Does Membership Matter?

Author(s):  
David P. Auerswald ◽  
Stephen M. Saideman

This chapter looks at two countries, Australia and New Zealand, that are partners with but not members of NATO. Australia and New Zealand have British-style political institutions, with the key decisions made by the prime minister and his or her minister of defense. The chapter then assesses whether membership in NATO makes a difference. It argues that non-membership can actually be a shield that countries use to deflect harder choices and more responsibilities. Otherwise, the domestic dynamics work like they do in Great Britain or Canada, demonstrating that the military constraints imposed by nations are driven far more by domestic politics than by NATO institutions.

Subject The Pakistan military's influence on domestic politics. Significance Parliament last month passed legislation extending the tenure of the current chief of army staff, General Qamar Javed Bajwa, for another three years. This followed a November ruling by the Supreme Court striking down an extension granted by Prime Minister Imran Khan's government. While Pakistan struggles to ease its economic woes and secure diplomatic support for its position on Kashmir, over which it disputes sovereignty with India, the politically powerful military is orchestrating efforts to mediate peace in Afghanistan and consolidate relations with key partners. Impacts The military will ensure that Khan remains in power, as it regards him as a suitably acquiescent prime minister. Most political parties will toe the military's line. Bajwa's likely successor as army chief, Faiz Hameed, may lack the charisma to command the same loyalty from senior officers.


Asian Survey ◽  
2007 ◽  
Vol 47 (1) ◽  
pp. 133-140 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Ockey

The year began with a prime minister elected with the largest margin of victory in Thai history. The year ended with the prime minister in exile, the military in power, and, according to polls, most people satisfied with the coup. The coup marked a setback for democracy and for all major political institutions.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 7
Author(s):  
Muhammad Indrawan Jatmika

Military forces have had many important roles in political life in Southeast Asia where the military has a full power or major role and influence in the domestic politics. These forms of military intervention in domestic politics are called praetorianism, which is characterized by the military being more inclined to take care of domestic political affairs rather than carrying out its professional duties as guardians of sovereignty from external threats. We can find this practice from seeing the New Order regime in Indonesia to the Military Junta of Myanmar and Thailand. This paper aims to analyze what factors are the background of the widespread practice of praetorianism and how the practice can last for a certain period of time, even still to this day in Southeast Asia. The main argument is the weak political institutions and the low political culture of developing country are the main causes of various intervention efforts made by the armed forces in the domestic political realm of a country.


1983 ◽  
Vol 26 (4) ◽  
pp. 867-889 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicholas P. Hiley

In June 1907 Arthur Balfour, the Conservative leader of the opposition, was visited at home by a group of civilian strategists. They were led by Charles Á Court Repington, the military correspondent of The Times, and had come to enlist his support for an official inquiry into the threat of a German attack on Great Britain. Balfour was presented with a lengthy memorandum of ‘Notes on Invasion…’ which explained their case, and described how the situation had changed since the committee of imperial defence had reported to him as prime minister on the French threat in 1903. This document explained that in the new circumstances invasion was not only possible, but could be rendered certain if Germany carried out her preparations in total secrecy and at great speed. Under the heading ‘Chances of a Surprise’, the paper noted that circumstances favoured Germany, because the assembly of an invading force could be explained ‘as part of the normal yearly training, manoeuvres, &c.’, and even the concentration of a strong fleet near Heligoland was no longer considered unusual.


2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 205-209
Author(s):  
Malika Sharipovna Tovsultanova ◽  
Rustam Alkhazurovich Tovsultanov ◽  
Lilia Nadipovna Galimova

In the 1950s, the Democratic Party came to power in Turkey, relying on the provincial bourgeoisie and clericals. The charismatic leader of democrats Adnan Menderes became the prime-minister. The Democratic government pursued an active foreign and domestic policy. In particular, abandoning its traditional neutrality, Turkey joined NATO and CenTO military blocs. Concessions were made to religious circles. The government also carried out large-scale reforms, for which the society was not ready, due to which an economic crisis erupted in the country, the most characteristic manifestation of which was high inflation. By introducing repressive laws against dissidents, attempts to isolate the opposition, in particular the leaders of the Republican Peoples Party (RPP), the Democrats pushed the latter to search for allies in the army. In the ranks of the latter, under the influence of Western agents and the dissatisfaction of the officers themselves with the situation in the country, the idea of a military coup came about on May 27, 1960. As a result of the coup, the National Unity Committee came to power, consisting of representatives of the generals and leaders of the Republican Peoples Party. In 1961, a new constitution was adopted at a referendum, reforming the system of legislative power in the country, after which power again passed to civilian political institutions. The leader of the military who carried out the coup, General Jemal Grsel, became the prime minister, while the chairman of the Republican Peoples Party Ismet İnnbecame became the president of Turkey.


1959 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 350-351 ◽  

The fifth meeting of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) Council was held in Wellington from April 8 to 10, 1959, under the chairmanship of the New Zealand Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs, the Right Hon. Walter Nash. The Council discussed reports and recommendations by the Council representatives, the military advisers, and the Secretary-General, and in the light of them gave directions with regard to the activities of the organization in the coming year. The communique issued at the close of the meeting noted that despite the continuing possibility of open aggression, the principal threat to the security and independence of the treaty area was now being presented in more indirect forms. The Council members were aware of the opportunities afforded for subversive activities in situations where basic problems of hunger, lack of opportunity, and underdevelopment remained unsolved. The Council stated that SEATO had done much to publicize and expose throughout the treaty area the objectives toward which subversion was directed and the methods by which it operated, and it agreed that during the coming year arrangements should be made for the further strengthening of this aspect of SEATO's work. For example, it was proposed that a meeting of experts on counter-subversion should be held in Pakistan. The Council members recognized the need for continuing action in the economic and social spheres.


Author(s):  
Mary S. Barton

This is a book about terrorism, weapons, and diplomacy in the interwar years between the First and Second World Wars. It charts the convergence of the manufacture and trade of arms; diplomacy among the Great Powers and the domestic politics within them; the rise of national liberation and independence movements; and the burgeoning concept and early institutions of international counterterrorism. Key themes include: a transformation in meaning and practice of terrorism; the inability of Great Powers—namely, Great Britain, the United States, France—to harmonize perceptions of interest and the pursuit of common interests; the establishment of the tools and infrastructure of modern intelligence—including the U.S.-U.K. cooperation that would evolve into the Five Eyes intelligence alliance; and the nature of peacetime in the absence of major wars. Particular emphasis is given to British attempts to quell revolutionary nationalist movements in India and elsewhere in its empire, and to the Great Powers’ combined efforts to counter the activities of the Communist International. The facilitating roles of the Paris Peace Conference and League of Nations are explored here, in the context of the Arms Traffic Convention of 1919, the Arms Traffic Conference of 1925, and the 1937 Terrorism Convention.


2008 ◽  
Vol 39 (1) ◽  
pp. 37-64 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robbie Totten

An examination of U.S. immigration policy during the early Republic from a security perspective—a common analytical focus within the field of international relations—reveals the inadequacy of traditional economic and ideological interpretations. Security concerns, based on actual threats from Great Britain and Spain, permeated the arguments both for and against immigration. Those in favor of immigration hoped to strengthen the nation, primarily by providing soldiers and money for the military; those opposed to immigration feared that it would compromise national security by causing domestic unrest and exposing the new nation to espionage and terrorism. These issues are not unlike those that beset contemporary policymakers.


1957 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 546-547 ◽  

The Council of the Baghdad Pact held its annual meeting in Karachi from June 3 through 6, 1957. Representatives were present from the five member countries—Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan and the United Kingdom—and the United States was represented by an observer delegation. The Council had been scheduled to meet months earlier, but Iraq originally refused to meet with the United Kingdom. At the opening session, presided over by Mr. Suhrawardy, Prime Minister of Pakistan, the Prime Minister of Iraq, Nuri es Said, was reported to have spoken forcefully about the dangers implicit in the problems of Israel, Algeria, Kashmir and Cyprus. Mr. Lloyd, Foreign Minister of the United Kingdom, was reported to have followed Mr. Nuri es Said's remarks with a speech in which he announced his government's offer of a contribution of £500,000 a year in cash and in kind for building up the minimum military infra-structure in member countries. The speeches of other delegates were reported to be noteworthy for their frank recognition of past weaknesses in the Baghdad Pact organization and the need to give it new effectiveness. In the course of the first session the United States formally accepted an invitation to join the Pact's Military Committee; and a United States military delegation headed by General Nathan F. Twining started participating in a separate concurrent meeting of the Military Committee. The United States thus became a member of the Pact's three main committees, but had still not become a formal member of the Pact.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick Rummel

The previously ignored model of Greek colonisation attracted numerous actors from the 19th century British empire: historians, politicians, administrators, military personnel, journalists or anonymous commentators used the ancient paradigm to advocate a global federation exclusively encompassing Great Britain and the settler colonies in Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa. Unlike other historical templates, Greek colonisation could be viewed as innovative and unspent: innovative because of the possibility of combining empire and liberty and unspent due to its very novelty, which did not contain the ‘imperial vice’ the other models had so often shown and which had always led to their political and cultural decline.


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