Breakdown of the Teleological View of Life?

2015 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 131-147 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pieter Vos

In response to Alasdair MacIntyre’s and Brad Gregory’s claim—that the Reformation’s concept of morality in terms of obedience to divine commandments has been a major factor in a catastrophic breakdown in modernity of the teleological view of life and the virtues—this essay aims both to correct this criticism and to reread Calvin from the perspective of virtue ethics. Calvin’s utterances about the nature of the law, virtue, the self before God, one’s calling in the world, natural law and reason appear to be much more in alliance with a teleological, virtue ethical view than MacIntyre suggests. This opens up the possibility of a fruitful interplay between a Reformed account of law and Christian virtue ethics.

2006 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-30 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gavin Byrne

This essay concerns the question of whether it is possible to have an account of what judges ought to do when they decide cases if one accepts Stanley Fish’s thesis that man is a socially constructed creature, who can only see the world around him in terms of the practice that he is involved in. It puts forward the view that such a position is defensible, provided that one makes different metaphysical commitments to the ones made by Fish. It is argued that Fish is best understood as a metaphysical idealist. The essay seeks to demonstrate that Martin Heidegger’s conception of the self and interpretation are similar to those of Fish, but that, when understood as involving a commitment to metaphysical realism, Heidegger’s philosophy can hold the possibility of strong legal theory open in a way that Fish’s cannot. Michael S. Moore’s natural law position is used in order to articulate what such a position might be. Moore’s example of what a judge ought to do if called upon to define ‘death’ as a concept is used to illustrate the difference between Fish and Heidegger when it comes to metaphysics and strong legal theory, despite their similarities when it comes to an account of interpretation and of the self.


2018 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 620
Author(s):  
Timbo Mangaranap Sirait

Diskursus hubungan antara hukum dengan “moral” dan “fakta” selalu saja menarik untuk dibahas di kalangan sarjana hukum. Hukum kodrat irrasional adalah teori hukum besar yang pertama yang cara pandangnya theocentris mengakui bahwa hukum bersumber dari “moralitas” Tuhan YME. Derivasi nilai moral universal ternyata semakin bermetamorfosa dalam berbagai fenomena kehidupan kemudian dituntut agar diperlakukan setara di hadapan hukum. Di berbagai belahan dunia, Gerakan LGBT (Lesbian, Gay, Biseksual, dan Transgender) dengan perjuangan perkawinan sesama jenis berkembang semakin luas dan telah memfalsifikasi dominasi perkawinan kodrati heteroseksual. Untuk itu, perlu ditilik secara reflektif filosofis akseptabilitas Konstitusi Indonesia atas perkawinan sesama jenis ini. Penelitian ini dilakukan dengan metode pendekatan yuridis normatif melalui cara berpikir deduktif dengan kriterium kebenaran koheren. Sehingga disimpulkan: pertama, kritikan hukum kodrat irrasional yang teosentris terhadap perkawinan sesama jenis, menganggap bahwa sumber hukum adalah “moral” bukan “fakta”, oleh karenanya aturan perundang-undangan dipositifkan dari/dan tidak boleh bertentangan dengan moral Ketuhanan. Oleh karena itu, menurut hukum kodrat irrasional perkawinan sesama jenis tidak mungkin dapat diterima dalam hukum karena bertentangan dengan moralitas Ketuhanan Y.M.E. Kedua, bahwa Konstitusi Indonesia menempatkan Pancasila sebagai grundnorm dengan sila Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa menjadi fondasi dan bintang pemandu pada Undang-undang Perkawinan Indonesia, yang intinya perkawinan harus antara pria dan wanita (heteroseksual) dengan tujuan membentuk keluarga (rumah tangga). Perkawinan sesama jenis juga tidak dapat diterima karena ketidakmampuan bentuk perkawinan ini untuk memenuhi unsur-unsur utama perkawinan, untuk terjaminnya keberlangsungan kemanusiaan secara berkelanjutan (sustainable).The discourse of relationships between law, moral and facts are always interesting to be discussed among legal scholars. Irrational natural law is the first major legal theory that which theocentris worldview admit that the law derived from the “morality” of the God. The derivation of universal moral values appear increasingly metamorphosed into various life phenomena then are required to be treated equally before the law. In different parts of the world the movement LGBT (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender) struggle for same-sex marriage has grown falsified domination of heterosexual marriage. Therefore it is necessary be a reflective philosophical divine the acceptability of the Constitution of Indonesia on same-sex marriage. This research was conducted by the method of normative juridical approach, in the frame of a coherent deductive acknowledgement. Concluded, Firstly, criticism Irrational natural law against same-sex marriage, assume that the source of the law is a “moral” rather than “facts”, therefore the rules of law are made of / and should not contradict with the morals of God. Therefore, according to irrational natural law that same-sex marriage may not be accepted in law as contrary to morality God. Secondly, That the Constitution of Indonesia puts Pancasila as the basic norms to please Almighty God be the foundation and a guiding star in the Indonesian Marriage Law, which is essentially a marriage should be between a man and a woman (heterosexual) with purpose of forming a family. Same-sex marriage is not acceptable also because of the inability to fulfill marriage form of the major elements of marriage, ensuring the sustainability of humanity in a sustainable manner.


2021 ◽  
Vol 28 (2021) ◽  
pp. 18-34
Author(s):  
Zhi Wong Jing

Mediation, as a form of dispute resolution, is widely practiced. Nations across the world recognize it as an increasingly appropriate form of dispute resolution. But the existential question remains. Can we rightly ascribe the word ‘law’ to the processes of mediation? This article makes one qualified proposition. Mediation is an extra-legal process, unless it is used to realize the law (and justice). This is for two reasons. First, mediation’s processes and mediated outcomes do not in themselves cause judges’ obeisance and adherence. Mediated settlements must rely on the law of contract for its validity and efficacy. Second, even if mediation is legislated to form part of our law, it is extra-legal. It does not comport with the minimum content of natural law in that it does not guarantee the realization of the law and access to justice. If we are to regard mediation as law, mediation must be used to realize the law and guarantee access to justice.


2021 ◽  
Vol 38 (3) ◽  
pp. 557-572
Author(s):  
Katja Maria Vogt

Abstract The Stoics identify the law with the active principle, which is corporeal, pervades the universe, individuates each part of the world, and causes all its movements. At the same time, the law is normative for all reasoners. The very same law shapes the movements of the cosmos and governs our actions. With this reconstruction of Stoic law, I depart from existing scholarship on whether Stoic law is a set of rules. The question of whether ethics involves a set of rules is rich and fascinating. In the 1970s and 80s, the observation that ancient ethics might do without rules was part of philosophy’s rediscovery of virtue ethics. This debate, however, neglects that Stoic law is a corporeal principle pervading the world. The key puzzle regarding Stoic law, I argue, is how it is possible that the very same law is a corporeal principle in the world and normative for us.


2019 ◽  
Vol 38 (3) ◽  
pp. 56-80
Author(s):  
Andrey K. Sudakov

In his popular 1806 lectures on religion Fichte considered five possible worldviews in the second of which, “the standpoint of legality”, one can readily recognise the ethics of law of the Stoical and Kantian type. Fichte stresses that in his youth he himself shared this worldview. However, he hastens to adduce a series of original arguments to show that this position is essentially incapable of delivering a pure and higher moral doctrine. I examine the substance of these critical arguments in the context of his later metaphysics. Fichte maintains that in the “second type” of worldview man himself feels and understands, respects and loves himself only as a subject of unconditional law, therefore the pathos and “affection of law” pervades all his assessments and motivations. This affects the impartiality of moral assessment if the requirements of the law are diverged from. The “man of law”, the Stoic and Kantian who is not conscious of direct violations of the law, can at most not despise himself, but he cannot, according to Fichte, positively respect himself: that would require surpassing the requirement of the law through action. Meanwhile the affection of the self-sufficient law conceals even this impossibility from such a person. Finally, I show that the ethics of the Stoical and Kantian type retains, according to Fichte’s diagnosis, a refined interest in preserving and indulging the sensual self and hence the idea of God as the warrantor of empirical happiness / bliss. Accordingly, the “overturn in the state of mind” sought by the Kantian himself implies “the highest act of freedom”, which is inaccessible to him and beyond which the perspective of the world as law is replaced for the subject by the perspective of the Kingdom of the Spirit in which the “selfhood” of each moral agent is practically overcome.


2008 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 200-212
Author(s):  
ELIZABETH BULLEN

This paper investigates the high-earning children's series, A Series of Unfortunate Events, in relation to the skills young people require to survive and thrive in what Ulrich Beck calls risk society. Children's textual culture has been traditionally informed by assumptions about childhood happiness and the need to reassure young readers that the world is safe. The genre is consequently vexed by adult anxiety about children's exposure to certain kinds of knowledge. This paper discusses the implications of the representation of adversity in the Lemony Snicket series via its subversions of the conventions of children's fiction and metafictional strategies. Its central claim is that the self-consciousness or self-reflexivity of A Series of Unfortunate Events} models one of the forms of reflexivity children need to be resilient in the face of adversity and to empower them to undertake the biographical project risk society requires of them.


2018 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-66
Author(s):  
Monika Szuba

The essay discusses selected poems from Thomas Hardy's vast body of poetry, focusing on representations of the self and the world. Employing Maurice Merleau-Ponty's concepts such as the body-subject, wild being, flesh, and reversibility, the essay offers an analysis of Hardy's poems in the light of phenomenological philosophy. It argues that far from demonstrating ‘cosmic indifference’, Hardy's poetry offers a sympathetic vision of interrelations governing the universe. The attunement with voices of the Earth foregrounded in the poems enables the self's entanglement in the flesh of the world, a chiasmatic intertwining of beings inserted between the leaves of the world. The relation of the self with the world is established through the act of perception, mainly visual and aural, when the body becomes intertwined with the world, thus resulting in a powerful welding. Such moments of vision are brief and elusive, which enhances a sense of transitoriness, and, yet, they are also timeless as the self becomes immersed in the experience. As time is a recurrent theme in Hardy's poetry, this essay discusses it in the context of dwelling, the provisionality of which is demonstrated in the prevalent sense of temporality, marked by seasons and birdsong, which underline the rhythms of the world.


Author(s):  
Karen J. Alter

In 1989, when the Cold War ended, there were six permanent international courts. Today there are more than two dozen that have collectively issued over thirty-seven thousand binding legal rulings. This book charts the developments and trends in the creation and role of international courts, and explains how the delegation of authority to international judicial institutions influences global and domestic politics. The book presents an in-depth look at the scope and powers of international courts operating around the world. Focusing on dispute resolution, enforcement, administrative review, and constitutional review, the book argues that international courts alter politics by providing legal, symbolic, and leverage resources that shift the political balance in favor of domestic and international actors who prefer policies more consistent with international law objectives. International courts name violations of the law and perhaps specify remedies. The book explains how this limited power—the power to speak the law—translates into political influence, and it considers eighteen case studies, showing how international courts change state behavior. The case studies, spanning issue areas and regions of the world, collectively elucidate the political factors that often intervene to limit whether or not international courts are invoked and whether international judges dare to demand significant changes in state practices.


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