Interessenkonflikte bei kollektiven Vermögensverwaltern und Stimmrechtsberatern

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicholas P. Schoch

Based on the new disclosure requirements for institutional investors, asset managers and proxy advisors introduced in the course of the implementation of Directive (EU) 2017/828, the study deals with the participation-related conflicts of interest of collective asset managers and proxy advisors, their treatment under European and national law to date, and the regulatory system of the Shareholder Rights Directive. On this basis, the question is examined to what extent the area under research requires further regulation. The focus is on the systemisation of the previous as well as the new conflict-related regulatory concept and, following on from this, the channelling of future legislative revisions.

2013 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 857-863
Author(s):  
Christophe Volonté ◽  
Simon Zaby

The influence exerted by proxy advisors or proxy firms has become significantly more important over the last few years in pace with the increased activity of institutional investors. Recently, the adoption of a Swiss referendum has given fresh impetus to this development, concerning also international stockholders in the country. Spill-over effects to the regulations of neighbor countries are not unlikely. Given this context, it is essential that the role of proxy advisory services and the associated stakeholders be critically appraised. Substantial problems may arouse with regard to the methodology that proxy advisors apply, the conflicts of interest that they confront, the transparency of their services or the lack thereof, and the competition in their market.


2021 ◽  
pp. 103237322098623
Author(s):  
Damien Lambert

Prior research in corporate governance has extensively investigated the mechanisms through which a variety of actors (financial analysts, investment managers, shareholder activists) monitor and discipline corporate executives. However, one recently emerged actor has received little attention so far: the proxy advisory firm. Mobilising Foucault’s concept of disciplinary power, this study uses historical analysis to examine the role of proxy advisors in corporate governance. This article shows that proxy advisors actively contributed to developing and implementing disciplinary mechanisms. This involves (1) hierarchical observations of corporations and their executives on a global scale. These observations are made available to institutional investors on proxy advisors’ voting platforms which have Panopticon-like features; (2) normalisation of judgements through the provision of generic voting policies, generic voting recommendations and corporate governance ratings prepared by proxy advisors and delivered to many institutional investors; (3) ritualised examination of the performance of corporations and of their executives during the annual general meeting, including record-keeping of all past voting results.


Author(s):  
Helen Campbell Pickford

The adoption of the Economics of Mutuality will depend on institutional investors promoting it through active engaged investing. Chapter 18 describes how some investment funds are taking an active role in managing the companies in which they are invested. It involves them acquiring significant blocks of shares that are held for extended periods of time and managed directly by asset owners themselves instead of by intermediary asset managers. Critical to this is the way in which the performance of their investments is monitored and measured. Alongside measuring financial performance over longer periods of time than is conventionally the case, performance needs to be assessed in relation to other indicators of performance related to human, social, and natural capital.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jan Fichtner

During the last decades, institutional investors gained an ever more important position as managers of assets and owners of corporations. By demanding (short-term) shareholder value, some of them have driven the financialization of corporations and of the financial sector itself. This chapter first characterizes the specific roles that private equity funds, hedge funds, and mutual funds have played in this development. It then moves on to focus on one group of institutional investors that is rapidly becoming a pivotal factor for corporate control in many countries – the “Big Three” large passive asset managers BlackRock, Vanguard and State Street.


2021 ◽  
pp. 138826272110303
Author(s):  
Ewan McGaughey

The quality of democracy in our economy depends on the governance of capital, but Europeans are still deprived of real voice over their retirement money: the single biggest source of capital in the 21st century. This paper outlines three major problems facing EU pensions: precarious retirement, escalating inequality, and mounting climate damage. These problems start with the places where we work, the institutions that control our retirement savings, and the votes on shares that come with them. The central argument is that pensions will only be sustainable once they are democratically, prudently, and loyally governed. First, member states have wide experience with co-determination in capital funds, which can inform the basis of minimum standards in EU law for ‘pension fund democracy’. Second, a growing number of investment rules draw upon Member States’ fiduciary duties and standards for prudence or care; but, these do not yet codify the requirement that beneficiaries’ environmental, social, and governance preferences are followed. Third, votes on shares - bought with pension fund assets - are still being cast by banks and asset managers who manage ‘other people’s money’. This is a serious problem because banks and asset managers have interests that systematically conflict with the ultimate investors: they vote in companies on other people’s money and, at the same time, sell financial products (e.g., pensions) to those companies. The problems are soluble with careful amendments to existing policy that ensure elected representatives of pension beneficiaries are the sole determinants of voting policies, with prudence and no conflicts of interest. A draft EU Directive, based upon emerging best practice, is proposed.


2019 ◽  
Vol 94 (5) ◽  
pp. 319-348 ◽  
Author(s):  
Albert Tsang ◽  
Fei Xie ◽  
Xiangang Xin

ABSTRACT We examine the impact of foreign institutional investors on firms' voluntary disclosure practices measured by management forecasts. In a sample of 32 non-U.S. countries, we find that, on average, foreign institutional investments lead to improved voluntary disclosure, and their impact is larger than that of domestic institutional investors. These results are more pronounced when foreign institutional investors (1) are unfamiliar with the firm's home country, (2) have longer investment horizons, and (3) are from countries with stronger investor protection and disclosure requirements than the firm's home country. However, we also find some evidence of voluntary disclosure deterioration in firms with foreign institutional investors from countries with inferior disclosure requirements and securities regulations and with concentrated foreign institutional ownership. Overall, our results suggest that the relation between foreign institutional investors and voluntary disclosure is much richer and more complex than what has been documented for domestic institutional investors in the literature.


2019 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 279-304
Author(s):  
Petrina Tjin Yi TAN

AbstractInstitutional investors are acknowledged as an influential force in markets worldwide. As a result of increased focus on the impact from the investing and shareholding practices of institutional investors, stewardship codes were first introduced in the UK, followed by Malaysia. This article evaluates the theory and practice of institutional investor stewardship in Malaysia through functional and contextual lenses, as juxtaposed against the more established position of stewardship in the UK. Notwithstanding an analogous legal framework for shareholder rights and the textual similarities of the UK Stewardship Code and Malaysian Code for Institutional Investors, the dominance of government-linked investment companies and government-linked companies in Malaysia results in a distinct set of issues in relation to institutional investor stewardship. This article then argues that the stewardship codes are in themselves insufficient in increasing the quality and scope of institutional investor engagement as they fail to address the underlying agency conflicts between the institutional investors and ultimate beneficiaries or clients. In learning from the UK's experience, it is important that Malaysian policymakers pay attention to the overarching structural factors and incentives driving institutional investor engagement alongside the development and take-up of the stewardship code.


Blood ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 126 (23) ◽  
pp. SCI-28-SCI-28
Author(s):  
Scott Worthen ◽  
Junjie Mei ◽  
Yuhong Liu ◽  
Hitesh Deshmukh

Abstract The microbiome regulates the development of innate immunity G. Scott Worthen, Junjie Mei, Yuhong Liu, Ning Dai, Hitesh Deshmukh Circulating granulocytes are maintained within a fairly narrow window for each individual during homeostasis. This regulatory system is nonetheless capable of dramatic shifts during stress. The mechanisms that govern control over granulocyte number remain incompletely understood. Recent information, however, provides clues to the feedback control systems that regulate homeostatic and emergency granulopoiesis. The first clues have come from adult mice with abnormalities in granulocyte function. Defects in Leukocyte Integrins or chemokine receptors result in marked increases in circulating (?2 integrin) or bone marrow (Cxcr2) neutrophils, associated with increased circulating IL-17 and G-CSF. This result appears to be due to a functional inability to arrive at sentinel site(s) whence they are attracted by (among others) Cxcl5. Strikingly, a single infusion of normal WT neutrophils resets this feedback loop. One signal for expression of IL-17 and G-CSF appears to be the gut microbiome. Antibiotic treatment also resets the system, reducing neutrophil numbers and cytokine expression. Thus, at sentinel site(s), the supply of functional neutrophils is balanced against perceived threat from the microbiome. In neonates, exposure to commensal organisms is an immediate result of birth from a sterile environment into a dirty one. We have described postnatal granulopoiesis in murine neonates, a dramatic increase in circulating and bone marrow neutrophils, that lasts for 5-7 days. Human infants similarly have been shown to demonstrate a postnatal increase in circulating neutrophils for 72 hrs after birth. Antibiotic-exposed mouse pups fail to develop postnatal granulopoiesis, as do mice deficient in IL17ra, MyD88, TLR4, or G-CSF even if not exposed to antibiotics, indicating a pathway that requires exposure to LPS that induces IL17 and G-CSF, as in adults. In contrast to adults, however, commensal bacteria are required for host defense. Antibiotic-exposed pups are exquisitely sensitive to E. coli sepsis, which can be partially reversed by transfer of cecal contents or exogenous G-CSF. Furthermore, small quantities of LPS, fed by gavage, can also partially protect. Thus, neonates use exposure to commensal bacteria and their products to trigger the rapid expansion and functional maturation of granulocyte development, and in so doing, prepare the neonate for potential exposure to pathogens. Adults maintain this system, where it is at least partially responsible for maintenance of granulocyte homeostasis. Disclosures No relevant conflicts of interest to declare.


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