Lachiri v Belgium and Bans on Wearing Islamic Dress in the Courtroom: An Emerging Trend

2019 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 48-53
Author(s):  
Kaushik Paul

In recent years, the wearing of Islamic dress in public spaces and elsewhere has generated widespread controversy all over Europe. The wearing of the hijab and other Islamic veils has been the subject of adjudication before the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) on many occasions. The most recent case before the ECtHR as to the prohibition on wearing the hijab is Lachiri v Belgium. In this case, the ECtHR held that a prohibition on wearing the hijab in the courtroom constitutes an infringement of Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which guarantees the right to freedom of religion or belief. From the perspective of religious freedom, the ruling of the Strasbourg Court in Lachiri is very significant for many reasons. The purpose of this comment is critically to analyse the ECtHR's decision in Lachiri from the standpoint of religious liberty.

2010 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 266-279 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ian Leigh

This article analyses recent trends in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights concerned with the right to freedom of thought, belief and religion (Article 9, European Convention on Human Rights) and the right of parents to respect by the state for their religious and philosophical views in the education of their children (Article 2, Protocol 1).1 These developments include notable decisions concerned with protection from religious persecution in Georgia, with religious education in Norway and Turkey and with the display of crucifixes in state schools in Italy. It is apparent that the European Convention religious liberty jurisprudence increasingly stresses the role of the state as a neutral protector of religious freedom. For individuals religious freedom is now also recognised to include not only the right to manifest their religious belief but also freedom from having to declare their religious affiliation. As the religious liberty jurisprudence comes of age, other significant developments, for example in relation to conscientious objection to military service, can be anticipated.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Léon E Dijkman

Abstract Germany is one of few jurisdictions with a bifurcated patent system, under which infringement and validity of a patent are established in separate proceedings. Because validity proceedings normally take longer to conclude, it can occur that remedies for infringement are imposed before a decision on the patent’s validity is available. This phenomenon is colloquially known as the ‘injunction gap’ and has been the subject of increasing criticism over the past years. In this article, I examine the injunction gap from the perspective of the right to a fair trial enshrined in Art. 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. I find that the case law of the European Court of Human Rights interpreting this provision supports criticism of the injunction gap, because imposing infringement remedies with potentially far-reaching consequences before the validity of a patent has been established by a court of law arguably violates defendants’ right to be heard. Such reliance on the patent office’s grant decision is no longer warranted in the light of contemporary invalidation rates. I conclude that the proliferation of the injunction gap should be curbed by an approach to a stay of proceedings which is in line with the test for stays as formulated by Germany’s Federal Supreme Court. Under this test, courts should stay infringement proceedings until the Federal Patent Court or the EPO’s Board of Appeal have ruled on the validity of a patent whenever it is more likely than not that it will be invalidated.


2016 ◽  
Vol 19 (01) ◽  
pp. 3-13 ◽  

The right to freedom of religion, enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights has been frequently tested, both in UK courts and in the European Court of Human Rights, where successive decisions over a number of years led to the establishment of several well-known principles. However, in recent years religious extremism has brought into focus a tension between the right of freedom of religious expression and the well-being of individuals (not least children) and society. The Strasbourg court requires neutrality on the part of the state and its courts. However, unlike the European Court of Human Rights, the domestic courts have had to face situations where religious observance can be seen to be causing serious harm and where interference in religious freedom and family life has been shown to be justified.


2017 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 168-173
Author(s):  
Tamara Gerasimenko

The subject. The article is devoted to the subject of the exhaustion of domestic remediesbefore filing a complaint to the European Court of Human Rights.The purpose. The purpose of this article is to show and reveal the characteristics of suchimportant condition of lodging a complaint before the European Court of Human Rights asthe exhaustion of domestic remedies.The methodology. The following scientific methods have been used to write this article:analysis, comparing and making conclusions.Results, scope of application. The right of individual petition is rightly considered to be thehallmark and the greatest achievement of the European Convention on Human Rights. Individualswho consider that their human rights have been violated have the possibility oflodging a complaint before the European Court of Human Rights. However, there are importantadmissibility requirements set out in the Convention that must be satisfied beforea case be examined. Applicants are expected to have exhausted their domestic remediesand have brought their complaints within a period of six months from the date of the finaldomestic decision. The obligation to exhaust domestic remedies forms part of customaryinternational law, recognized as such in the case – law of the International Court of Justice.The rationale for the exhaustion rule is to give the national authorities, primarily the courts,the opportunity to prevent or put right the alleged violation of the Convention. The domesticlegal order should provide an effective remedy for violations of Convention rights.Conclusions. The rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies is an important part of the functioningof the protection system under the Convention and its basic principle. 


2021 ◽  
pp. 402-419
Author(s):  
Peter Cumper ◽  
Tom Lewis

This chapter examines the interpretation of the right to freedom of religion or belief under Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights (1950) by the European Court of Human Rights. The topic is examined with reference to legal bans on items of Islamic dress such as headscarves and face-veils. It is argued that both the structure of Article 9, and the way in which it has been interpreted, has resulted in weak levels of protection for applicants bringing such claims, and that the reasons for this lie deep in European history and politics. The Court’s approach may, arguably, be justifiable in that the protection it offers is subsidiary to that offered by states. Nevertheless, the scant hope that such applicants have raises questions as to the effectiveness of the Convention and threatens to undermine much of the laudable work that has been undertaken elsewhere by the Court.


Author(s):  
Kristina Hatas

This case list offers a guide to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) case law pertaining to migration. While the case list does not cite every ECtHR decision related to migration, it offers a comprehensive overview of important instances of case law indicative of the ECtHR’s jurisprudence on migration. These are, for example, Grand Chamber decisions, or cases cited by the Court in its more recent case law. In addition to including key cases cited in the preceding chapters of this book, this list also includes cases identified in thematic case law guides of the ECHR and recent jurisprudence in the area of migration, notified by the ECHR in monthly updates. The cases are organised in thematic blocks, which in turn appear in the order in which they pertain to the different temporal stages of migration, from entering the destination country to the right to remain and the cultural and religious rights of long-term migrants.


2008 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 599-627 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Cumper ◽  
Tom Lewis

It is a view widely held amongst psychologists that human beings have a basic need to create a positive social identity for themselves, either as individuals or as members of a group. In this regard, choice of dress is likely to be particularly important. A person's clothes can reveal much about their identity, in relation to their gender, class, sexual orientation, and religious beliefs. Yet what an individual wears can also attract great controversy, as evidenced by the fact that, in Europe of late, there have been few issues more controversial than that of religious dress.Today in towns and cities across Europe a significant proportion of Muslims—in particular Muslim females—have eschewed conventional western clothes in favor of garments (such as veils and headscarves) traditionally associated with Islam. With a new generation of “European Muslims” keen to cultivate a distinct identity for themselves as members of the continent's second largest religion, Islamic dress often has an “emblematic status” as a “powerful and overdetermined marker of difference.” Yet the right to wear religious dress varies significantly in Europe. In some countries there are clear restrictions on what can (or cannot) be worn in public (e.g., France and Turkey), whereas in other parts of the continent (e.g., the U.K.) young people are relatively free to wear the religious dress of their choice. Mindful of this state of affairs, the European Court of Human Rights has chosen to tread warily, letting governments retain considerable discretion in the field of religious dress. Consequently, states enjoy a wide “margin of appreciation” when determining whether their curbs on religious symbols or related garments are compatible with Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).


Author(s):  
Nicholas Hatzis

This chapter discusses whether there is a non-religious justification for limiting religiously offensive speech. The most commonly used argument is that the right to freedom of religion includes a more specific right to be protected from offence to one’s religious sensibilities. If this is correct, it provides a non-religious reason for censorship: even those who are hostile to religion can accept that religious freedom is an important right and that the government is justified in giving effect to rights. The European Court of Human Rights has repeatedly upheld restrictions on expression which insults religious feelings, reasoning that religious freedom, as guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights, protects the religious sensibilities of believers from offence. I suggest that this interpretation is mistaken. After exploring how rights give rise to claims, I argue that there is no right-based claim to be protected from the unpleasant feelings caused by religious insults. Therefore, it is unpersuasive to describe cases of religious offence as involving the conflict of two fundamental rights—speech and religion—which require a balancing exercise to decide which one will prevail each time.


Author(s):  
Lucía CASADO CASADO

LABURPENA: Lan honetan, lehen-lehenik, hurbilpen orokor bat egingo dugu Giza Eskubideak eta Oinarrizko Askatasunak Babesteko Europako Hitzarmenak jasotzen dituen diskriminazio-debekuaren eta hezkuntzarako eskubidearen eraketari; eta ondoren, arraza-diskriminazioaren debekuak hezkuntzarako eskubidearekin duen lotura aztertuko dugu, Giza Eskubideen Europako Auzitegiaren jurisprudentziaren esparruan. Horretarako, eremu horretako lau epai esanguratsuri helduko diegu: Giza Eskubideak eta beste batzuk Txekiar Errepublikaren aurka kasua, bi epai sortarazi dituena (bata Bigarren Sekzioarena, eta bestea Sala Nagusiarena); Sampanis eta beste batzuk Greziaren aurka kasua, eta Orsus eta beste batzuk Kroaziaren aurka kasua. Kasu horietan planteatzen den auzia da ea estatu jakin batzuek ijito etniako umeak eskolaratzeko abiarazi dituzten neurriak diskriminatzaileak diren ala ez. Horretaz gainera, gogoeta batzuk egingo ditugu alor horretako jurisprudentziaren bilakaeraz eta beraren ondorioez. RESUMEN: este trabajo, tras realizar una aproximación general a la configuración de la prohibición de discriminación y al derecho a la instrucción en el Convenio Europeo para la protección de los derechos humanos y las libertades fundamentales, analiza la prohibición de discriminación racial en conexión con el ejercicio del derecho a la instrucción en la jurisprudencia del Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos. Para ello, examina cuatro sentencias relevantes recaídas en este ámbito (casos D.H. y otros contra República Checa, que ha dado lugar a dos sentencias —una de la Sección 2.ª y otra de la Gran Sala—; Sampanis y otros contra Grecia; y Orsus y otros contra Croacia), en las que se plantea si las medidas adoptadas por determinados Estados en relación con la escolarización de niños de etnia gitana son o no discriminatorias. También se realizan algunas consideraciones en torno a la evolución jurisprudencial en este ámbito y sus consecuencias. ABSTRACT: After a general approximation to the configuration of the prohibition of discrimination and of the right of instruction by the European Convention for the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, this work analyzes the prohibition of racial discrimination in relation with the exercise of the right of instruction within the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. For this purpose, four relevant judgments on the subject (cases D.H and others against the Czech Republic, which produced two rulings: one by the Second section and other by the Grand Chamber; Sampanis against Greece; and Orsus and others against Croatia) where it arose whether the measures adopted by some States in relation to the schooling of kids from the gypsy ethnic group are or not discriminatory are studied. Some considerations regarding the evolution by the case law regarding this area are also carried out and their consequences.


2002 ◽  
Vol 71 (1) ◽  
pp. 83-106
Author(s):  

AbstractThe subject of this article is the right to cross-examine witnesses as laid down in Article 6 paragraph 3(d) of the European Convention on Human Rights. Case law of the European Court and Commission of Human Rights shows that general principles are applied by the Convention organs. Thus, it is practicable – in more general terms – to outline some acceptable possibilities of using statements made to the police or in court before the beginning of the hearing without violating the fair hearing requirement in Article 6.


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