Hume on Laws and Miracles

2018 ◽  
Vol 92 (4) ◽  
pp. 563-581
Author(s):  
Nathan Rockwood ◽  

Hume famously argues that our past experience of the laws of nature provide us with decisive reason to believe that any testimony of a miracle is false. In this paper, I argue that the laws of nature, as such, give us no reason at all to believe that the testimony of a miracle is false. I first argue that Hume’s proof is unsuccessful if we assume the Humean view of laws, and then I argue that Hume’s proof is unsuccessful even if we assume a governing view of laws. I conclude that regardless of which kind of view we adopt, the fact that a miracle is a violation of the laws of nature does not give us any reason to believe it did not happen.

Metaphysica ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 51-71
Author(s):  
Andrei A. Buckareff

Abstract Humean compatibilism combines a Humean conception of laws of nature with a strong dual-ability condition for free will that requires that agents possess the ability to decide differently when they make a free decision. On the Humean view of laws of nature, laws of nature are taken to be contingent non-governing descriptions of significant regularities that obtain in the entire history of the universe. On Humean compatibilism, agents are taken to possess dual ability when making free decisions because what the laws of nature will finally be is (at least partially) dependent upon how an agent decides. In this paper, I argue that the tenability of Humean compatibilism depends in part upon what theory of time is correct. More specifically, I argue that Humean compatibilism is untenable in a deterministic universe if eternalism is true.


2015 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 83-98
Author(s):  
Joel Archer

Miracles are commonly understood in the way David Hume defined them: as violations of the laws of nature. I argue, however, that the conjunction of Hume’s definition with a neo-Humean view of the laws of nature yields objectionable consequences. In particular, the two jointly imply that some miracles are logically impossible. A better way of thinking about miracles, I suggest, is on a neo-Aristotelian metaphysics. On that view, the laws of nature contain built-in ceteris paribus clauses that allow for the possibility of external influences in the natural world. Miracles, understood as instances of external, divine influence, would therefore neither violate the laws of nature nor be instances of those laws. In this respect, neo-Aristotelians have an advantage over neo-Humeans in providing a coherent account of miracles.


1987 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 263-278 ◽  
Author(s):  
E. J. Lowe

Hume's famous discussion of miracles in the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding is curious both on account of the arguments he does deploy and on account of the arguments he does not deploy, but might have been expected to. The first and second parts of this paper will be devoted to examining, respectively, these two objects of curiosity. The second part I regard as the more important, because I shall there try to show that the fact that Hume does not deploy an argument that he might have been expected to deploy in fact reflects a weakness in the view of natural laws that has (rightly or wrongly) come to be associated with Hume's name. I shall argue, in fact, that it is a symptom of the defectiveness of the ‘Humean’ view of natural laws that on that view it is only too easy to rule out the possibility of a miracle ever occurring. In the third part of the paper, I shall show how another view of laws can overcome this problem.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
David Mark Kovacs
Keyword(s):  

Abstract Humeans identify the laws of nature with universal generalizations that systematize rather than govern the particular matters of fact. Humeanism is frequently accused of circularity: laws explain their instances, but Humean laws are, in turn, grounded by those instances. Unfortunately, this argument trades on controversial assumptions about grounding and explanation that Humeans routinely reject. However, recently an ostensibly semantic circularity objection has been offered, which seeks to avoid reading such assumptions into the Humean view. This paper argues that the new semantic version tacitly relies on the familiar metaphysical one and, therefore, it ultimately brings nothing new to the table.


2020 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kellen Mrkva ◽  
Luca Cian ◽  
Leaf Van Boven

Abstract Gilead et al. present a rich account of abstraction. Though the account describes several elements which influence mental representation, it is worth also delineating how feelings, such as fluency and emotion, influence mental simulation. Additionally, though past experience can sometimes make simulations more accurate and worthwhile (as Gilead et al. suggest), many systematic prediction errors persist despite substantial experience.


1978 ◽  
Vol 48 ◽  
pp. 7-29
Author(s):  
T. E. Lutz

This review paper deals with the use of statistical methods to evaluate systematic and random errors associated with trigonometric parallaxes. First, systematic errors which arise when using trigonometric parallaxes to calibrate luminosity systems are discussed. Next, determination of the external errors of parallax measurement are reviewed. Observatory corrections are discussed. Schilt’s point, that as the causes of these systematic differences between observatories are not known the computed corrections can not be applied appropriately, is emphasized. However, modern parallax work is sufficiently accurate that it is necessary to determine observatory corrections if full use is to be made of the potential precision of the data. To this end, it is suggested that a prior experimental design is required. Past experience has shown that accidental overlap of observing programs will not suffice to determine observatory corrections which are meaningful.


Author(s):  
K.H. Westmacott

Life beyond 1MeV – like life after 40 – is not too different unless one takes advantage of past experience and is receptive to new opportunities. At first glance, the returns on performing electron microscopy at voltages greater than 1MeV diminish rather rapidly as the curves which describe the well-known advantages of HVEM often tend towards saturation. However, in a country with a significant HVEM capability, a good case can be made for investing in instruments with a range of maximum accelerating voltages. In this regard, the 1.5MeV KRATOS HVEM being installed in Berkeley will complement the other 650KeV, 1MeV, and 1.2MeV instruments currently operating in the U.S. One other consideration suggests that 1.5MeV is an optimum voltage machine – Its additional advantages may be purchased for not much more than a 1MeV instrument. On the other hand, the 3MeV HVEM's which seem to be operated at 2MeV maximum, are much more expensive.


2000 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicole Charves ◽  
Amy Clemens
Keyword(s):  

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