scholarly journals La nueva economía institucional y la economía de los recursos naturales: Comunes, instituciones, gobernanza y cambio institucional

2011 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 61 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gonzalo Caballero Miguez ◽  
María Dolores Garza Gil

In recent decades, the New Institutional Economics has brought about the “return of institutions” to the economic mainstream, and institutional theory and analysis have been developed from Ronald Coase’s notion of transaction costs and Douglass North’s view on institutions. The Nobel Prize award in Economics to Oliver Williamson and Elinor Ostrom in 2009 has pointed out the relevance of the new institutional approach. Natural Resource Economics has included the institutional determinants of the management of natural resources into its research agenda. In this sense, the advances of the New Institutional Economics allows the development of institutional analysis in the field of the Economics of Natural Resources, such as Elinor Ostrom’s work has shown. This paper presents an integral and updated perspective of the foundations of the New Institutional Economics that constitute a set of theoretical inputs for the analysis of institutions and governance in the management of natural resources.

Author(s):  
Arild Vatn

- Analyzing environmental governance implies foremost to analyze institutional structures and their implications. In doing so, the present paper utilizes insights primarily from the tradition of classical institutional economics. The paper is divided in three. In the first part I describe the main features of the classical position and compare it briefly with that of neoclassical economics and the tradition of new institutional economics. In the second part I clarify what is considered the main aspects of governance as seen from an institutional perspective. In part three I move to the more specific area of environmental governance. The concept of resource regimes is defined. Moreover I analyze how different regimes influence which environmental problems appear and how they can be treated. I discuss how institutions influence the formation and articulation of knowledge and values, how they form and protect interests, how they influence the level of transaction costs and hence the possibilities for coordination, and finally how they form the motivations underlying human choices in concrete contexts. Given that all these variables are shown to be endogenous to the institutional system, the use of comparative analysis in the assessment of various governance options is emphasized.Keywords: classical institutional economics, interdependence, resource regimes, value articulation, interest protection, transaction costs, plural rationalities.JEL classifications: B52; Q50; D02; D70.


2017 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 96
Author(s):  
Jared Isaboke Mose

Trypanosomiasis is a widespread constraint in livestock production, mixed farming and human health in Africa. Several technologies have been developed to ameliorate the effects of the disease but delivery of these technologies to farmers has been undertaken on trial and error basis without a proper strategy leading to more failure than success and wastage of scarce resources. The purpose of this paper was to carry out an analysis of transaction costs incurred in accessing and using insecticide treated net in tsetse and trypanosomiasis control among smallholder cattle farms in Busia County, Kenya. The study utilized cross–sectional survey design and was guided by the New Institutional Economics approach and utilized stratified and simple random sampling technique to get 211 respondents for the study. Data was collected by use of structured questionnaires and analyzed using descriptive and inferential statistics. Conjoint analysis results for zero grazing net showed that cost was the most important factor influencing farmers’ decision, accounting for 38.52% of the total while durability and availability each accounted for 25% and retreatability accounted for 10% of the decisions. Further t-test results showed that there were significant differences between men and women with respect to attribute scores (at 99 d.f. and alpha = 0.05%) suggesting that men and women face different transaction costs in accessing T&T control technologies. Therefore there is need for gender sensitive strategies in T&T technology design and dissemination. Tsetse fly and Trypanosomiasis control by use of low cost technologies such as insecticide treated zero grazing net should be promoted by government and other development partners. The net should be affordable, available at supply outlets close to farmers, long lasting and re-treatable for famers to take it up.


2018 ◽  
Vol 64 (No. 6) ◽  
pp. 277-290 ◽  
Author(s):  
Satola Lukasz ◽  
Wojewodzic Tomasz ◽  
Sroka Wojciech

For at least 25 years, processes involving structural changes have been growing more and more intense in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, with these processes including a decline in the number of small farms. The main aim of this paper is to present the mechanisms involved in, as well as barriers to and costs preventing the exit of farms from agriculture, including those that make it difficult to transfer production resources which are being released to other companies. This research takes the form of an overview and is based on the output of new institutional economics, and on transaction cost and rent-seeking theories in particular. The most frequent difficulties encountered in the process of exit from farming include low profitability of production and the shortage of capital among potential buyers, while the lack of sellers’ financial resources and the necessity of incurring expenses related to preparing and finalising the sale of resources held by them (the actual transaction costs related to closing down farms) are frequently overlooked. The most important barriers preventing the complete liquidation of farms are the inherent transaction costs categorised as expenses, as well as the emotional costs and costs of alternatives, which are difficult to evaluate and estimate. The following notions are particularly helpful in explaining barriers to exit from farming: the concept of transaction costs and rent-seeking theory, which are both a part of the stream of thought of new institutional economics.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eduardo Araral

<p>Water scholars and practitioners generally agree that improving water governance is the key to addressing water insecurity in developing countries. We review the literature on water governance in the last decade and argue for a second-generation research agenda, which pays more attention to the study of incentive structures, is multi and inter-disciplinary in orientation and with clear policy implications. We then illustrate how theories drawn from public economics, new institutional economics, political economy and public administration can help diagnose the challenges of integrated water resources management, improving efficiency of water utilities, privatization of utilities and public-private partnerships, water pricing reforms, virtual waters / water trading, among others. We conclude that these tools can help advance the second-generation research agenda on water governance.</p>


2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 21-36 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniil Frolov

AbstractFrom a modern institutional economics viewpoint, blockchain is an institutional technology that minimizes transaction costs and greatly reduces intermediation. Through an analysis of blockchain, I demonstrate the possibilities of extended institutional approach – a new generation of complexity-focused methodologies and theories of institutional analysis that complement and expand the standard institutional paradigm. By using the theory of transaction value, I argue blockchain technologies not only will lead to a significant reduction in transaction costs but will also reorient intermediaries toward improving the quality of transactions and expanding the offer of additional transaction services. The theory of institutional assemblages indicates it is impossible to form a homogeneous system of blockchain-based institutions associated exclusively with the principles of decentralization, transparency, and openness. Blockchain-based institutions will be of a hybrid and conflicting nature, combining elements of opposing institutional logics – regulatory and algorithmic law, Ricardian and smart contracts, private and public systems, and uncontrollability and arbitration.


2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 333-354
Author(s):  
Kofi Oteng Kufuor

A feature of the Ghana private rental accommodation market is that landlords usually demand advance rent of, in some instances, up to 5 years before signing a tenancy agreement. This is in violation of the 1963 Rent Act and recent initiatives are in the direction of curing this problem in the interest of protecting prospective tenants. However while advance rent is a financial burden this is offset by transaction costs in the housing market. Hence, in this paper and influenced by New Institutional Economics, I argue that it is possible for tenants and landlords to continue to bargain outside the shadow of the law to secure mutually beneficial tenancy agreements.


2003 ◽  
Vol 154 (2) ◽  
pp. 42-50 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin Hostettler

The Swiss forest economy has been trying for many years to improve logistics in the chain of the added value of wood. This work addresses necessary reforms to the system within the context of new institutional economics. The basic concept is explained, transaction costs of markets and hierarchies are presented systematically and the forms of governance structures outlined. The example of Swiss forest economy shows that fruitful points of departure can be developed aimed at reforming the vertical and horizontal relations between enterprises, as well as internal questions of governance. A pre-condition to achieve more efficient governance in forest economy is the reduction of restrictive institutions, whether formal or informal.


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