scholarly journals Competition Law Enforcement in Italy after the ECN+ Directive: the Difficult Balance between Effectiveness and Over-enforcement

2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (19) ◽  
pp. 91-109
Author(s):  
Giacomo Dalla Valentina

Almost fifteen years after its adoption, the system of decentralized enforcement laid down in Regulation 1/2003 has shaped competition law in a way that could hardly be predicted, in terms of both magnitude and quality of the activities of National Competition Authorities. More recently, the so-called ‘ECN+ Directive’ was adopted to address the shortcoming of such system, namely a perceived lack of independence and accountability of several NCAs and a certain degree of divergence within the European Competition Network. In this scenario, the Italian Competition Authority has frequently been depicted as a well-equipped, independent and effective enforcer and – with a few notable exceptions – the international debate concerning such reform has mostly overlooked its possible impact within the Italian legal system. This paper aims to assess whether, and to what an extent, the ECN+ Directive should affect the enforcement of competition law in Italy and, in particular, those fundamental guarantees of independence and effectiveness that form the core of the rule of law in the field of EU competition law.

Author(s):  
Katalin J Cseres

This chapter evaluates the functioning of the decentralized public enforcement of EU competition law. The analysis focuses on the effectiveness of the decentralized enforcement, which relies on Rule of Law principles. It has been argued that Rule of Law principles are a prerequisite for effective competition law enforcement. Aside from that, assessing the effectiveness of the decentralized enforcement framework also takes account of the problems of multilevel governance which have emerged as a result of the decentralization of enforcement powers and the creation of parallel competences for the Commission and national actors which made it essential to guarantee uniform and consistent application of the EU competition rules. Centrifugal pulls from the Member States towards their national legal systems and centripetal pushes from the Commission create uniformity and consistency in this multilevel system. Analysing these bottom-up and top-down approaches allows us to analyse decentralized enforcement as a specific governance model.


2020 ◽  
Vol 40 (4) ◽  
pp. 846-877
Author(s):  
Maria Ioannidou

Abstract Over the years, regulators have sought to improve the effectiveness of both private and public competition law enforcement. In EU competition law, recent debates have concerned damages actions for competition law violations and the empowerment of national competition authorities. These debates are often premised on a clear dichotomy between public and private competition law enforcement, each pursuing a distinct set of aims. This article employs a novel holistic approach, which is informed by the theories of responsive regulation and restorative justice, and argues in favour of a ‘responsive’ remodelling of competition law enforcement. Such a ‘responsive’ remodelling advocates flexibility in enforcement mechanisms, with the consensual participation of the affected stakeholders and the adoption of remedies to restore the inflicted harm. The article discusses the current system and its respective aims and problems, and highlights an emerging hybridisation of remedies. Building on this emerging practice, it then constructs the ‘responsive’ remodelling benchmark for effective compliance. It discusses how this benchmark can inform competition law enforcement and it considers its potential to increase compliance, countenance various legitimacy and accountability concerns, increase consumers’ access to markets and bring benefits to the affected parties.


2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 83-101
Author(s):  
Mária T. Patakyová

Abstract Digitalisation is a challenge from the regulatory point of view. Competition law, as a special type of regulation, is no exception to this. The article explores the risks of digitalisation, especially the ones related to the enhanced use of pricing algorithms. In theory, pricing algorithms are not easily assessed from the perspective of competition law, let alone its application in practice. The prohibition of anticompetitive agreements (pursuant to Article 101 of the Treaty on Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)) is applied with certain difficulty to agreements created by using pricing algorithms. This is an unfortunate situation, as horizontal agreements represent one of the worst infringements of EU competition law, including price cartels or bid rigging. Apart from presenting a theoretical background, the article dives into the practice of the Antimonopoly Office of the Slovak Republic (AMO) in order to assess which practical issues the AMO might face when applying the theoretical concepts. In sum, the article asks from a theoretical perspective which issues of competition law have been introduced (or deepened) by the enhanced digitalisation, looking in particular to pricing algorithms. On top of that, the article explores the issues which may be encountered in practice, taking the Slovak jurisdiction as the example. The willingness and feasibility of the AMO to enforce digital issues such as pricing algorithms is assessed based on the previous acts of the AMO as well as the new Act on Protection of Competition, adopted by the Slovak parliament on 11 May 2021.


Author(s):  
Rodger Barry ◽  
Ferro Miguel Sousa ◽  
Marcos Francisco

This chapter explains the contents and goals of the Antitrust Damages Directive (Directive 2014/104/EU), the corollary of the EU’s policy towards the promotion and facilitation of private enforcement of competition law. It first traces the evolution in EU competition law enforcement and policy that led to the adoption of the Directive before considering the goals of the Directive in more detail, namely to provide rules for the effective compensation of victims of antitrust infringements and to harmonize some rules concerning damages claims. It then examines the Directive’s legal basis under EU Law as well as substantive provisions, including those relating to compensatory principles, quantification of harm, and consensual dispute resolution. The chapter goes on to highlight neglected issues, limitations, and inherent biases regarding the scope and nature of the Directive’s rules and concludes with an analysis of issues arising from implementation of the Directive in Member States.


Author(s):  
Cheng Thomas K

This chapter offers a coherent approach to competition law enforcement in developing countries. The promotion of economic growth and development should be the paramount objective of competition law enforcement in developing countries. However, ascribing the objective of the promotion of economic growth and development to competition law enforcement in developing countries does not require a detraction from a focus on promoting competition. In addition, competition law enforcement in developing countries must abide by the principle of causing no harm to the poor in society. If a developing country decides to pursue industrial policy, its competition authority may be asked to balance between competition and industrial policy objectives. Ultimately, competition law enforcement in developing countries must take into account the economic characteristics of developing countries as well as the enforcement capacity of developing country authorities.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document