scholarly journals Hume's sentimentalism: Not non-cognitivism

2021 ◽  
Vol 1 (34) ◽  
pp. 95-111
Author(s):  
Jonas Olson
Keyword(s):  
Moral Knowledge ◽  
Moral Judgement ◽  
Motivational Internalism ◽  
Positive Evidence ◽  
Moral Beliefs ◽  
Textual Support

This paper considers and argues against old and recent readings of Hume according to which his account of moral judgement is non-cognitivist. In previous discussions of this topic, crucial metaethical distinctions-between sentimentalism and non-cognitivism and between psychological and semantic non-cognitivism-are often blurred. The paper aims to remedy this and argues that making the appropriate metaethical distinctions undermines alleged support for non-cognitivist interpretations of Hume. The paper focuses in particular on Hume's so-called 'motivation argument' and argues that it is a poor basis for non-cognitivist interpretations. While there is textual support for attributing to Hume what may be called 'modally weak' motivational internalism, there is no solid textual support for attributing to him either psychological or semantic non-cognitivism. The paper also challenges briefly some further alleged support for non-cognitivist interpretations. It concludes by offering some positive evidence against such interpretations, namely that Hume appears to hold that there are moral beliefs and moral knowledge.

Knowledge, belief, and moral psychology

2021 ◽  
Vol 44 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Mikhail
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Moral Psychology ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Moral Knowledge ◽  
Knowledge Representations ◽  
Knowledge Attributions ◽  
Moral Beliefs ◽  
Strong Case ◽  
Synthetic A Priori ◽  
The Law

Abstract Phillips et al. make a strong case that knowledge representations should play a larger role in cognitive science. Their arguments are reinforced by comparable efforts to place moral knowledge, rather than moral beliefs, at the heart of a naturalistic moral psychology. Conscience, Kant's synthetic a priori, and knowledge attributions in the law all point in a similar direction.

Does Neuroscience Undermine Morality?

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Henne ◽  
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong
Keyword(s):  
Moral Theory ◽  
Moral Knowledge ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Moral Beliefs

In Chapter 4, the authors explore whether neuroscience undermines morality. The authors distinguish, analyze, and assess the main arguments for neuroscientific skepticism about morality and argue that neuroscience does not undermine all of our moral judgments, focusing the majority of their attention on one argument in particular—the idea that neuroscience and psychology might undermine moral knowledge by showing that our moral beliefs result from unreliable processes. They argue that the background arguments needed to bolster the main premise fail to adequately support it. They conclude that the overall issue of neuroscience undermining morality is unsettled, but, they contend, we can reach some tentative and qualified conclusions. Neuroscience is, then, not a general underminer, but can play a constructive role in moral theory, although not by itself. In order to make progress, neuroscience and normative moral theory must work together.

scholarly journals A New Evolutionary Debunking Argument Against Moral Realism

2016 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 233-253 ◽  
Author(s):  
JUSTIN MORTON
Keyword(s):  
Moral Realism ◽  
Moral Knowledge ◽  
Evolutionary Debunking Arguments ◽  
Moral Beliefs ◽  
Standard Version ◽  
Debunking Arguments ◽  
Moral Claims ◽  
Evolutionary Debunking ◽  
Categorical Reasons

ABSTRACT:Evolutionary debunking arguments (EDAs) claim that evolution has influenced our moral faculties in such a way that, if moral realism is true, then we have no positive moral knowledge. I present several popular objections to the standard version of this argument before offering a new EDA that has clear advantages in responding to these objections. Whereas the Standard EDA argues that evolution has selected for many moral beliefs with certain contents, this New EDA claims that evolution has selected for one belief: belief in the claim that categorical reasons exist. If moral realism is true, then this claim is entailed by all positive moral claims, and belief in it is defeated due to evolutionary influence. This entails that if realism is true, then we have no positive moral knowledge. While there may be objections against this New EDA, it is much stronger than the Standard EDA, and one realists ought to worry about.

scholarly journals RATIONALITY: NORMAL MENTAL FUNCTIONING OR PSYCHOLOGICAL COHERENCE?

Problemos ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 82 ◽  
pp. 99-111
Author(s):  
Ieva Vasilionytė
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgement ◽  
Normative Reason ◽  
Necessary Condition ◽  
Mental Functioning ◽  
Motivational Internalism ◽  
Intuitive Notion ◽  
Full Rationality

A version of the rationalist internalist argument, employing a pro tanto reading of the term “normative reason”, is often criticized due to its conception of rationality. It is said that the condition of rationality is insufficient to secure the necessary relation between the moral judgement and the respective motivation to act. I claim that such a criticism is based on the false supposition that rationality is to be identified with normal mental functioning. It is shown that for the rationalist internalists rationality does and should rather amount to inner psychological coherence, and that the respective conception of irrationality can account for all the purported counterexamples to the motivational internalism. In addition, I pinpoint that “full rationality” is neither an intuitive notion nor a necessary condition for the rationalist internalism to hold, therefore, a line of criticism employing the notion misses the target.Keywords: rationalist internalism, coherence, full rationality, pro tanto normative reason.Racionalumas: normalus psichinis funkcionavimas ar psichologinis koherentiškumas?Ieva VasilionytėSantrauka Racionalistinio internalizmo argumento versija, normatyvaus pagrindo terminą vartojanti pro tanto reikšme, neretai kritikuojama nusitaikius į jos racionalumo sampratą. Teigiama, kad veikėjo racionalumo sąlyga nėra pakankama būtinam ryšiui tarp moralinio sprendinio arba normatyvaus pagrindo bei atitinkamos motyvacijos veiksmui užtikrinti. Straipsnyje teigiama, kad tokia kritika remiasi klaidinga prielaida, jog racionalumas tapatintinas su normaliu psichiniu funkcionavimu. Parodoma, kad racionalistiniams internalistams racionalumas yra ir turėtų būti tapatintinas veikiau su vidiniu veikėjo psichologijos koherentiškumu, o atitinkama iracionalumo samprata pajėgi apimti visus motyvaciniam internalizmui tariamai prieštaraujančius atvejus. Taip pat patikslinama, jog „visiškas racionalumas“ nėra nei intuityvi sąvoka, nei būtina sąlyga racionalistinio internalizmo teisingumui, todėl kritika, besiremianti šia sąvoka, nepasiekia tikslo.Pagrindiniai žodžiai: racionalistinis internalizmas, racionalumas, koherentiškumas, visiškas racionalumas, pro tanto normatyvus pagrindas.

Internalism and Pessimism

2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 189-209 ◽  
Author(s):  
Casey Doyle
Keyword(s):  
Moral Belief ◽  
Moral Emotions ◽  
Belief Formation ◽  
Motivational Internalism ◽  
Moral Beliefs ◽  
Motivational States

Motivational Internalism is the thesis that, necessarily, moral beliefs are accompanied by motivational states. While another's testimony might transmit knowledge and justification, it cannot warrant motivational states such as moral emotions. Thus, Internalism provides a compelling explanation of “Pessimism,” the view that there is something illicit about forming moral beliefs by testimony. This paper presents a nonconstitutive reading of the Internalist thesis and then argues that it supports Pessimism in the form of a defeasible presumption against moral deference. It also argues against views which explain Pessimism by appeal to requirements on moral belief formation.

Love, Truth and Moral Judgement

Philosophy ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 94 (04) ◽  
pp. 529-545
Author(s):  
David Carr
Keyword(s):  
Moral Knowledge ◽  
Moral Judgement ◽  
Moral Life ◽  
Transitional Stage ◽  
1 Corinthians ◽  
Iris Murdoch ◽  
Human Love ◽  
Moral Wisdom

AbstractA famous section of 1 Corinthians and some influential passages in the work of Iris Murdoch seem to suppose a significant connection between the higher human love of agape and moral knowledge: that, perhaps, the former may provide access to the latter. Following some sceptical attention to this possibility, this paper turns to a more modest suggestion of Plato's Symposium that the ‘lower’ human love of eros might be a transitional stage to higher moral love or knowledge of the good. Still, while conceding that this may be so, the present paper argues that any moral transformations of such loves would need to be informed by moral wisdom or knowledge rather than vice versa. However, the paper concludes that there are ultimately deep and perhaps irreconcilable tensions between the epistemic and agapeic dimensions of moral life.

Disagreement and Convergence

2020 ◽  
pp. 193-212
Author(s):  
Billy Dunaway
Keyword(s):  
At Risk ◽  
Moral Knowledge ◽  
Moral Disagreement ◽  
Moral Language ◽  
Moral Beliefs ◽  
The Core ◽  
Realist View

The main problem in the first five chapters is that of explaining why it is that many possible users of moral language disagree with one other, rather than talk past each other. There are other problems about moral disagreement which relate to the core claims of the realist view that I have defended. These problems center on the notion of convergence: many users of moral terms do not appear to be disposed to agree, or converge, on moral matters, even after extensive reflection. Some argue that non-converging users of moral language cannot refer to the same property. Others claim that if convergence does not obtain, then moral knowledge is not possible. This chapter shows how the realist view developed in the previous chapters should reject these claims. It should hold that reference magnetism allows for non-converging speakers to co-refer, and that the possibility of a non-converging speaker does not show that moral beliefs are at risk of being false, and so not knowledge.

The Difficulty of Moral Knowledge

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joshua May
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Biases ◽  
Moral Knowledge ◽  
Moral Foundations ◽  
Moral Foundations Theory ◽  
Ordinary People ◽  
Moral Issues ◽  
Moral Skepticism ◽  
Moral Beliefs ◽  
Debunking Arguments ◽  
Selective Targeting

While empirical debunking arguments fail to support wide-ranging moral skepticism, there are more modest threats to moral knowledge. First, debunking arguments are more successful if highly selective, targeting specific sets of moral beliefs that experimental research reveals to be distinguished for morally irrelevant reasons (thus flouting consistency reasoning). Second, the science of political disagreement suggests that many ordinary people can’t claim to know what they believe about controversial moral issues. Drawing on moral foundations theory, the best examples come from disagreements between liberals and conservatives within a culture. Controversial moral beliefs at least are disputed by what one should regard as epistemic peers, at least because others are just as likely to be wrong, even if not right, due to cognitive biases that affect proponents of all ideologies, such as motivated reasoning. Still, both of these empirical threats to moral knowledge are limited.

scholarly journals Moral Perception and the Reliability Challenge

2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 63-73 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Faraci
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
Moral Epistemology ◽  
Moral Knowledge ◽  
Moral Perception ◽  
Moral Beliefs ◽  
Dead End ◽  
Reliability Challenge

Given a traditional intuitionist moral epistemology, it is notoriously difficult for moral realists to explain the reliability of our moral beliefs. This has led some to go looking for an alternative to intuitionism. Perception is an obvious contender. I previously argued that this is a dead end, that all moral perception is dependent on a priori moral knowledge. This suggests that perceptualism merely moves the bump in the rug where the reliability challenge is concerned. Preston Werner responds that my account rests on an overly intellectualized model of perception. In this paper, I argue that though Werner may well be correct, my arguments, properly extended, still suggest that perceptualism leaves realists in no better position than intuitionism when it comes to the reliability challenge.

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