scholarly journals Recusatio iudicus: Serbian scope, comparative review and practice of European Court of Human Rights

2020 ◽  
pp. 137-150
Author(s):  
Krsto Pejović

The right of a party to exercise a judicial function in a case deciding its rights and obligations is impartial to a judge, which is determined by the obligation of the state to provide, first in a normative and then in a practical framework, the right to be upheld. Prima faciae, when it comes to the Serbian and legal frameworks of surrounding countries, it has been done nomotechnically in an impeccable way, but there are a number of essential shortcomings. The results we have obtained, using comparative legal review and analyzing practice of ECHR indicate that the Serbian, as well as the legislatures in the region, faces major problems in this area. As an anomaly we identified the possibility that a judge, although biased, in accordance with applicable regulations (in Serbian, Croatian and North Macedonian legal framework), could exercise judicial function in the case (because, there Criminal procedure codes stipulates that judge "can" be disqualified if there are doubts in his impartiality). Furthermore, very big problem in all legislatures (except Montenegrin) was that the injured party, although entitled to make a compensation claim (and this claim, within the meaning of Article 6(1) of the European Convention constitutes a civil claim), has no opportunity to seek a judicial excption/recusation. Finally, all analyzed legislation, except the Slovenian, allows a judge to take immediate action when it comes to an optional recusation. Disagreeing with this, we suggested that in the future they follow their Slovenian colleague who arranged it in a much better way.

2014 ◽  
pp. 33-48
Author(s):  
Przemysław Florjanowicz-Błachut

The core function of the judiciary is the administration of justice through delivering judgments and other decisions. The crucial role for its acceptance and legitimization by not only lawyers, but also individulas (parties) and the hole society plays judicial reasoning. It should reflect on judge’s independence within the exercise of his office and show also judicial self-restraint or activism. The axiology and the standards of proper judicial reasoning are anchored both in constitutional and supranational law and case-law. Polish Constitutional Tribunal derives a duty to give reasoning from the right to a fair trial – right to be heard and bring own submissions before the court (Article 45 § 1 of the Constitution), the right to appeal against judgments and decisions made at first stage (Article 78), the rule of two stages of the court proceedings (Article 176) and rule of law clause (Article 2), that comprises inter alia right to due process of law and the rule of legitimate expactation / the protection of trust (Vertrauensschutz). European Court of Human Rights derives this duty to give reasons from the guarantees of the right to a fair trial enshrined in Article 6 § 1 of European Convention of Human Rights. In its case-law the ECtHR, taking into account the margin of appreciation concept, formulated a number of positive and negative requirements, that should be met in case of proper reasoning. The obligation for courts to give sufficient reasons for their decisions is also anchored in European Union law. European Court of Justice derives this duty from the right to fair trial enshrined in Articles 6 and 13 of the ECHR and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Standards of the courts reasoning developed by Polish constitutional court an the European courts (ECJ and ECtHR) are in fact convergent and coherent. National judges should take them into consideration in every case, to legitimize its outcome and enhance justice delivery.


Author(s):  
Guido Raimondi

This article comments on four important judgments given by the European Court of Human Rights in 2016. Al-Dulimi v. Switzerland addresses the issue of how, in the context of sanctions regimes created by the UN Security Council, European states should reconcile their obligations under the UN Charter with their obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights to respect the fundamentals of European public order. Baka v. Hungary concerns the separation of powers and judicial independence, in particular the need for procedural safeguards to protect judges against unjustified removal from office and to protect their legitimate exercise of freedom of expression. Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v. Hungary is a judgment on the interpretation of the Convention, featuring a review of the “living instrument” approach. Avotiņš v. Latvia addresses the principle of mutual trust within the EU legal order and the right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the Convention.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Léon E Dijkman

Abstract Germany is one of few jurisdictions with a bifurcated patent system, under which infringement and validity of a patent are established in separate proceedings. Because validity proceedings normally take longer to conclude, it can occur that remedies for infringement are imposed before a decision on the patent’s validity is available. This phenomenon is colloquially known as the ‘injunction gap’ and has been the subject of increasing criticism over the past years. In this article, I examine the injunction gap from the perspective of the right to a fair trial enshrined in Art. 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. I find that the case law of the European Court of Human Rights interpreting this provision supports criticism of the injunction gap, because imposing infringement remedies with potentially far-reaching consequences before the validity of a patent has been established by a court of law arguably violates defendants’ right to be heard. Such reliance on the patent office’s grant decision is no longer warranted in the light of contemporary invalidation rates. I conclude that the proliferation of the injunction gap should be curbed by an approach to a stay of proceedings which is in line with the test for stays as formulated by Germany’s Federal Supreme Court. Under this test, courts should stay infringement proceedings until the Federal Patent Court or the EPO’s Board of Appeal have ruled on the validity of a patent whenever it is more likely than not that it will be invalidated.


2019 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 48-53
Author(s):  
Kaushik Paul

In recent years, the wearing of Islamic dress in public spaces and elsewhere has generated widespread controversy all over Europe. The wearing of the hijab and other Islamic veils has been the subject of adjudication before the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) on many occasions. The most recent case before the ECtHR as to the prohibition on wearing the hijab is Lachiri v Belgium. In this case, the ECtHR held that a prohibition on wearing the hijab in the courtroom constitutes an infringement of Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which guarantees the right to freedom of religion or belief. From the perspective of religious freedom, the ruling of the Strasbourg Court in Lachiri is very significant for many reasons. The purpose of this comment is critically to analyse the ECtHR's decision in Lachiri from the standpoint of religious liberty.


2003 ◽  
Vol 52 (2) ◽  
pp. 297-332 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emmanuel Voyiakis

This comment discusses three recent judgments of the European Court of Human Rights in the cases of McElhinney v Ireland, Al-Adsani v UK, and Fogarty v UK. All three applications concerned the dismissal by the courts of the respondent States of claims against a third State on the ground of that State's immunity from suit. They thus raised important questions about the relation the European Convention on Human Rights (the Convention)—especially the right to a fair trial and access to court enshrined in Arcticle 6(1)—and the law of State immunity.


2011 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 165-176 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dennis Kurzon

In two English cases which reached the European Court of Human Rights in the mid-2000s, it was argued that the statutory requirement on the part of a motorist who has been caught speeding to give the police information concerning the identity of the driver of the car at the time of the offence is a violation of the right of silence by which a person should not be put into a position that s/he incriminates him/herself. The right of silence is one of the conventional interpretations of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. As well as a study on the right of silence with regard to written texts, this paper also investigates the two cases in terms of icons and indices: a text may be indexical of a basic human right, and then may become an icon of that right. The European Court of Human Rights considers the particular section of the relevant statute as an icon of the "regulatory regime".


De Jure ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ilmira Ilieva ◽  
◽  
◽  

This article examines the organization and functioning of Bulgarian military courts to determine to what extent they are compatible with fair trial standards. The guarantees and institutional requirements for providing the right to a fair trial are analyzed in the light of the European Convention on Human Rights and the practice of the European Court of Human Rights. This research is focused on the issue whether Bulgarian military courts could provide a fair trial, held by an independent and impartial court, mainly with regard to civil citizens. For the purpose of the research is scrutinized the ECHR Judgment from 28.11.2019 on the case Mustafa vs. Bulgaria.


2017 ◽  
Vol 6 (s2) ◽  
pp. 9-17
Author(s):  
Pir Ali Kaya ◽  
Ceyhun Güler

Abstract According to The European Social Charter, the European Convention on Human Rights, the ILO Conventions, the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, the decisions of the European Social Rights Committee and the ILO supervisory bodies, the right to collective action is a democratic right that aims to protect and correct the economic and social interests of workers in the workplace or in another place appropriate for the purpose of action. The above-mentioned institutions accept the right to collective action as a fundamental human right. According to the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, the right to collective action is regarded as a democratic right, including strike. In particular, the right to collective action is being used as a resistance mechanism against new working relations, which are imposed on working conditions, right to work and the right to organize. However, the tendency of this right to political field, leads to some debate about the legality of the right to collective action. In this context, In the decision of the European Court of Human Rights, the ILO's supervisory bodies and the European Committee on Social Rights, it is emphasized that collective action rights should be a basic human right. In this study, the legal basis of the right to collective action will be discussed in accordance with the decisions and requirements of the European Court of Human Rights and the decisions of the ILO supervisory bodies.


2009 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
pp. 353-375 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher Hilson

Abstract The aim of this chapter is to provide an initial attempt at analysis of the place of risk within the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and, where appropriate, the Commission, focusing on the related issues of public concern and perception of risk and how the ECHR dispute bodies have addressed these. It will argue that, for quite some time, the Court has tended to adopt a particular, liberal conception of risk in which it stresses the right of applicants to be provided with information on risk to enable them to make effective choices. Historically, where public concerns in relation to particular risks are greater than those of scientific experts—nuclear radiation being the prime example in the case law—the Court has adopted a particularly restrictive approach, stressing the need for risk to be ‘imminent’ in order to engage the relevant Convention protections. However, more recently, there have been emerging but as yet still rather undeveloped signs of the Court adopting a more sensitive approach to risk. One possible explanation for this lies in the Court’s growing awareness of and reference to the Aarhus Convention. What we have yet to see—because there has not yet been a recent, post-Aarhus example involving such facts—is a case where no imminent risk is evident. Nevertheless, the chapter concludes that the Court’s old-style approach to public concern in such cases, in which it rode roughshod over rights to judicial review, is out of line with the third, access to justice limb of Aarhus.


2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 244-269
Author(s):  
Christine Carpenter

Abstract Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights protects the right to freedom of religion and conscience. The language of Article 9(1) has been interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights as including protections for acts of proselytism, when properly committed and respectful of the rights and freedoms of others. This was the view taken in the foundational Article 9 case of the Court, Kokkinakis v. Greece. In the decades since Kokkinakis, however, the view of the Court on proselytism appears to have shifted, in particular in Article 9 cases involving religious garments. This article seeks to determine whether the Court is consistent in its views on proselytism between these religious garment cases and earlier examples of Article 9 case law.


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