scholarly journals Assessing the Europeanisation of Turkey domestic politics: To what extent has candidate status transformed the military control over civilian rule in Turkey?

2011 ◽  
Vol 5 (22) ◽  
pp. 8832-8842
Author(s):  
Oney Bilge ◽  
Halilsoy Pinar
Keyword(s):  
Domestic Politics ◽  
Military Control ◽  
The Military

The Military in African Politics

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maggie Dwyer
Keyword(s):  
Domestic Politics ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Humanitarian Assistance ◽  
Sub Saharan Africa ◽  
External Threats ◽  
Sub Saharan ◽  
Military Control ◽  
The 1960S ◽  
Civilian Leadership ◽  
The Military

Interstate conflict has been rare in sub-Saharan Africa and militaries often do not fit the image of a force focused on external threats. Instead, they have often been heavily engaged in domestic politics, regularly serving as regime protection. For many militaries on the continent, the continued internal focus of the armed forces has been shaped by practices under colonialism. One defining feature of African militaries’ involvement in politics is the coup d’état. From the 1960s to the 1980s coups were the primary method of regime change, making the military central to the political landscape of the continent. By the start of the 21st century there were far fewer direct attempts at military control of African states, yet militaries continue to influence politics even under civilian leadership. While there are differences in the role of militaries based on the unique circumstances of each state, there are also general patterns regarding new missions undertaken by armed forces following the end of the Cold War. These include peacekeeping, counterterrorism, and humanitarian assistance, all of which generally involve international partnerships and cooperation. Yet these missions have also had domestic political motivations and effects.

China’s Military Reform: In Search of Centrality and Joint Capability

2016 ◽  
Vol 08 (03) ◽  
pp. 68-77
Author(s):  
Bojian LIU ◽  
Gang CHEN
Keyword(s):  
New Wave ◽  
Military Reform ◽  
Operational Capability ◽  
Weapon Systems ◽  
People’S Liberation Army ◽  
Military Control ◽  
The Military ◽  
Party State ◽  
Party Congress ◽  
The Way

In a new wave of reform, China’s Central Military Commission remains a party-state organ of the highest military control. Politically, the reorganisation enhances intra-People’s Liberation Army (PLA) supervision and inter-section checks, and paves the way for the personnel reshuffle before the 19th Party Congress scheduled in 2017. Strategically, the military reshuffle is to advance the PLA’s joint operational capability, facilitate modernisation of weapon systems, accelerate China’s transition towards maritime power and improve the PLA’s systemic commanding efficiency.

Explaining the Long-Term Maintenance of a Military Regime: Panama before the U.S. Invasion

1992 ◽  
Vol 44 (2) ◽  
pp. 210-234 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steve C. Ropp
Keyword(s):  
Domestic Politics ◽  
Authoritarian Regime ◽  
Military Force ◽  
International Banking ◽  
Military Regimes ◽  
The 1960S ◽  
The Military ◽  
Term Maintenance ◽  
The U.S

Before the U.S. invasion of December 1989, Panama experienced one of the longest periods of military rule in the modern-day history of Latin America. While numerous authoritarian military regimes emerged in the region during the 1960s and established for themselves a relatively high degree of autonomy from both domestic and international actors, only those in Panama, Paraguay, and Chile survived until the late 1980s. And of these three surviving military regimes, only Panama's was ended through the application of external military force. For the past several years, there has been considerable discussion of the factors that seem best to account for General Manuel Antonio Noriega's personal ability to resist U.S. pressure from 1987 until 1989 and to largely insulate himself from the political and economic constraints of Panamanian domestic politics. However, much less attention has been devoted to discussion of the factors that explain the long-term maintenance of the military authoritarian regime in existence for fifteen years prior to his assumption of power. This analysis suggests that the long-term maintenance of Panama's military authoritarian regime was due in large part to its ability to acquire substantial amounts of foreign capital. During the 1970s, such capital was preferentially obtained from the international banking community. During the 1980s, it was obtained through illicit activities of various kinds, including participation in the growing international drug trade.

Does Membership Matter?

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
David P. Auerswald ◽  
Stephen M. Saideman
Keyword(s):  
New Zealand ◽  
Great Britain ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
Domestic Politics ◽  
Prime Minister ◽  
The Military

This chapter looks at two countries, Australia and New Zealand, that are partners with but not members of NATO. Australia and New Zealand have British-style political institutions, with the key decisions made by the prime minister and his or her minister of defense. The chapter then assesses whether membership in NATO makes a difference. It argues that non-membership can actually be a shield that countries use to deflect harder choices and more responsibilities. Otherwise, the domestic dynamics work like they do in Great Britain or Canada, demonstrating that the military constraints imposed by nations are driven far more by domestic politics than by NATO institutions.

The Wadi Zone Campus, Citadel, and C3 Bath

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simon James
Keyword(s):  
Roman Period ◽  
Major Area ◽  
Military Base ◽  
Open Ground ◽  
Formed Part ◽  
Military Control ◽  
The Military ◽  
The City ◽  
The Temple ◽  
And Training

From the junction of H and 8th Sts, which gave access to the twin main axes of the military base zone on the plateau, H St led S to the bulk of the civil town and ultimately to the Palmyrene Gate, the steppe plateau W of the city, and the roads W to Palmyra and NW up the Euphrates to Syria. The fourth side of the crossroads followed a curving course SE, down into the inner wadi, then snaking through the irregularly laid-out old lower town to the now-lost River Gate, portal to the Euphrates and its plain. Of most immediate significance is that the Wadi Ascent Road also linked the plateau military zone with what can now be seen as another major area of military control, in the old Citadel, and on the adjacent wadi floor. The N part of the wadi floor is now known to have accommodated two military-built temples, the larger of which, the A1 ‘Temple of the Roman Archers’, was axial to the long wadi floor, which in the Roman period appears to have comprised one of the largest areas of open ground inside the city walls. This is interpreted as the campus, or military assembly and training ground, extension of which was commemorated in an inscription found in the temple. In 2011, what is virtually certainly a second military temple was found in the wadi close by the first, built against the foundation of the Citadel. This is here referred to as the Military Zeus Temple. Behind the Temple of the Roman Archers was a lane leading from the Wadi Ascent Road to the N gate of the Citadel. It helped define a further de facto enclosure, effectively surrounded by other military-controlled areas and so also presumed to have been in military hands. The Citadel itself, while in Roman times already ruinous on the river side due to cliff falls, still formed part of the defences. Moreover the massive shell of its Hellenistic walls now also appears to have been adapted to yet more military accommodation, some of it two storeys or higher.

Statistics and the Field Army Loyalty System

1974 ◽  
Vol 57 ◽  
pp. 146-148 ◽  
Author(s):  
William W. Whitson
Keyword(s):  
Cultural Revolution ◽  
Domestic Politics ◽  
Statistical Evidence ◽  
Chinese Politics ◽  
Previous Issue ◽  
Chinese Military ◽  
Military Politics ◽  
The Military ◽  
The Cultural Revolution

Although many readers would probably interpret William Parish's article in the previous issue of The China Quarterly (“Factions in Chinese Military Politics,” CQ, No. 56, pp. 667–699) as an attack on my 1969 assessment of the historic role of the Field Army in post-1950 Chinese politics, I am nevertheless sincerely grateful to him for keeping the dialogue about “loyalty systems” alive. Indeed, I am struck by the irony of our respective positions. He seems to argue that, while the Field Army loyalty system apparently (according to my statistics) had little demonstrable impact on elite assignments before the Cultural Revolution, the same system apparently (according to his statistics) helps clarify factional behaviour within the PLA during and after the Cultural Revolution. The irony of this is doubled since the statistical evidence which I now have available argues that “the old boy net” of the Field Armies actually had a diminishing impact on the domestic politics of China in the late 1960s. By then the Military Region as a geo-political unit had replaced the Field Army as a temporary focus of individual and collective PLA loyalties.

The Emerging New Politics of Liberalizing Paraguay: Sustained Civil-Military Control without Democracy

1992 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 127-164 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul C. Sondrol
Keyword(s):  
Latin American ◽  
Transition Process ◽  
Authoritarian Regimes ◽  
Press Freedom ◽  
Latin American Politics ◽  
Democratic Development ◽  
New Politics ◽  
Major Subject ◽  
Military Control ◽  
The Military

The Process of the transition from authoritarianism to more representative forms of government has become a major subject of the scholarship on Latin American politics today (O'Donnell, et al, 1986; Malloy and Seligson, 1987; Stepan, 1989; Diamond et al, 1988-1990; Lowenthal, 1991). Given this interest, as expressed by the growing literature in this area, little attention has been paid to the transition process now going on in Paraguay, which is now emerging from one of Latin America's most long-standing authoritarian regimes.A number of studies testify to the authoritarian nature of Paraguay's government and society. Johnson indicates that Paraguay ranked either 18th or 19th—out of 20 Latin American nations ... in 9 successive surveys of democratic development, carried out at 5-year intervals from 1945 to 1985 (Jonnson> 1988). A longitudinal study of press freedom found that Paraguay was invariably placed in the category of “poor,” or even “none,” between 1945-1975 (Hill and Hurley, 1980). When Palmer applied his 5 indicators of authoritarianism (nonelective rule, coups, primacy of the military, military rule, executive predominance) to the countries of Latin America, Paraguay consistently ranked first in its degree of authoritarianism (Palmer, 1977).

Horror Vacui

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ozan O. Varol
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Domestic Politics ◽  
Physical World ◽  
Dense Material ◽  
The Political ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Civilian Leaders ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
The Military ◽  
Coup Attempt

Nature, Aristotle said, abhors a vacuum. He argued that a vacuum, once formed, would be immediately filled by the dense material surrounding it. Aristotle’s insights into vacuums in the physical world also apply to civil-military relations. Where a vacuum exists in domestic politics because the political parties are weak, unstable, or underdeveloped, the dense material that is the military may fill the void by staging an intervention into domestic politics. But when, as in the July 2016 coup attempt in Turkey, the civilian leaders themselves hold densely concentrated authority—in other words, are powerful, popular, and credible—their attempts to keep the military at bay are far more likely to succeed. Without a vacuum there is no void for the military to fill.

Territorial Threats and Military Dictatorships

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nam Kyu Kim
Keyword(s):  
Domestic Politics ◽  
Military Rule ◽  
Human Rights Abuses ◽  
Military Regimes ◽  
External Threat ◽  
Military Institution ◽  
New Research ◽  
State Centralization ◽  
The Military ◽  
The Relationship

Many scholars consider the military dictatorship a distinct authoritarian regime type, pointing to the singular patterns of domestic and international behaviors displayed by military regimes. Existing studies show that compared with civilian dictatorships, military dictatorships commit more human rights abuses, are more prone to civil war, and engage in more belligerent behaviors against other countries. Despite their coercive capacity, rulers of military dictatorships tend to have shorter tenures than rulers of non-military dictatorships. Additionally, military dictatorships more quickly and peacefully transition to democracy than their non-military counterparts and frequently negotiate their withdrawal from power. Given the distinct natures of military dictatorships, research on military dictatorships and coups has resurged since 2000. A great body of new research utilizing new theories, data, and methods has added to the existing scholarship on military rule and coups, which saw considerable growth in the 1970s. Most studies tend to focus on domestic issues and pay relatively little attention to the relationship between international factors and military rule. However, a growing body of studies investigates how international factors, such as economic globalization, international military assistance, reactions from the international community, and external threat environments, affect military rule. One particularly interesting research topics in this regard is the relationship between external territorial threats and military rule. Territorial issues are more salient to domestic societies than other issues, producing significant ramifications for domestic politics through militarization and state centralization. Militaries play a pivotal role in militarization and state centralization, both of which are by-products of external territorial threats. Thus, external territorial threats produce permissive structural conditions that not only prohibit democratization but also encourage military dictatorships to emerge and persist. Moreover, if territorial threats affect the presence of military dictatorships, they are more likely to affect collegial military rule, characterized by the rule of a military institution, rather than military strongman rule, characterized by the rule by a military personalist dictator. This is because territorial threats make the military more internally unified and cohesive, which helps the military rule as an institution. Existing studies provide a fair amount of empirical evidence consistent with this claim. External territorial threats are found to increase the likelihood of military regimes, particularly collegial military regimes, as well as the likelihood of military coups. The same is not true of non-territorial threats. This indicates that the type of external threat, rather than the mere presence of an external threat, matters.

China: Party–Army Relations Past and Present

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sofia K. Ledberg
Keyword(s):  
21St Century ◽  
Domestic Politics ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Early Years ◽  
The Political ◽  
Reform Process ◽  
Early 21St Century ◽  
Chinese State ◽  
The Military

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is a key political actor in the Chinese state. Together with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Chinese state institutions, it makes up the political foundation of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). In the early years after the founding of the PRC in 1949, the military played an important role in state consolidation and the management of domestic state affairs, as is expected in a state founded on Leninist principles of organization. Since the reform process, which was initiated in the late 1970s, the political role of the PLA has changed considerably. It has become less involved in domestic politics and increased attention has been directed toward military modernization. Consequently, in the early 21st century, the Chinese military shares many characteristics with the armed forces in noncommunist states. At the same time, the organizational structures, such as the party committee system, the system of political leaders, and political organs, have remained in place. In other words, the politicized structures that were put in place to facilitate the role of the military as a domestic political tool of the CCP, across many sectors of society, are expected to also accommodate modernization, professionalization, and cooperation with foreign militaries on the international arena in postreform China. This points to an interesting discrepancy between form and purpose of the PLA. The role of the military in Chinese politics has thus shifted over the years, and its relationship with the CCP has generally been interpreted as having developed from one marked by symbiosis to one of greater institutional autonomy and independence. Yet these developments should not necessarily be seen as linear or irreversible. Indeed, China of the Xi Jinping era has shown an increased focus on ideology, centralization, and personalized leadership, which already has had consequences for the political control of the Chinese armed forces. Chances are that these trends will affect the role of the PLA in politics even further in the early decades of the 21st century.

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