In this essay, Matheron turns to Ethics IV, 37 Scholium 2, where Spinoza discusses the role of the State in managing the affects and passions of individuals. But despite a potential misreading of these passages, Matheron argues the State exists neither for the sake of obliging individuals to pursue rational ends nor for ensuring the realisation of pre-determined ethical ends that would belong to a fixed “human nature.” Spinoza’s radical critique of teleology prohibits precisely any such view for it does not fix any ends humans ought to pursue and, in so doing, it strips the State of having any fixed ethical function. Part IV of the Ethics, on this view, is not a normative account of how humans should live, but rather theorizes how they would life in the event that they were guided only by reason. In such a case, however, the state would instantaneously dissolve since humans would spontaneously agree with one another without any need for political institutions. For Matheron, the Spinozist philosopher can take up many positions with respect to particular States and legal orders, since their aim will always be to advocate for a society whose laws ensure peace and stability.