Lying: An Experimental Investigation of the Role of Situational Factors

2011 ◽  
Vol 21 (4) ◽  
pp. 605-632 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lucy F. Ackert ◽  
Bryan K. Church ◽  
Xi (Jason) Kuang ◽  
Li Qi

ABSTRACT:Individuals often lie for psychological rewards (e.g., preserving self image and/or protecting others), absent economic rewards. We conducted a laboratory experiment, using a modified dictator game, to identify conditions that entice individuals to lie solely for psychological rewards. We argue that such lies can provide a ready means for individuals to manage others’ impression of them. We investigated the effect of social distance (the perceived familiarity, intimacy, or psychological proximity between two parties) and knowledge of circumstances (whether parties have common or asymmetric information) on the frequency of lying. We found that lying occurs more frequently when social distance is near and that the effect is exacerbated when information is asymmetric. Our theoretical development suggests that, under these conditions, individuals’ need to manage others’ impression is magnified. We discuss the implications of our findings.

Author(s):  
Blanca L. Delgado-Márquez ◽  
Nuria E. Hurtado-Torres ◽  
J. Alberto Aragón-Correa

One of the major debates currently in the literature about trust and management relies on the perspective of trust-building in organizations. In this chapter we draw on graph-based structures in order to investigate the role of individuals’ social networks as tools for enhancing potential trust-building processes at interpersonal level. The chapter relies on two main aspects. First, we propose a theoretical approach establishing a linkage between agents’ social networks and trust-building processes among unknown agents. Second, we carry out an experimental investigation focused on a laboratory experiment developed with students of Management and Economics bachelor degrees. Furthermore, we outline some implications for managers.


2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 41-72
Author(s):  
Juyoung Kang ◽  
Sooyun Kim ◽  
Kim Heejin ◽  
Sunmee Choi

MIS Quarterly ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 41 (3) ◽  
pp. 787-809 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yili Hong ◽  
◽  
Paul A. Pavlou ◽  
Nan Shi ◽  
Kanliang Wang ◽  
...  

2017 ◽  
Vol 93 (4) ◽  
pp. 177-202 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emily E. Griffith

ABSTRACT Auditors are more likely to identify misstatements in complex estimates if they recognize problematic patterns among an estimate's underlying assumptions. Rich problem representations aid pattern recognition, but auditors likely have difficulty developing them given auditors' limited domain-specific expertise in this area. In two experiments, I predict and find that a relational cue in a specialist's work highlighting aggressive assumptions improves auditors' problem representations and subsequent judgments about estimates. However, this improvement only occurs when a situational factor (e.g., risk) increases auditors' epistemic motivation to incorporate the cue into their problem representations. These results suggest that auditors do not always respond to cues in specialists' work. More generally, this study highlights the role of situational factors in increasing auditors' epistemic motivation to develop rich problem representations, which contribute to high-quality audit judgments in this and other domains where pattern recognition is important.


2000 ◽  
Vol 75 (4) ◽  
pp. 429-451 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ronald R. King ◽  
Rachel Schwartz

This paper reports the results of an experiment designed to investigate how legal regimes affect social welfare. We investigate four legal regimes, each consisting of a liability rule (strict or negligence) and a damage measure (out-of-pocket or independent-of-investment). The results of the experiment are for the most part consistent with the qualitative predictions of Schwartz's (1997) model; however, subjects' actual choices deviate from the point predictions of the model. We explore whether these deviations arise because: (1) subjects form faulty anticipations of their counterparts' actions and/or (2) subjects do not choose the optimal responses given their anticipations. We find that subjects behave differently under the four regimes in terms of anticipation errors and departures from best responses. For example, subjects playing the role of auditors anticipate investments most accurately under the regime with strict liability combined with out-of-pocket damages, but are least likely to choose the optimal response given their anticipations. This finding implies that noneconomic factors likely play a role in determining subjects' choices.


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