scholarly journals Dobbeltspillet

Politik ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Maria Bøegh-Lervang ◽  
Laura Madum

The European Union (EU) has from its very beginning had the objective to grant its workers a right to free movement across the European borders. A secondary effect has since then been the right to bring the family along. As the Union has evolved, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has functioned as the primary generator of rights when it comes to securing the union citizens’ right to family reunification. On the other hand, the Danish legislators have been tightening the domestic rules regarding family reunification for numerous years. In other words, there has been a clear discrepancy between EU law and domestic law on the family reunification area for a long time.The article analyzes this discrepancy while trying to gain an insight into the EU’s effect on Danish family reunification policies. 

2011 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 443-466 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Van Elsuwege ◽  
Peter Van Elsuwege ◽  
Dimitry Kochenov

Abstract This article scrutinises the logic behind the recent judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in Ruiz Zambrano and McCarthy focusing on their implications for the right to family reunification under EU law. Specific attention is devoted to the phenomenon of reverse discrimination in the context of the new jurisdiction test established by the Court, which is based on the severity of the Member States’ interference with EU citizenship rights rather than on a pure cross-border logic. EU citizens unable to establish a link with EU law are often subject to stricter family reunification requirements in comparison to their migrant compatriots and even certain third country nationals. It is argued that this situation is difficult to accept in light of the principles of legal certainty, equality and the protection of fundamental rights. A new balance between EU citizenship and Member States’ regulatory autonomy is established but legislative action is required to solve the outstanding problems.


2010 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 462-480 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anja Wiesbrock

On 4 March 2010 the Court of Justice of the European Union issued its first judgment on the conformity with EU law of national provisions implementing Directive 2003/86/EC on the right to family reunification. In the case Chakroun v. Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken the Court had to rule on the Dutch implementing measures concerning resource requirements and the concepts of family reunification and family formation.


2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (2-2019) ◽  
pp. 419-433
Author(s):  
Stefanie Vedder

National high courts in the European Union (EU) are constantly challenged: the European Court of Justice (ECJ) claims the authority to declare national standing interpretations invalid should it find them incompatible with its views on EU law. This principle noticeably impairs the formerly undisputed sovereignty of national high courts. In addition, preliminary references empower lower courts to question interpretations established by their national ‘superiors’. Assuming that courts want to protect their own interests, the article presumes that national high courts develop strategies to elude the breach of their standing interpretations. Building on principal-agent theory, the article proposes that national high courts can use the level of (im-) precision in the wording of the ECJ’s judgements to continue applying their own interpretations. The article develops theoretical strategies for national high courts in their struggle for authority.


2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (5) ◽  
pp. 1073-1098 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mattias Derlén ◽  
Johan Lindholm

AbstractThe case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) is one of the most important sources of European Union law. However, case law's role in EU law is not uniform. By empirically studying how the Court uses its own case law as a source of law, we explore the correlation between, on the one hand, the characteristics of a CJEU case—type of action, actors involved, and area of law—and, on the other hand, the judgment's “embeddedness” in previous case law and value as a precedent in subsequent cases. Using this approach, we test, confirm, and debunk existing scholarship concerning the role of CJEU case law as a source of EU law. We offer the following conclusions: that CJEU case law cannot be treated as a single entity; that only a limited number of factors reliably affect a judgment's persuasive or precedential power; that the Court's use of its own case law as a source of law is particularly limited in successful infringement proceedings; that case law is particularly important in preliminary references—especially those concerning fundamental freedoms and competition law; and that initiating Member State and the number of observations affects the behavior of the Court.


2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-23
Author(s):  
Marija Daka

The paper presents some of the most relevant aspects of European nondiscrimination law established th rough European Union law and the European Convention on Human Rights, looking also at the evolution of the norms and milestones of case-law on equal treatment within the two systems. The paper gives an overview of the non-discrimination concept as interpreted by the Court of Justice of the European Union and by the European Court of Human Rights. We examine the similar elements but also give insight into conceptual differences between the two human rights regimes when dealing with equal treatment. The differences mainly stem from the more complex approach taken by EU law although, based on analysed norms, cases, and provisions, the aspects of equal treatment in EU law are largely consistent with the practice of the ECtHR. Lastly, the paper briefl y places the European non-discrimination law within the multi-layered human rights system, giving some food for thought for the future potential this concept brings.


Author(s):  
Nigel Foster

This chapter examines the procedural law of the European Union (EU), focusing on Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). It explains that Article 267 is the reference procedure by which courts in member states can endorse questions concerning EU law to the European Court of Justice (CoJ). Under this Article, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has the jurisdiction to provide preliminary rulings on the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions, bodies, offices, or agencies of the Union and on the interpretation of the Treaties.


2020 ◽  
Vol 114 (2) ◽  
pp. 261-267
Author(s):  
Monika Zalnieriute

In Google LLC v. Commission nationale de l'informatique et des libertés (CNIL), the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU or Court) held that the EU law only requires valid “right to be forgotten” de-referencing requests to be carried out by a search engine operator on search engine versions accessible in EU member states, as opposed to all versions of its search engine worldwide. While the ruling has been perceived as a “win” for Google and other interveners, such as Microsoft and the Wikimedia Foundation, who argued against worldwide de-referencing, the Court also made clear that that while the EU law does not currently require worldwide de-referencing, “it also does not prohibit such a practice” (para. 72). As a result, the CJEU found that an order by a national supervisory or judicial authority of an EU member state requiring worldwide de-referencing in accordance with its own national data protection laws would not be inconsistent with EU law where the data subject's right to privacy is adequately balanced against the right to freedom of information. By leaving the door to extraterritorial de-referencing wide open, the CJEU continues to pursue its post-Snowden hard-line stance on data privacy in a manner that is likely to transform the data privacy landscape.


2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (6) ◽  
pp. 1491-1508
Author(s):  
Eva Julia Lohse

So far, the German Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht, henceforth:BVerfG) has only made a single preliminary reference to the (now) Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), despite frequent rulings on matters connected with European Union (EU) Law. Its apparent reluctance seemed odd considering the atmosphere of dialogue and cooperation which prevails between the non-constitutional courts and the EU courts. This situation might, however, have changed with the preliminary reference from January 2014, proving predictions on the perceived “most powerful constitutional court” and its relationship to the EU partly wrong. The legal effects of its preliminary reference on the interpretation of Articles 119, 123, 127 ff. of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and the validity of Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) by the European Central Bank (ECB) under EU Law are as yet unclear; although the Opinion of the Advocate General Cruz Villalón was delivered in the beginning of 2015, which did not confirm the doubts expressed by theBVerfGabout the conformity of the OMT programme with EU law. Nonetheless, the interpretative scheme and the normative questions as to the reluctance of theBVerfGremain the same after this single referral and offer explanations as to why theBVerfGhad for nearly sixty years not referred a question to the former European Court of Justice (ECJ).


2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 31-37
Author(s):  
Fabio Giuffrida

This contribution examines whether the principles laid down in M.A.S., M.B. (‘ Taricco II’) may play a role in some forthcoming decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). In Scialdone, the Court will be asked to strike a balance between the effectiveness of national legislation on VAT offences and the principle of lex mitior. The key difference between Taricco and Scialdone lies in the fact that the lex mitior principle, unlike the regulation of the statute of limitation, falls within the scope of the principle of legality at the European level. Kolev concerns instead an alleged incompatibility between Article 325 TFEU and the Bulgarian Code of Criminal Procedure. Unlike Taricco, therefore, the CJEU will have to deal with national rules that form part of procedural criminal law. Nevertheless, it cannot be excluded that the Court may reach a Taricco II-like conclusion (i.e. disapplication in theory, exception to the disapplication in practice), especially if the reasoning of the CJEU will rely on the importance of foreseeability and legal certainty in criminal matters. These same principles could lead the CJEU, in Menci, not to endorse the partial revirement of the European Court of Human Rights in the A. and B v. Norway ruling and, as a consequence, not to lower the EU standard of protection of the right not to be tried or punished twice for the same offence.


Author(s):  
Berthold Rittberger

This chapter examines how the European Union acquired distinctive constitution-like features. It begins with a discussion of three routes to constitutionalization: the first is through changes in the EU's primary law; the second focuses on ‘in between’ constitutionalization; and the third leads directly to the European Court of Justice and its jurisprudence. The chapter proceeds by discussing two developments that have shaped the EU constitutional order almost since the beginning: the emergence of a body of EU law constituting a set of higher-order legal rules, and the consolidation of the constitutional principle of representative democracy. It explains how the supremacy and direct effect of EU law, as well as the EU court's concern with the protection of fundamental rights, helped transform the EU into a constitutional polity. It also considers how the extension of the legislative, budgetary, and other powers of the European Parliament animated the constitutional principle.


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