Beyond The Self: Virtue Ethics And The Problem Of Culture: Essays In Honor Of W. David Solomon

2022 ◽  
Vol 96 (1) ◽  
pp. 149-152
Author(s):  
Daniel John Sportiello ◽  
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Philip J. Ivanhoe

This chapter develops various implications of the oneness hypothesis when applied to theories of virtue, drawing on several claims that are closely related to the hypothesis. Many of the views introduced and defended are inspired by neo-Confucianism and so the chapter offers an example of constructive philosophy bridging cultures and traditions. It focuses on Foot’s theory, which holds that virtues correct excesses or deficiencies in human nature. The alternative maintains that vices often arise not from an excess or deficiency in motivation but from a mistaken conception of self, one that sees oneself as somehow more important than others. The chapter goes on to argue that such a view helps address the “self-centeredness objection” to virtue ethics and that the effortlessness, joy, and wholeheartedness that characterizes fully virtuous action are best conceived as a kind of spontaneity that affords a special feeling of happiness dubbed “metaphysical comfort.”


2019 ◽  
pp. 197-214
Author(s):  
Emily Brady

This chapter explores Kant’s discussion of the sublime in the Critique of the Power of Judgment (1790), in which the aesthetic subject becomes aware of a certain kind of greatness of mind. Kant’s scheme emphasizes respect for the moral capacities of the self as part of humanity, as well as admiration for greatness in the natural world. More broadly, his views show how ideas about greatness—if not magnanimity in the narrower sense—flow into philosophical approaches that lie beyond virtue ethics, moral thought, and human exceptionalism. The chapter argues that a comparative relation between self and sublime phenomena is central to understanding greatness of mind. Drawing out this comparative relation supports a deeper understanding of how both self-regarding and other-regarding attitudes feature within sublime experience, and just how this greatness might express itself within an aesthetic context.


2018 ◽  
Vol 92 (4) ◽  
pp. 641-668 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeff D’Souza ◽  

This paper examines one of the central objections levied against neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics: the self-absorption objection. Proponents of this objection state that the main problem with neo-Aristotelian accounts of moral motivation is that they prescribe that our ultimate reason for acting virtuously is that doing so is for the sake of and/or is constitutive of our own eudaimonia. In this paper, I provide an overview of the various attempts made by neo-Aristotelian virtue ethicists to address the self-absorption objection and argue that they all fall short for one reason or another. I contend that the way forward for neo-Aristotelian virtue ethicists is to reject the view that the virtuous agent ought to organize her life in a way that is ultimately good for her, and instead adopt a more expansive conception of her ultimate end, one in which no special preference is given to her own good.


2015 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 131-147 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pieter Vos

In response to Alasdair MacIntyre’s and Brad Gregory’s claim—that the Reformation’s concept of morality in terms of obedience to divine commandments has been a major factor in a catastrophic breakdown in modernity of the teleological view of life and the virtues—this essay aims both to correct this criticism and to reread Calvin from the perspective of virtue ethics. Calvin’s utterances about the nature of the law, virtue, the self before God, one’s calling in the world, natural law and reason appear to be much more in alliance with a teleological, virtue ethical view than MacIntyre suggests. This opens up the possibility of a fruitful interplay between a Reformed account of law and Christian virtue ethics.


2019 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 167
Author(s):  
M Ulil Abshor

<p><em>The </em><em>s</em><em>tudy aims to </em><em>uncovered the facts behind the scientific authority that was </em><em>showed</em><em> by Gus Izza Sadewa (the son of KH. Imron Jamil Jombang), who was only 15 years old and was able to present a scientific identity and sufism practices that was very beneficial. The author focuses on YouTube's new media as a shap</em><em>ing </em><em>of scientific authority in the cyberculture world. The author analyzes the content analysis of some YouTube videos about Gus Izza. The content provided is manifested in aspects of contextual </em><em>sufism</em><em>. According to Heidi A. Campbell, there are 4 things that influence a religion or </em><em>a text </em><em>ideolog</em><em>y</em><em>, namely hierarchy (value), structure, ideology, and text. The results obtained from several segments of the hierarchy or values formed in the self of Gus Izza, he has Sufi</em><em>sm</em><em> and mature scientific authority, which can be proven by giving explanations about monotheism, </em><em>the most important in </em><em>looking for murs</em><em>y</em><em>hd-teachers, faith, actualizing worship that </em><em>applied</em><em> in daily life. </em><em>A</em><em>ll of those have </em><em>the main</em><em> orientation in the </em><em>virtue ethics (</em><em>akhlaq al</em><em>-</em><em>karimah).</em></p>


2020 ◽  
pp. 019145372094837
Author(s):  
Frédéric Vandenberghe

The article explores the scope and the limits of virtue ethics from the perspective of critical theory (Habermas) and critical realism (Bhaskar). Based on new research in moral sociology and anthropology, it ponders how the self-realization of each can be combined with the self-determination of all. The article adopts an action-theoretical perspective on morality and defends the priority of the right over the good. It suggests that in plural and polarized societies, there no longer exists a consensus on any version of the good life. It therefore limits the scope of virtue ethics to personal life and pleads for a minima moralia at the social and political level.


2010 ◽  
Vol 84 (4) ◽  
pp. 651-692 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yong Huang ◽  
Keyword(s):  

2019 ◽  
Vol 44 ◽  
pp. 237-250
Author(s):  
Jeff D’Souza ◽  

One of the longest standing objections levied against virtue ethics is the Self-Absorption Objection. Proponents of this objection state that the main problem with neo-Aristotelian accounts is that the virtuous agent’s motive is to promote her own eudaimonia. In this paper, I examine Christopher Toner’s attempt to address this objection by arguing that we should understand the virtuous agent as acting virtuously because doing so is what it means to live well qua human. I then go on to defend Toner’s view from two of Anne Baril’s criticisms: that his account is un-Aristotelian, and that his account does not take seriously the importance of the virtuous agent organizing her life in a way that is good for her. In doing so, I pave the way for neo-Aristotelian virtue ethicists to develop an adequate response to the self-absorption objection along Toner’s lines.


2017 ◽  
Vol 153 (2) ◽  
pp. 389-406 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patricia Grant ◽  
Surendra Arjoon ◽  
Peter McGhee
Keyword(s):  

Philosophy ◽  
2006 ◽  
Vol 81 (4) ◽  
pp. 595-618 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher Toner
Keyword(s):  
The Self ◽  

Aristotelian virtue ethics is often charged with counseling a self-centred approach to the moral life. Reviewing some influential responses made by defenders of virtue ethics, I argue that none of them goes far enough. I begin my own response by evaluating two common targets of the objection, Aristotle and Aquinas, and based on my findings sketch the outlines of a clearly non-self-centred version of virtue ethics, according to which the ‘center’ is instead located in the agent’s right relation to others and ultimately to the Good. I conclude that while some species of virtue ethics may be self-centred, the objection cannot be used to indict the whole genus.


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