Horror Vacui

Author(s):  
Ozan O. Varol

Nature, Aristotle said, abhors a vacuum. He argued that a vacuum, once formed, would be immediately filled by the dense material surrounding it. Aristotle’s insights into vacuums in the physical world also apply to civil-military relations. Where a vacuum exists in domestic politics because the political parties are weak, unstable, or underdeveloped, the dense material that is the military may fill the void by staging an intervention into domestic politics. But when, as in the July 2016 coup attempt in Turkey, the civilian leaders themselves hold densely concentrated authority—in other words, are powerful, popular, and credible—their attempts to keep the military at bay are far more likely to succeed. Without a vacuum there is no void for the military to fill.

1993 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 283-299 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jorge Zaverucha

The state of civil–military relations in the world, especially in the Third World, is very well summed up by Mosca's statement that civilian control over the military ‘is a most fortunate exception in human history’.All over the globe, the armed forces have frequently preserved their autonomous power vis-à-vis civilians. They have also succeeded in maintaining their tutelage over some of the political regimes that have arisen from the process of transition from military to democratic governments, as in Argentina and Brazil. Spain is a remarkable exception. Today, Spain, despite its authoritarian legacy, is a democratic country. The constituted civil hierarchy has been institutionalised, military áutonomy weakened, and civilian control over the military has emerged. Spain's newly founded democracy now appears quite similar to the older European democracies.


Author(s):  
Sarah Sewall

This chapter argues that the changing character of conflict demands rethinking U S civil-military relations. The United States has long relied on a nuclear deterrent and conventional military superiority to defend itself, but its adversaries have changed the rules of the game to exploit civilian vulnerabilities in the U S homeland using non kinetic tools. To ensure continued civilian control of the military use of force and effective management of competition below the threshold of war, civilian leaders must assume greater responsibility for the political and operational management of hostilities in the Gray Zone. Because civilian leaders are underprepared for this new global competition, they will be tempted to default to conventional military solutions. Traditional civil-military frameworks did not envision permanent conflict or the centrality of civilian terrain, capabilities, and operational responsibilities. The United States needs civilian-led tools and approaches to effectively avoid the dual extremes of national immobilization in the face of non kinetic threats and inadvertent escalation of conflict without civilian authorization or intent. Civilian adaptation could also diminish the traditional role of the armed forces in defending the nation. The United States must rewire the relationship of the military and civilians through its decisions about how to manage Gray Zone competition.


Author(s):  
Ozan O. Varol

Balanced civil-military relations emerge from synergy. In this case synergy refers to civilians setting aside their ideological differences, working together to build credible democratic institutions, and constructing a viable alternative to military rule. If the civilians themselves are divided on the future democratic trajectory of the nation or the military’s exit from politics, the military may more easily exploit these divisions. Instead of trying for a quick power grab, civilians in an emerging democracy must shun any antidemocratic alternatives, including military interventions, to political rule. The more effective the civilian politicians are in constructing a stable, robust democracy, the less likely power vacuums and military interventions will occur. If political parties have a real chance to compete and win in the electoral marketplace, they are more likely to play the democratic game rather than violate its rules and resort to tanks and guns to oust their opponents.


Author(s):  
Renaud Egreteau

This book examines the political landscape that followed the 2010 elections in Myanmar and the subsequent transition from direct military rule to a semi-civilian, ‘hybrid’ regime. Striking political, social, and economic transformations have indeed taken place in the long-isolated country since the military junta disbanded in March 2011. To better construe – and question – what has routinely been labelled a ‘Burmese Spring’, the book examines the reasons behind the ongoing political transition, as well as the role of the Burmese armed forces in the process. The book draws on in-depth interviews with Burmese political actors, party leaders, parliamentarians, active and retired army officers. It also takes its cue from comparative scholarship on civil-military relations and post-authoritarian politics, looking at the ‘praetorian’ logic to explain the transitional moment. Myanmar’s road to democratic change is, however, paved with obstacles. As the book suggests, the continuing military intervention in domestic politics, the resilience of bureaucratic, economic and political clientelism at all levels of society, the towering presence of Aung San Suu Kyi, the shadowy influence of regional and global powers, and the enduring concerns about interethnic and interreligious relations, all are strong reminders of the series of elemental conundrums which Myanmar will have to deal with in order to achieve democratization, sustainable development and peace.


Author(s):  
Naila Salihu

Civil–military relations is traditionally concerned with the nature and interaction among three societal actors namely military institutions, political elites, and the citizenry. The nature of this complex relationship and whether it is harmonious to prevent military intervention in politics depends on how these societal actors cooperate on certain societal variables. Civil–military relations of West African countries are influenced by those countries’ colonial and postindependence experiences. The military establishments of most African states were birthed from colonial armies. Historically rooted pathologies about the role of the security and defense forces in society created deep cleavages between state and the military, and their relations to political authority on the one hand, and society on the other. The use of African armies for political and imperialist purposes during the colonial era and their roles in the struggle for independence were important factors in shaping the behavior of African armies after independence. Most colonial states did not attain independence with indigenous, nationalist-oriented military institutions. The transition of colonial regiments into the national armies of newly independent states were met with challenges in terms of establishing legitimacy and effectiveness, as these institutions had been set up under conditions that were not ideally suited to the needs of new states. Most postindependence African leaders missed the opportunity to build democratic and national militaries; instead, they maintained the status quo, as these leaders appeared more interested in building large armies for the purposes of regime stability. Successive political leaders resorted to deleterious devices such as patron–client systems, ethnic manipulation, and politicization of the military. These practices undermined the professionalism of the security apparatus and provided breeding grounds for pretorian tendencies. As the military became conscious of their political power, coups d’état became a common feature in the political dispensation of West African states. Frequent military interventions in West Africa often came with destabilizing consequences such as devastating military rules, intra-military conflicts, insurgencies, and even civil wars. Even in those countries where civil wars did not occur, the military were influential in the political landscape, in which autocratic regimes ruled with an iron hand and often used the military to inflict severe hardship on the citizens. With the return to constitutional democracies from the late 1980s, it was widely expected the role or influence of the military in the political space would be diminished as those states became more professional and democratic. However, coups d’état have reduced in the region, rather than going away completely, and the military as a state institution with a monopoly over legitimate force remains a very strong political actor, even under civilian governments. Former metropoles have been providing defense and security assistance programs to West African states for diverse reasons, including maintaining strategic hold on former colonies. Some of these interventions that aim at professionalization of the military have produced mixed outcomes in the region. In Anglophone West Africa, the British colonial policy of indirect rule contributed to the class division between the upper class (civilian politicians) and the lower class (the military and common people). This, coupled with the use of the military as agents of repression to safeguard colonial interests, created a popular dislike and negative image of colonial armies. State militaries went on to become destabilizing forces in political processes across the region. After independence, United Kingdom maintained a fluctuating presence in its former colonies due to its imperial past and strategic interests. In French West Africa, Africans were recruited from French colonies into the French army serve France’s military interests. African soldiers played diverse roles in their countries’ struggles for independence, which led to the military’s having a central role in the politics of postindependence Francophone states. France’s Africa policy differs from that of other former colonial powers in terms of its postindependence engagements with former colonies. In other parts of West Africa, Portuguese colonialism contributed to the creation of a central role for national liberation forces, which metamorphosed into postindependence military and political actors, with destabilizing consequences.


Author(s):  
Ahmed S. Hashim

Iran has traditionally been troubled by unstable civil–military relations throughout its history. In the past, even before the emergence of the academic study of civil–military relations, Iranian imperial monarchs attempted, but often failed to ensure complete oversight of their military forces, due to the nature of imperial rule with its multiple power centers, and to the existence of myriad military forces that were often not under the monarch’s control. The rise of a centralized state in the early 20th century under Reza Shah ensured the emergence of stability in civil–military relations by means of carrots and sticks. Under Mohammad Reza Shah (r.1941–1979), early civil–military relations were quite unstable due to political turmoil and the young ruler’s lack of confidence; in subsequent years, he managed to cement his control over the military by means of patronage, insulation from domestic politics, and stringent oversight of the senior officer corps. The Iranian revolution (1978–1979) succeeded, to a large extent, due to the Shah’s own failures and those of the senior officer corps, both of which were paralyzed in the face of massive political and social turmoil. The successor state, the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) achieved control over the armed forces through ideological control and oversight and the creation of institutionalized parallel military structures. Nonetheless, the IRI has faced and continues to face instability in civil–military relations due to war, domestic political and socioeconomic crises, and foreign pressures.


2019 ◽  
Vol 54 (7) ◽  
pp. 1033-1047
Author(s):  
Furkan Halit Yolcu

The main paradox of the civil–military relations theory has been the protection of the political sphere from the military, which is administered by the politicians. The new dilemma lies under the paradox that occurs when the political sphere is entirely co-opted by the military, which is legitimized through democratization instead of protection of the civilian sphere. The question regarding the continuity of the pathology, the military superiority over the civil administration, has been largely omitted. This study is an attempt to respond to this conundrum related to the continuity of pathological civil–military relations. The main focus is the pathology that occurs when the military is the modernizer or the democratizer in a country. The study uses process tracing to collect the data as research attempts to unravel the rationale behind the continuity of military dominance in politics. In doing so, it will attempt to trace the causality between the lack of democratization and military dominance over politics in the case of Algeria.


2017 ◽  
pp. 147-151
Author(s):  
Michael Tsoorupa

The revolutionary transition of power to democratic forces after the "dignity revolution" in 2014 in Ukraine did not indicate the absence of contradictions within the new ruling class, because patriotic and devotion to democratic transformation are not the only condition for the consolidation of the ruling class. The democratic theory of the elite, which corresponds to the essence of the designated form of government, recognizes the existence of a select minority (elite) in each of the social spheres, which owns intellectual and voluntary law, not leadership. The relations between the elites are not stable, but on the contrary may become exacerbated in the fractured periods of history In the countries of "young democracy", the relationship between the political and military elite is controversial lace of relations, because the military elite represents a closed "group of interests" in politics, so it can move from supporting the ruling class to a strong opponent of relations. Even the neutral position of the military elite includes a variant of interference in political processes of power scale. Revolutionary changes on Ukraine's path to European integration may have been deeply embedded in the formation of a new military elite that has tempered itself in the armed struggle with the Russian-separatist forces, was engaged in joint exercises, and most importantly, in business cooperation with representatives of the military elites of the West, which have a long tradition Serious interaction with the ruling class. Taking into account that social and political processes in Ukraine can be compared with developing countries, the whole set of contradictory relations between the political and military elite in our country should be directed to the general line of constitutional-legal civil-military relations.


2020 ◽  
Vol 130 (629) ◽  
pp. 1317-1345
Author(s):  
Gustavo Fajardo

ABSTRACT I show that coups that break the chain of command polarise the military along hierarchical lines. I study an instance of Venezuelan history in which the political preferences of individual members of the army towards former coup leader Hugo Chávez became observable. Outranking Chávez at the time of the insubordination increases the probability of later opposing his presidency. Causal estimates rely on a fuzzy regression discontinuity design, where minimum time requirements for promotion in the army provide exogenous variation in the ranking of officers at the time of the coup. I discuss implications for the literature on civil–military relations.


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