Love, Truth and Moral Judgement

Philosophy ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 94 (04) ◽  
pp. 529-545
Author(s):  
David Carr
Keyword(s):  
Moral Knowledge ◽  
Moral Judgement ◽  
Moral Life ◽  
Transitional Stage ◽  
1 Corinthians ◽  
Iris Murdoch ◽  
Human Love ◽  
Moral Wisdom

AbstractA famous section of 1 Corinthians and some influential passages in the work of Iris Murdoch seem to suppose a significant connection between the higher human love of agape and moral knowledge: that, perhaps, the former may provide access to the latter. Following some sceptical attention to this possibility, this paper turns to a more modest suggestion of Plato's Symposium that the ‘lower’ human love of eros might be a transitional stage to higher moral love or knowledge of the good. Still, while conceding that this may be so, the present paper argues that any moral transformations of such loves would need to be informed by moral wisdom or knowledge rather than vice versa. However, the paper concludes that there are ultimately deep and perhaps irreconcilable tensions between the epistemic and agapeic dimensions of moral life.

Moral judgement

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Garrett Cullity
Keyword(s):  
Human Trafficking ◽  
Moral Virtue ◽  
General Rule ◽  
Moral Judgement ◽  
The State ◽  
Psychological State ◽  
Moral Discernment ◽  
Moral Wisdom ◽  
State Of Affairs ◽  
Philosophical Questions

The term ‘moral judgement’ can refer to an activity, a state, a state-content, a capacity or a virtue. The activity of moral judgement is that of thinking about whether something has a moral attribute. The thing assessed might be an action, person, institution or state of affairs, and the attribute might either be general (such as rightness or badness) or specific (such as loyalty or injustice). If I engage in this activity and make up my mind, then the result will be the formation of a psychological state: the state of judging that the thing has the attribute. The state should then be distinguished from its content: what is judged by me, rather than my judging it. My psychological state of judging that human trafficking is wrong is a feature of me with a duration and location that depend on me. But the content of that state – the wrongness of human trafficking itself – is not a feature of me. Philosophers also frequently use ‘moral judgement’ to refer to a capacity: our alleged capacity ‘to go beyond the application of rules’ when we deliberate morally. And, going further, it can be used as a term of commendation, referring to a moral virtue (or set of virtues) that we might also call ‘moral discernment’ or ‘moral wisdom’, displayed when we exercise that capacity well. Someone with the virtue of moral judgement, it is often claimed, has an appropriate sensitivity to the way in which the individuality of a person or the particularity of a context can determine how it is right to act, think and feel – a sensitivity that cannot be captured in any general rule. Moral judgement in these various senses raises four main groups of philosophical questions. First, what kind of psychological state is the state of moral judgement? Is it, either wholly or in part, a belief, or is it some kind of noncognitive state? Secondly, what is required in order for a moral judgement-state, or the content of that state, to be justified? What kind of support do moral judgements require? Thirdly, how ought the activity of moral judgement to be conducted? In particular, what role within this activity is properly played by the application of rules? Do we need a capacity that goes beyond rule-application? And, fourthly, what is it to possess the virtue of moral judgement?

scholarly journals The ideas of F. Bacon, R. Descartes, T. Hobbes about the morality and ethics relating to education

2017 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 178-182
Author(s):  
Anna Vladimirovna Guschina
Keyword(s):  
Moral Education ◽  
Practical Problem ◽  
Human Life ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Moral Life ◽  
Modern Time ◽  
Moral Wisdom ◽  
Inner World ◽  
Ethnicity And Race

The paper provides evidence of the importance and necessity to resort to the ideas of modern time philosophers about morality. Understanding their application to education makes it possible to identify conserved and preserved ideas of moral education of humans. The author shows that the moral wisdom include the experience of mankind that has started to realize the value of each person, the equality of all people regardless of ethnicity and race, to understand that living in harmony with their own kind means to contribute to the prosperity of mankind. The author proves that identification of the relation between morality and ethics is conditioned by the need to solve a practical problem - to identify the ideas of F. Bacon, R. Descartes, T. Hobbes about morality and ethics who consume these categories as synonyms relating to education. According to F. Bacon, morality comes to a person from outside and a leading way of moral decency acquisition is teaching, turning into manners. Morality, from R. Descartes point of view, guiding human life and customs, is given to man from outside; following the rules of human morality is a key way of building a proper and moral life. Morality, from R. Descartes and T. Hobbes point of view, determines mans inner world.

The Philosophy of a Christian Virtuoso iii

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Victor Nuovo
Keyword(s):  
Moral Knowledge ◽  
Moral Life ◽  
Divine Command ◽  
Civic Life ◽  
Law Of Nature ◽  
Ethical System ◽  
Hugo Grotius ◽  
Reliable Source ◽  
The Law

The question why Locke failed to publish an ethical system, notwithstanding the value he placed on the moral life, is raised and its answer postponed. Locke’s thoughts about ethics expressed in the Essay and other writings are examined, their sources identified, and the systematic connections between them are considered. Hellenistic sources, especially Epicurean ones, are identified, along with the ethical rationalism and naturalism of Hugo Grotius. Following Grotius, Locke developed a theory of the law of nature, rooted in social convenience, but sanctioned by divine command. In Some Thoughts concerning Education, Locke advocated the cultivation of virtues suitable to the moral and civic life of a gentleman. His abortive attempt to develop a system of ethics in ‘Of Ethics in General’, intended as a chapter of the Essay, but abandoned, brings the reader back to the opening question. Locke concluded that revelation is a more reliable source of moral knowledge.

scholarly journals Murdoch andMargaret: Learning a Moral Life

2017 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 265-280
Author(s):  
Lucy Bolton
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Life ◽  
Moral Decision ◽  
Iris Murdoch ◽  
Moral Decision Making ◽  
Moral Good ◽  
Moral Agents

Reading the moral philosophy of Iris Murdoch alongside film enables us to see Murdoch's notions of practical moral good in action. For Murdoch, moral philosophy can be seen as “a more systematic and reflective extension of what ordinary moral agents are continually doing”. Murdoch can help us further by her consideration of the value of a moral fable: does a morally important fable always imply universal rules? And how do we decide whether a fable is morally important? By bringing Murdoch and Margaret (Kenneth Lonergan, 2011) together in an exploration of the moral decision making of the film's protagonist and our assessment of her choices, we can learn more about the idea of film as a morally important fable rather than a fable that is purely decorative.

scholarly journals O DESENVOLVIMENTO DO JULGAMENTO MORAL E SUA RELAÇÃO COM AÇÕES POLÍTICAS E JURÍDICAS: UMA ILUSTRAÇÃO A PARTIR DO PENSAMENTO DE ARISTÓTELES

2010 ◽  
Vol 37 (119) ◽  
pp. 309
Author(s):  
Leonardo Alves Vieira
Keyword(s):  
Human Life ◽  
Moral Judgement ◽  
Moral Life ◽  
Nicomachean Ethics ◽  
De Anima ◽  
Material Constitution ◽  
Rational Structure ◽  
Intellectual Virtues ◽  
The Social

O trabalho procura enfrentar o tema do julgamento moral e sua relação com ações políticas e jurídicas através da filosofia de Aristóteles. De acordo com sua Metafísica da forma e matéria, exploro a interpretação aristotélica da constituição psíco-material do homem, exposta no De anima. Com base nessas considerações iniciais, a “obra do homem” é estudada no horizonte da Ética a Nicômacos. As virtudes éticas e intelectuais formarão o juízo moral do homem, na medida em que ele gradualmente tome posse de sua alma racional, a medida especificamente humana. Embora uma qualidade da alma, o agir moral não pode, contudo, simplesmente negligenciar as circunstâncias corpóreas da vida humana. Finalmente, a Política tematiza o contexto sócio-político-jurídico (as várias formas de constituição e suas bases sócio-econômicas) em que a vida moral alcança seu pleno florescimento ou se defronta com obstáculos que a desviam de sua estrutura racional.Abstract: Taking as a guide Aristotle’s philosophy, this paper seeks to address the issue of moral judgement and its relationship with political and juridical actions. According to the philosopher’s Metaphysics of form and matter, I investigate the Aristotelian idea of the psycho-material constitution of man, as presented in De anima. Based on the above mentioned considerations, “the function of man” is studied within the horizon of the Nicomachean Ethics. Moral and intellectual virtues form man’s moral judgement as he gradually gets possession of his rational soul, the human measure par excellence. Although it is a quality of the soul, the moral deed cannot, however, neglect the corporeal condition of human life. Finally, Aristotle’s Politics deals with the social, political and juridical context (the several forms of constitution and their socio-economic bases) in which moral life reaches its full unfolding or faces obstacles that deviate it from its rational structure. 

The place of reason in the moral life: Moral knowledge.

2012 ◽  
pp. 306-336
Author(s):  
John Dewey ◽  
James H. Tufts
Keyword(s):  
Moral Knowledge ◽  
Moral Life

Only Connect: The Place of Self-Knowledge in Ethics

1987 ◽  
Vol 13 ◽  
pp. 308-338 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sheila Mullett
Keyword(s):  
Moral Agency ◽  
Recent Literature ◽  
Charles Taylor ◽  
Moral Life ◽  
Feminist Ethics ◽  
Human Love ◽  
American Tradition ◽  
Self Knowledge ◽  
Anglo American ◽  
Caring Relations

Only connect the prose and the passion, and both will be exalted, and human love will be seen at its height. Live in fragments no longer.(E.M.Forster)How important is self-knowledge in moral life? What kind of self-knowledge, if any, is necessary for full moral agency? What kinds of self-knowledge are there? What is ‘full moral agency’? Despite the great proliferation of theories about the self in psychology in this century, questions like these have not been addressed very often in recent literature on ethics in the Anglo-American tradition. And, although in 1958 Anscombe recommended that we stop doing moral philosophy altogether until we have a better moral psychology, the main response to this suggestion has been a renewed interest in the virtues. Another approach to these problems can be found in feminist ethics, with its interest in caring relations. In this paper I shall describe a few of the connections between caring and self-knowledge. I shall then compare the insights generated by this approach with the views of two authors, who work from radically opposed frameworks, Richard Brandt and Charles Taylor. Both have produced interesting, but completely different descriptions of self-knowledge and its place in moral life.

Can Fiction be Philosophy?

1998 ◽  
pp. 23-30
Author(s):  
Margaret G. Holland
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Life ◽  
Martha Nussbaum ◽  
Iris Murdoch ◽  
Writing Style ◽  
Moral Understanding ◽  
Religious Texts ◽  
Philosophy And Literature ◽  
Moral Claims

This paper examines the relation between philosophy and literature through an analysis of claims made by Martha Nussbaum regarding the contribution novels can make to moral philosophy. Perhaps her most controversial assertion is that some novels are themselves works of moral philosophy. I contrast Nussbaum’s view with that of Iris Murdoch. I discuss three claims which are fundamental to Nussbaum’s position: the relation between writing style and content; philosophy’s inadequacy in preparing agents for moral life because of its reliance on rules; and the usefulness of the moral work engaged in by readers of novels. The evaluation of these claims requires a discussion of the nature of philosophy. I find that Murdoch and Nussbaum agree on the ability of literature to contribute to moral understanding, but disagree on the issue of what philosophy is. Therefore, they disagree on the question of whether certain works of fiction are also works of philosophy. I argue that the task Nussbaum assigns philosophy is too broad. Through the use of critical and reflective methods, philosophy should examine and sort moral claims. Literary, philosophical and religious texts contribute to moral eduction; keeping them separate helps us appreciate their distinct contributions, as well as respect their distinct aims and methods. Therefore, I conclude that Nussbaum’s inclusion of certain novels in philosophy cannot be sustained.

scholarly journals Hume's sentimentalism: Not non-cognitivism

2021 ◽  
Vol 1 (34) ◽  
pp. 95-111
Author(s):  
Jonas Olson
Keyword(s):  
Moral Knowledge ◽  
Moral Judgement ◽  
Motivational Internalism ◽  
Positive Evidence ◽  
Moral Beliefs ◽  
Textual Support

This paper considers and argues against old and recent readings of Hume according to which his account of moral judgement is non-cognitivist. In previous discussions of this topic, crucial metaethical distinctions-between sentimentalism and non-cognitivism and between psychological and semantic non-cognitivism-are often blurred. The paper aims to remedy this and argues that making the appropriate metaethical distinctions undermines alleged support for non-cognitivist interpretations of Hume. The paper focuses in particular on Hume's so-called 'motivation argument' and argues that it is a poor basis for non-cognitivist interpretations. While there is textual support for attributing to Hume what may be called 'modally weak' motivational internalism, there is no solid textual support for attributing to him either psychological or semantic non-cognitivism. The paper also challenges briefly some further alleged support for non-cognitivist interpretations. It concludes by offering some positive evidence against such interpretations, namely that Hume appears to hold that there are moral beliefs and moral knowledge.

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