scholarly journals La forja jurisprudencial del principio de transparencia

Author(s):  
Blanca Ballester Martínez

Regulation 1049/2001 establishes and shapes the right of access to documents in the European Union. This right is limited by a series of colliding principles and rights, such as privacy of personal data, ‘ordre public’ or commercial interests. The European Court of Justice, through rulings by each one of its two Courts (the General Court and the European Court), has shaped and generally extended the scope of Regulation 1049/2001, increasing transparency in the institutions. However, there is no clear case-law trend as regards access to documents, since rulings often contradict each other and precedents are of relatively little value. Recent rulings, such as those given to the Borax and Bavarian Lager cases, seem to restrict public access to documents in the institutions by placing access to documents under other values such as privacy and data protection. This trend seems again to contradict what the Lisbon Treaty and the European Charter of Fundamental Rights have just introduced: a higher consideration of access to documents and a clear commitment with institutional transparency. This paper aims at giving a clear overview of the evolution and state of play of the right of public access to documents in the European legislation and case law. By analyzing the latest legal and jurisprudential developments, it can be concluded that law and case law do not seem to go hand in hand yet and seem to contradict each other. Immediate and further developments should be watched with a careful eye, as these will shape the post-Lisbon concept of access to documents. Consequently, essential principles such as transparency and data protection might undergo as well important changes.El Reglamento 1049/2001 consagra y configure el derecho de acceso público a documentos en la Unión Europea. Este derecho está limitado por ciertos bienes jurídicos en conflicto, como la privacidad de los datos personales, el orden público o los intereses comerciales. El Tribunal de Justicia de la Unión Europea, a través de las sentencias emanadas de sus dos instancias, ha pulido y en general extendido el campo de aplicación del Reglamento 1049/2001, aumentando la transparencia en las instituciones. Sin embargo, no hay una línea jurisprudencial clara al respecto, dado que las sentencias a menudo se contradicen entre sí y los precedentes jurisprudenciales parecen tener escaso valor en los asuntos posteriores. Algunas sentencias recientes, como las recaídas en los asuntos Borax y Bavarian Lager, parecen por el contrario restringir el derecho de acceso a documentos, dado que hacen prevalecer otros bienes jurídicos como la privacidad o la protección de datos. Esta última tendencia parece contradecir al Tratado de Lisboa y a la Carta Europea de Derechos Fundamentales, puesto que éstos han introducido una mayor consideración al derecho de acceso a documentos con el fin de aumentar la transparencia institucional. Este artículo busca procurar una panorámica general de la evolución y el estado actual del derecho de acceso público a los documentos tanto en la legislación como en la jurisprudencia europeas. Del análisis tanto de las novedades legislativas y jurisprudenciales al respecto se deduce que ambas no parecen ir a la par, sino que llegan incluso a contradecirse. El desarrollo futuro tanto de la ley como de la jurisprudencia deberán ser objeto de estudio detallado, dado que serán determinantes en la configuración del derecho de acceso a documentos tras el Tratado de Lisboa. Como consecuencia de esto, puede que ciertos principios también fundamentales, como la transparencia o la protección de datos, sufran importantes cambios en un futuro inmediato.

Author(s):  
Oreste Pollicino ◽  
Marco Bassini

The decision of the Court of Justice in Schrems follows the Digital Rights Ireland and Google Spain stances in the Court process of revisiting the data protection framework in Europe in light of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Through the invalidation of Decision 2000/520/EC of the Commission on the adequacy of the US safe harbor principles, the Court of Justice has relied on a very extensive interpretation of the right to private life and data protection. As in the former decisions that have let emerge the existence of a new digital right to privacy, this judgment mirrors some degree of manipulation by the Court of Justice, justified by the goal of protecting as much as possible personal data in the new technological environment.


2014 ◽  
Vol 63 (3) ◽  
pp. 569-597 ◽  
Author(s):  
Orla Lynskey

AbstractArticle 8 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights sets out a right to data protection which sits alongside, and in addition to, the established right to privacy in the Charter. The Charter's inclusion of an independent right to data protection differentiates it from other international human rights documents which treat data protection as a subset of the right to privacy. Its introduction and its relationship with the established right to privacy merit an explanation. This paper explores the relationship between the rights to data protection and privacy. It demonstrates that, to date, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has consistently conflated the two rights. However, based on a comparison between the scope of the two rights as well as the protection they offer to individuals whose personal data are processed, it claims that the two rights are distinct. It argues that the right to data protection provides individuals with more rights over more types of data than the right to privacy. It suggests that the enhanced control over personal data provided by the right to data protection serves two purposes: first, it proactively promotes individual personality rights which are threatened by personal data processing and, second, it reduces the power and information asymmetries between individuals and those who process their data. For these reasons, this paper suggests that there ought to be explicit judicial recognition of the distinction between the two rights.


2020 ◽  
Vol 54 (4) ◽  
pp. 1231-1252
Author(s):  
Tatjana Bugarski ◽  
Milana Pisarić

Possession of accurate, complete and reliable relevant data on electronic communications traffic and timely access of authorized competent state bodies to such data is without a doubt a useful tool in the fight against modern forms of crime. For that reason, it is justified to establish an obligation for providers of electronic communications services to keep certain data on communications for a certain period of time in the realization of which they mediate and to hand over that data at the request of authorized state bodies, in order to use them for legitimate purposes. For this reason, the Data Retention Directive was adopted in 2006, which Member States were required to transpose into national law. However, data retention poses a risk to basic human rights and freedoms, if the regulation establishing this obligation does so without respecting the essence of these rights and freedoms, especially the right to privacy and rights related to the processing of personal data, for which reason the Court of Justice of the European Union declared the Directive invalid is 2014. Despite this decision, Member States continue to regulate the obligation to retain data in their national regulations. In this regard, the question of compliance of these regulations with the fundamental rights and freedoms and principles of the Union is raised. The subject of the paper is the analysis of the case law of the Court of Justice of the EU on this issue after the annulment of the Data Retention Directive.


The Treaty of Lisbon 2007 made the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights legally binding. Article 42 of the Charter sets out the right of access to documents, and today has the same legal value as the Treaties. The law relating to public access to EU documents is in Council Regulation (EC) 1049/2001. It is directly applicable in all Member States. In 2008 the Commission released a proposal for amending the Regulation but no amendments have yet been made. The Regulation, which is examined in detail in Chapter 11, including its definitions and exceptions, is attractive in its brevity compared with the 2000 Act. Another parallel regime for access to environmental information has been created by Regulation (EC) 1367/2006 applying the Aarhus Convention to the Community Institutions. The chapter also discusses the proposals for reform made by the European Ombudsman and others prompted by recent decisions of the European Court.


2018 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 43-55 ◽  
Author(s):  
Menno Mostert ◽  
Annelien L. Bredenoord ◽  
Bart van der Slootb ◽  
Johannes J.M. van Delden

Abstract The right to privacy has usually been considered as the most prominent fundamental right to protect in data-intensive (Big Data) health research. Within the European Union (eu), however, the right to data protection is gaining relevance as a separate fundamental right that should in particular be protected by data protection law. This paper discusses three differences between these two fundamental rights, which are relevant to data-intensive health research. Firstly, the rights based on the right to data protection are of a less context-sensitive nature and easier to enforce. Secondly, the positive obligation to protect personal data requires a more proactive approach by the eu and its Member States. Finally, it guarantees a more comprehensive system of personal data protection. In conclusion, we argue that a comprehensive system of data protection, including research-specific safeguards, is essential to compensate for the loss of individual control in data-intensive health research.


Author(s):  
Francesco Seatzu

The year 2015 was characterized by some important development in the European Court of Justice’s (ECJ) case law as a whole, and in particular the case law on fundamental rights, citizenship, institutional issues, protection of personal data, and social policy and rights issues. Noteworthy is that the ECJ finally issued its landmark and long-awaited judgment in the Maximillian Schrems case that led to the invalidation of the ‘safe harbour’ system, namely, one of the mechanisms in the last fifteen years for personal data transfers from the European Union to US entities having voluntary self-certified under the US safe harbour framework.


2020 ◽  
Vol 37 (2) ◽  
pp. 121-138
Author(s):  
Julia Wojnowska-Radzińska

The purpose of this paper is to explore whether the processing of personal data under Regulation 2017/226 is compatible with the principle of proportionality in the light of Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU and the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). The Regulation 2017/2226 provides the EES system which is the only system that collects the entry/exit data of all third-country nationals entering the Schengen area for a short stay, whether via a land, sea or air border. The EES replaces the current system of manual stamping of passports.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yuliya Samovich

The manual is devoted to making individual complaints to the European Court of human rights: peculiarities of realization of the right to appeal, conditions of admissibility and the judicial procedure of the European Court of Human Rights. The author analyses some “autonomous concepts” used in the court's case law and touches upon the possibility of limiting the right to judicial protection. The article deals with the formation and development of the individual's rights to international judicial protection, as well as the protection of human rights in universal quasi-judicial international bodies and regional judicial institutions of the European Union and the Organization of American States. This publication includes a material containing an analysis of recent changes in the legal regulation of the Institute of individual complaints. The manual is recommended for students of educational organizations of higher education, studying in the areas of bachelor's and master's degree “Jurisprudence”.


2014 ◽  
pp. 33-48
Author(s):  
Przemysław Florjanowicz-Błachut

The core function of the judiciary is the administration of justice through delivering judgments and other decisions. The crucial role for its acceptance and legitimization by not only lawyers, but also individulas (parties) and the hole society plays judicial reasoning. It should reflect on judge’s independence within the exercise of his office and show also judicial self-restraint or activism. The axiology and the standards of proper judicial reasoning are anchored both in constitutional and supranational law and case-law. Polish Constitutional Tribunal derives a duty to give reasoning from the right to a fair trial – right to be heard and bring own submissions before the court (Article 45 § 1 of the Constitution), the right to appeal against judgments and decisions made at first stage (Article 78), the rule of two stages of the court proceedings (Article 176) and rule of law clause (Article 2), that comprises inter alia right to due process of law and the rule of legitimate expactation / the protection of trust (Vertrauensschutz). European Court of Human Rights derives this duty to give reasons from the guarantees of the right to a fair trial enshrined in Article 6 § 1 of European Convention of Human Rights. In its case-law the ECtHR, taking into account the margin of appreciation concept, formulated a number of positive and negative requirements, that should be met in case of proper reasoning. The obligation for courts to give sufficient reasons for their decisions is also anchored in European Union law. European Court of Justice derives this duty from the right to fair trial enshrined in Articles 6 and 13 of the ECHR and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Standards of the courts reasoning developed by Polish constitutional court an the European courts (ECJ and ECtHR) are in fact convergent and coherent. National judges should take them into consideration in every case, to legitimize its outcome and enhance justice delivery.


Author(s):  
Miguel Ángel CABELLOS ESPIÉRREZ

LABURPENA: Lan eremuan bideozaintzaren erabilerak ondorio garrantzitsuak dakartza funtsezko eskubideei dagokienez, esate baterako intimitateari eta datu pertsonalen babesari dagokienez. Hala eta guztiz ere, oraindik ez daukagu araudi zehatz eta espezifikorik kontrol-teknika hori lan eremuan erabiltzeari buruz. Horrek behartuta, errealitate horri araudi-esparru anitz eta generikoa aplikatzeko modua auzitegiek zehaztu behar dute, kontuan hartuta, gainera, Espainiako Konstituzioaren 18.4 artikulua alde horretatik lausoa dela. Konstituzio Auzitegiak, datuen babeserako funtsezko eskubidea aztertzean, datuen titularraren adostasuna eta titular horri eman beharreko informazioa eskubide horretan berebizikoak zirela ezarri zuen; hortik ondorioztatzen da titularraren adostasuna eta hari emandako informazioa mugatuz gero behar bezala justifikatu beharko dela. Hala ere, Konstituzio Auzitegiak, duela gutxiko jurisprudentzian, bere doktrina aldatu du. Aldaketa horrek, lan eremuan, argi eta garbi langileak informazioa jasotzeko duen eskubidea debaluatzea dakar, bere datuetatik zein lortzen ari diren jakiteari dagokionez. RESUMEN: La utilización de la videovigilancia en el ámbito laboral posee importantes implicaciones en relación con derechos fundamentales como los relativos a la intimidad y a la protección de datos personales. Pese a ello, carecemos aún de una normativa detallada y específica en relación con el uso de dicha técnica de control en el ámbito laboral, lo que obliga a que sean los tribunales los que vayan concretando la aplicación de un marco normativo plural y genérico a esa realidad, dada además la vaguedad del art. 18.4 CE. El TC, al analizar el derecho fundamental a la protección de datos, había establecido el carácter central en él del consentimiento del titular de los datos y de la información que debe dársele a éste, de donde se sigue que cualquier limitación del papel de ambos deberá estar debidamente justificada. Sin embargo, en su más reciente jurisprudencia el TC ha realizado un cambio de doctrina que supone, en el ámbito laboral, una clara devaluación del derecho a la información por parte del trabajador en relación con qué datos suyos se están obteniendo. ABSTRACT : T he use of video surveillance systems within the work sphere has major implications for fundamental rights such as privacy and data protection. Nonetheless, we still lack of a detailed and specific regulation regarding the use of that control technology within the work sphere, which obliges courts to define the application of a plural and generic normative framework to that issue, given the vagueness of art. 18.4 of the Constitution. The Constitutional Court, when analyzing the fundamental right to data protection, had settled the centralityof the consent of the data rightholder and of the information to be provided to the latter, and from this it followed that any restriction on the role of both rights should be duly justified. However, in its most recent case law the Constitutional Court has changed its doctrine which means, within the work sphere, a clear devaluation of the right of information by the employee regarding the obtained data of him/her.


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