scholarly journals Schizophrenia and the Virtues of Self-Effacement

2016 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-48
Author(s):  
Paul Barry

Michael Stocker’s “The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories” attacks versions of consequentialism and deontological ethics on the grounds that they are self-effacing. While it is often thought that Stocker’s argument gives us a reason to favour virtue ethics over those other theories, Simon Keller has argued that this is a mistake. He claims that virtue ethics is also self-effacing, and is therefore afflicted with the self-effacement-related problems that Stocker identifies in consequentialism and deontology. This paper defends virtue ethics against this claim. Although there is a kind of self-effacement involved in the exercise of virtue, this is quite different from the so-called schizophrenia that Stocker thinks is induced by modern ethical theory. Importantly, manifesting virtue does not require one to embrace mutually inconsistent moral commitments, as is at times encouraged by consequentialists and deontologists. This paper also considers a reading of the virtue-ethical criterion of right action that is encouraged by Bernard Williams’s distinction between a de re and a de dicto interpretation of the phrase “acting as the virtuous person would.” I argue that such a reading addresses concerns that a virtue-ethical criterion of right action inevitably generates a problematic form of self-effacement.

2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 313
Author(s):  
Urbanus Ura Weruin

Sebagai ilmu preskriptif, etika adalah cabang filsafat yang mempertimbangakan secara kritis tindakan mana yang baik atau tindakan mana yang buruk berdasarkan ajaran moral tertentu. Sementara ajaran moral adalah ajaran tentang kebaikan manusia berdasarkan martabat setiap orang sebagai manusia. Studi literer dengan menggunakan metode content analysis yang dilakukan terhadap berbagai sumber kepustakaan yang ada memperlihatkan bahwa  terdapat dua teori utama etika yang relevan bagi etika bisnis. Pertama teori etika konsekuensialis atau teleologis. Kedua, teori etika nonkonsekuensilis Termasuk dalam teori etika konsekuensilis adalah etika utilitarianisme, etika egoism, dan etika hedonisme. Sementara teori etika non-konsekuensialis mencakup etika deontologi, etika keutamaan, dan etika kesetaraan dan keadilan sebagai kewajaran. Etika konsekuensialis menilai moralitas tindakan atau keputusan berdasarakan tujuan, kegunaan, atau dampak positif yang diperoleh dari tindakan atau keputusan tersebut. Sementara etika nonkonsekuensialis memfokuskan moralitas tidakan atau putusan pada kewajiban untuk melakukan apa yang merupakan kewajiban, pada motivasi dan karakter moral si pelaku tindakan, serta pada prinsip keadilan. Semua teori etika ini, berkontribusi bagi pemahaman terhadap etika bisnis.  As a prescriptive science, ethics is a branch of philosophy that considers critically which actions are good or which actions are bad based on certain moral teachings. While moral teachings are teachings about human kindness based on the dignity of each person as a human being. Literary studies using content analysis methods conducted on various sources of existing literature show that there are two main theories of ethics that are relevant for business ethics. First the consequentialist or teleological ethical theory. Second, the theory of non-consensual ethics Included in the theory of consequent ethical ethics is the ethics of utilitarianism, ethics of egoism, and ethics of hedonism. While non-consequentialist ethical theories include deontological ethics, virtue ethics, and equality and fairness ethics as fairness. Consequentialist ethics assesses the morality of an action or decision based on the purpose, usefulness, or positive impact obtained from the action or decision. While non-consequentialist ethics focuses on the morality of actions or decisions on the obligation to do what is mandatory, on the motivation and moral character of the perpetrators of actions, as well as on the principle of justice. All of these ethical theories, contribute to understanding business ethics.


Author(s):  
Julia Driver

This essay argues that consequentialist theories can both accommodate virtue evaluation, and, indeed, the most plausible versions must do so, and that consequentialist theories can also be structured as forms of virtue ethics. Different strategies available to the consequentialist are presented and criticized, including indirect strategies which argue that the right action is the action that the virtuous person would perform. The best way for the consequentialist to approach virtue is as another form of moral evaluation understood in consequentialist terms which is distinct from consequentialist act evaluation; that is, evaluating action is only one part of an overarching consequentialist account of moral evaluation, and the theory can also be applied to dispositions, motives, intentions, etc.


1992 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 133-148 ◽  
Author(s):  
Julia Annas

It is well-known that in recent years, alongside the familiar forms of modern ethical theory, such as consequentialism, deontology, and rights theory, there has been a resurgence of interest in what goes by the name of “virtue ethics” — forms of ethical theory which give a prominent status to the virtues, and to the idea that an agent has a “final end” which the virtues enable her to achieve. With this has come an increase of theoretical (as opposed to antiquarian) interest in ancient ethical theories, particularly Aristotle's, an interest which has made a marked difference in the way ethics is pursued in the Anglo-Saxon and European intellectual worlds.In this essay, I shall not be discussing modern virtue ethics, which is notably protean in form and difficult to pin down. I shall be focusing on ancient eudaimonistic ethical theories, for in their case we can achieve a clearer discussion of the problem I wish to discuss (a problem which arises also for modern versions of virtue ethics which hark back to the ancient theories in their form).


1998 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 37-55 ◽  
Author(s):  
Julia Annas

The two most important and central concepts in ancient ethical theory are those of virtue (aretē) and happiness (eudaimonia). This is well-known by now, as is the way that many scholars and philosophers have in recent years investigated the structure of ancient ethical theories, at least partly in the hope that this would help us in our modern ethical thinking by introducing us to developed theories which escape the problems that have led to so much frustration with deontological and consequentialist approaches. And there has indeed been considerable interest in developing modern forms of ethics which draw inspiration, to a greater or lesser extent, from the ancient theories. However, there is an asymmetry here. Modern theories which take their inspiration from Aristotle and other ancient theorists are standardly called virtue ethics, not happiness ethics. We have rediscovered the appeal of aretē, but eudaimonia is still, it appears, problematic for us. This has an important consequence for us, for in ancient theories virtue is not discussed in isolation; it is seen as part of a larger structure in which the overarching concept is happiness. If we focus on virtue alone and ignore its relation to happiness, we are missing a large part of the interest that study of the ancient theories can offer.


Author(s):  
Bronwyn Finnigan

Is there a “common element” in Buddhist ethical thought from which one might rationally reconstruct a Buddhist normative ethical theory? Many construe this as the question Which contemporary normative theory does Buddhist ethics best approximate: consequentialism or virtue ethics? This essay argues that two distinct evaluative relations underlie these positions: an instrumental and a constitutive analysis. This chapter raises some difficulties for linking these distinct analyses to particular normative ethical theories but gives reasons to think that both may be justified as meta-ethical grounds for rationally reconstructing Buddhist thought as an ethical theory. It closes with some reflections on the complexity involved in trying to establish a single and homogeneous position on the nature of Buddhist ethics.


Philosophy ◽  
2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Julia Driver

Virtue ethics is a type of normative ethical theory that regards virtue evaluation as the primary form of evaluation, in contrast to theories that focus on “right” action. Some writers fold theories about virtue into virtue ethics, though the two are distinct. A Utilitarian, for example, can provide an account of virtue that is based on or compatible with her theory, without being committed to virtue ethics. Again, virtue ethics treats virtue evaluation as primary. There has been much recent interest generated in virtue ethics. Often writers have been inspired by Aristotle’s ethics, though some have developed broadly Humean accounts of virtue ethics, and others, pluralistic accounts that borrow from a variety of traditions. At the beginning of this new wave of interest in virtue, the project was primarily negative, focusing on problems with other theories, particularly Utilitarianism and Kantian ethics. The following resources are resources that include articles on virtue itself, as well as articles that explicitly develop, defend, or criticize virtue ethics.


2018 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 76
Author(s):  
Jeremiah A. Lasquety-Reyes

I consider the applicability of Agent-Based Modeling (ABM) and computer simulations for ethical theories. Though agent-based modeling is already well established in the social sciences, it has not yet found acceptance in the field of philosophical ethics. Currently, there are only a few works explicitly connecting ethics with agent-based modeling. In this paper, I show that it is possible to build computer simulations of ethical theories and that there are also potential benefits in doing so: (1) the opportunity for virtual ethical experiments that are impossible to do in real life, and (2) an increased understanding and appreciation of an ethical theory either through the programming implementation or through the visual simulation. In the first part of the paper, I mention some social science simulations with ethical import that could encourage ethicists to work with ABM. Second, I list the few pioneering works that attempt to combine computer simulation with philosophical ethics, the most prominent being Evolving Ethics: The New Science of Good and Evil (2010) by Mascaro et al. Third, I give pointers for the computer simulation of the most prominent ethical theories: deontological ethics, utilitarianism, feminist care ethics, and virtue ethics. In the final part, I consider the potential of using an existing reference model for the simulation of human behavior, the PECS model, as the foundation for a computer simulation of virtue ethics.


Author(s):  
Nathan Harter

Ethics as a distinct line of inquiry dates back to antiquity. Historically, the professions in particular have taken ethics seriously, since by means of ethical behavior a profession earns trust from the community it serves. The emerging profession of information assurance and security can engage in ethical deliberation using a variety of existing theories. The following chapter begins by answering whether there is really any point engaging in ethical theory. We argue there is such a purpose. Following this section, the chapter outlines three classic theories of Western ethics, namely utilitarian ethics, deontological ethics, and virtue ethics. We offer three of the most enduring theories for use in this book. Before we reach them, however, we must first explain why professionals in information assurance and security might want to learn them.


Author(s):  
Philip J. Ivanhoe

This chapter develops various implications of the oneness hypothesis when applied to theories of virtue, drawing on several claims that are closely related to the hypothesis. Many of the views introduced and defended are inspired by neo-Confucianism and so the chapter offers an example of constructive philosophy bridging cultures and traditions. It focuses on Foot’s theory, which holds that virtues correct excesses or deficiencies in human nature. The alternative maintains that vices often arise not from an excess or deficiency in motivation but from a mistaken conception of self, one that sees oneself as somehow more important than others. The chapter goes on to argue that such a view helps address the “self-centeredness objection” to virtue ethics and that the effortlessness, joy, and wholeheartedness that characterizes fully virtuous action are best conceived as a kind of spontaneity that affords a special feeling of happiness dubbed “metaphysical comfort.”


Author(s):  
Claire Field

AbstractDe Re Significance accounts of moral appraisal consider an agent’s responsiveness to a particular kind of reason, normative moral reasons de re, to be of central significance for moral appraisal. Here, I argue that such accounts find it difficult to accommodate some neuroatypical agents. I offer an alternative account of how an agent’s responsiveness to normative moral reasons affects moral appraisal – the Reasonable Expectations Account. According to this account, what is significant for appraisal is not the content of the reasons an agent is responsive to (de re or de dicto), but rather whether she is responsive to the reasons it is reasonable to expect her to be responsive to, irrespective of their content. I argue that this account does a better job of dealing with neuroatypical agents, while agreeing with the De Re Significance accounts on more ordinary cases.


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