgiy D. Travin

This article analyses construction and application of the “good faith” concept by the European Court of Justice. Historically having played an important role in the national law of the EU member states the term functions with a similar but not identical purpose on the supranational level within the European Union law. Topicality of the referenced practices is based on the EU’s leading role in the general globalisation and unification of substantive law. After an analysis of the European Court of Justice judgements constructing EU Secondary law provisions which refer to “good faith” the role said construction plays in regulation of civil matters in the European Union as a supranational authority is outlined. Case law on matters concerning consumer protection and intellectual property are analysed and a conclusion on probability of applying foreign practices to Russian law is made.


2020 ◽  
pp. 100-130
Author(s):  
Nigel Foster

This chapter examines the forms and sources of European Union (EU) law. It describes the nature of the EU legal system and discusses the classification of various elements of EU law, which include institutional laws, procedural laws, and substantive laws. It explains that the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) are the principal sources of law for the Union. Other sources include regulations, Directives, procedural requirements, and international agreements and conventions. This chapter also discusses the contribution of the European Court of Justice (CJEU) to the sources of EU law.


Author(s):  
Nigel Foster

This chapter examines the forms and sources of European Union (EU) law. It describes the nature of the EU legal system and discusses the classification of various elements of EU law, which include institutional laws, procedural laws, and substantive laws. It explains that the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) are the principal sources of law for the Union. Other sources include regulations, Directives, procedural requirements, and international agreements and conventions. This chapter also discusses the contribution of the European Court of Justice (CoJ) to the sources of EU law.


2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (2-2019) ◽  
pp. 419-433
Author(s):  
Stefanie Vedder

National high courts in the European Union (EU) are constantly challenged: the European Court of Justice (ECJ) claims the authority to declare national standing interpretations invalid should it find them incompatible with its views on EU law. This principle noticeably impairs the formerly undisputed sovereignty of national high courts. In addition, preliminary references empower lower courts to question interpretations established by their national ‘superiors’. Assuming that courts want to protect their own interests, the article presumes that national high courts develop strategies to elude the breach of their standing interpretations. Building on principal-agent theory, the article proposes that national high courts can use the level of (im-) precision in the wording of the ECJ’s judgements to continue applying their own interpretations. The article develops theoretical strategies for national high courts in their struggle for authority.


2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (5) ◽  
pp. 1073-1098 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mattias Derlén ◽  
Johan Lindholm

AbstractThe case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) is one of the most important sources of European Union law. However, case law's role in EU law is not uniform. By empirically studying how the Court uses its own case law as a source of law, we explore the correlation between, on the one hand, the characteristics of a CJEU case—type of action, actors involved, and area of law—and, on the other hand, the judgment's “embeddedness” in previous case law and value as a precedent in subsequent cases. Using this approach, we test, confirm, and debunk existing scholarship concerning the role of CJEU case law as a source of EU law. We offer the following conclusions: that CJEU case law cannot be treated as a single entity; that only a limited number of factors reliably affect a judgment's persuasive or precedential power; that the Court's use of its own case law as a source of law is particularly limited in successful infringement proceedings; that case law is particularly important in preliminary references—especially those concerning fundamental freedoms and competition law; and that initiating Member State and the number of observations affects the behavior of the Court.


2004 ◽  
Vol 6 ◽  
pp. 1-34
Author(s):  
Anthony Arnull

The purpose of this article is to consider the effect of the draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe on the European Court of Justice (ECJ). At the time of writing, the future of the draft Constitution is somewhat uncertain. Having been finalised by the Convention on the Future of Europe in the summer of 2003 and submitted to the then President of the European Council, it formed the basis for discussion at an intergovernmental conference (IGC) which opened in October 2003. Hopes that the text might be finalised by the end of the year were dashed when a meeting of the IGC in Brussels in December 2003 ended prematurely amid disagreement over the weighting of votes in the Council. However, it seems likely that a treaty equipping the European Union with a Constitution based on the Convention’s draft will in due course be adopted and that the provisions of the draft dealing with the ECJ will not be changed significantly. Even if either assumption proves misplaced, those provisions will remain of interest as reflecting one view of the position the ECJ might occupy in a constitutional order of the Union.


2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-23
Author(s):  
Marija Daka

The paper presents some of the most relevant aspects of European nondiscrimination law established th rough European Union law and the European Convention on Human Rights, looking also at the evolution of the norms and milestones of case-law on equal treatment within the two systems. The paper gives an overview of the non-discrimination concept as interpreted by the Court of Justice of the European Union and by the European Court of Human Rights. We examine the similar elements but also give insight into conceptual differences between the two human rights regimes when dealing with equal treatment. The differences mainly stem from the more complex approach taken by EU law although, based on analysed norms, cases, and provisions, the aspects of equal treatment in EU law are largely consistent with the practice of the ECtHR. Lastly, the paper briefl y places the European non-discrimination law within the multi-layered human rights system, giving some food for thought for the future potential this concept brings.


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