scholarly journals Action-thoughts and the genesis of time in linguistic semiosis

2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 7-28
Author(s):  
A. Simsky ◽  
◽  
A. V. Kravchenko ◽  
A. S. Druzhinin ◽  
◽  
...  

The genesis of time is explained in the spirit of constructivism combined with the activity approach to cognition. The cardinal temporal categories of present, past, and future are dis­cussed in terms of action-thoughts understood as elementary units of activity whose structure is determined by linguistic semiosis. Husserl’s tripartite model of the phenomenology of time (prime perception, retention, protention) is applied to the analysis of the subject’s experience of his actions. It is demonstrated that, while our lived present is composed of the actually per­formed actions, our past and future are constructed by reflexive action-thoughts in the cogni­tive domain of language. It is emphasized that the construction of a temporal sequence that unites what is and what already or still is not, is possible only in linguistic semiosis. The analogy with Husserl’s tripartite structure of the time-consciousness flow helps elucidate the triad ‘present-past-future’ as an instance of the epistemological trap of language: ‘past’ and ‘future’ are mental constructs that belong to the present just as any other act of thinking.

2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 647-653
Author(s):  
Mike C. Parent ◽  
Aaron B. Rochlen ◽  
Lexie Wille
Keyword(s):  
Gay Men ◽  

Author(s):  
G.S. Prygin

We study the problems of time consciousness from the standpoint of philosophy, physics and psychology; it is argued that such a sequence in the analysis of the problem allows us to reveal the actual psychological aspect of the problem of the objectivity of the consciousness of time, which is the goal of the study. Both the philosophical concepts of the time consciousness of I. Kant, E. Husserl and F. Brentano, and the physical theories of the study of time (quantum physics, cosmology, the physics of non-equilibrium processes) are analyzed. It has been established that in philosophical theories, the concepts: consciousness, memory, perception, representation, and others do not have clear definitions and can change their meaning depending on the context. It is emphasized that in physical and human sciences time is investigated, as a rule, in connection with the concept of “space”. It is shown that when analyzing the problem of the consciousness of time, one should first decide on the concept of “reality”, which allows us to remove contradictions in the understanding of time in various physical theories. It is concluded that the existence of both objective and subjective time can only be spoken when we operate with concepts; outside of this the concept of “time” has meaning only when a person is considered as part of society. It is shown that in relation to the collective and personal unconscious, the temporal modes of the "past", "present" and "future" do not make sense, since "the whole diversity of everything" is represented in the unconscious field simultaneously and extra-spatially.


Author(s):  
Stephanie Collins

Moral duties are regularly attributed to groups. We might think that the United Kingdom has a moral duty to defend human rights, that environmentalists have a moral duty to push for global systemic reform, or that the affluent have a moral duty to alleviate poverty. This book asks (i) whether such groups are apt to bear duties and (ii) what this implies for their members. It defends a ‘Tripartite Model’ of group duties, which divides groups into three fundamental categories. First, combinations are collections of agents that do not have any goals or decision-making procedures in common. Combinations cannot bear moral duties. Instead, we should re-cast their purported duties as a series of duties—one held by each agent in the combination. Each duty demands its bearer to ‘I-reason’: to do the best they can, given whatever they happen to believe the others will do. Second, coalitions are groups whose members share goals but lack decision-making procedures. Coalitions also cannot bear duties, but their alleged duties should be replaced with members’ several duties to ‘we-reason’: to do one’s part in a particular group pattern of actions, on the presumption that others will do likewise. Third, collectives have group-level procedures for making decisions. They can bear duties. Collectives’ duties imply duties for collectives’ members to use their role in the collective with a view to the collective doing its duty.


Erkenntnis ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Camden Alexander McKenna

AbstractI argue for constraining the nomological possibility space of temporal experiences and endorsing the Succession Requirement for agents. The Succession Requirement holds that the basic structure of temporal experience must be successive for agentive subjects, at least in worlds that are law-like in the same way as ours. I aim to establish the Succession Requirement by showing non-successively experiencing agents are not possible for three main reasons, namely that they (1) fail to stand in the right sort of causal relationship to the outcomes of their actions, (2) exhibit the wrong sort of epistemic status for agency, and (3) lack the requisite agentive mental attitude of intentionality. I conclude that agency is incompatible with non-successive experience and therefore we should view the successive temporal structure of experience as a necessary condition for agency. I also suggest that the Succession Requirement may actually extend beyond my main focus on agency, offering preliminary considerations in favor of seeing successive experience as a precondition for selfhood as well. The consequences of the Succession Requirement are wide-ranging, and I discuss various implications for our understanding of agency, the self, time consciousness, and theology, among other things.


Diversity ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (7) ◽  
pp. 309
Author(s):  
Rhian A. Salmon ◽  
Samuel Rammell ◽  
Myfanwy T. Emeny ◽  
Stephen Hartley

In this paper, we focus on different roles in citizen science projects, and their respective relationships. We propose a tripartite model that recognises not only citizens and scientists, but also an important third role, which we call the ‘enabler’. In doing so, we acknowledge that additional expertise and skillsets are often present in citizen science projects, but are frequently overlooked in associated literature. We interrogate this model by applying it to three case studies and explore how the success and sustainability of a citizen science project requires all roles to be acknowledged and interacting appropriately. In this era of ‘wicked problems’, the nature of science and science communication has become more complex. In order to address critical emerging issues, a greater number of stakeholders are engaging in multi-party partnerships and research is becoming increasingly interdisciplinary. Within this context, explicitly acknowledging the role and motivations of everyone involved can provide a framework for enhanced project transparency, delivery, evaluation and impact. By adapting our understanding of citizen science to better recognise the complexity of the organisational systems within which they operate, we propose an opportunity to strengthen the collaborative delivery of both valuable scientific research and public engagement.


2021 ◽  
pp. 089484532110228
Author(s):  
Janet Mantler ◽  
Bernadette Campbell ◽  
Kathryne E. Dupré

Mid-career is a time when work orientation (i.e., viewing ones’ work as a job, a career, or a calling) comes into sharper focus. Using Wrzeniewski et al.’s tripartite model, we conducted a discriminant function analysis to determine the combination of variables that best discriminates among people who are aligned with a job, a career, or a calling orientation in a sample of 251 full-time, North American mid-career employees. Compared to those who approach work as a job, those with a calling orientation were more engaged in work. The career-oriented stood apart from the others as a function of shorter job tenure, greater turnover intentions, work engagement, career satisfaction, and a tendency to engage in career self-comparisons. Work-orientation groups did not differ significantly in terms of family centrality, work–life balance, life satisfaction, or well-being. The results suggest that the work orientations represent distinct and equally valid ways to approach work.


Author(s):  
Marek Jakubiec

AbstractAlthough much ink has been spilled on different aspects of legal concepts, the approach based on the developments of cognitive science is a still neglected area of study. The “mental” and cognitive aspect of these concepts, i.e., their features as mental constructs and cognitive tools, especially in the light of the developments of the cognitive sciences, is discussed quite rarely. The argument made by this paper is that legal concepts are best understood as mental representations. The piece explains what mental representations are and why this view matters. The explanation of legal concepts, understood as mental representations is one of (at least) three levels of explanation within legal philosophy, but—as will be argued—it is the most fundamental level. This paper analyzes the consequences of such understanding of concepts used in the field of legal philosophy. Special emphasis is put on the current debate on the analogical or amodal nature of concepts.


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