scholarly journals Narrative and Argumentation in a Case of Alleged Child Abuse

2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
Clive Baldwin ◽  
Michelle Greason

The relationship between argument and narrative has been the subject of much debate, particularly in the area of law, where a number of theorists have argued for the priority of one over the other in the decision-making process, the premise being that argumentation and narrative are two distinct text forms. Through the rhetorical analysis of a series of expert reports in a case of alleged child abuse, we seek to explore the dynamics between argumentation and narrative. In so doing, we argue that while certain actions may undermine the robustness of an argument, it is these very actions that make possible the telling of a persuasive story. We conclude with a plea for the development of rhetorical skills among social workers so as to be better able to discern future directions for the benefit of service users.

Author(s):  
Jack Knight ◽  
James Johnson

Pragmatism and its consequences are central issues in American politics today, yet scholars rarely examine in detail the relationship between pragmatism and politics. This book systematically explores the subject and makes a strong case for adopting a pragmatist approach to democratic politics—and for giving priority to democracy in the process of selecting and reforming political institutions. What is the primary value of democracy? When should we make decisions democratically and when should we rely on markets? And when should we accept the decisions of unelected officials, such as judges or bureaucrats? This book explores how a commitment to pragmatism should affect our answers to such important questions. It concludes that democracy is a good way of determining how these kinds of decisions should be made—even if what the democratic process determines is that not all decisions should be made democratically. So, for example, the democratically elected U.S. Congress may legitimately remove monetary policy from democratic decision-making by putting it under the control of the Federal Reserve. This book argues that pragmatism offers an original and compelling justification of democracy in terms of the unique contributions democratic institutions can make to processes of institutional choice. This focus highlights the important role that democracy plays, not in achieving consensus or commonality, but rather in addressing conflicts. Indeed, the book suggest that democratic politics is perhaps best seen less as a way of reaching consensus or agreement than as a way of structuring the terms of persistent disagreement.


Author(s):  
Charlotte Bailey ◽  
Debbie Plath ◽  
Alankaar Sharma

Abstract The international policy trend towards personalised budgets, which is designed to offer people with disabilities purchasing power to choose services that suit them, is exemplified in the Australian National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS). This article examines how the ‘purchasing power’ afforded to service users through individualised budgets impacts on social work practice and the choice and self-determination of NDIS service users. Social workers’ views were sought on the alignment between the NDIS principles of choice and control and social work principles of participation and self-determination and how their social work practice has changed in order to facilitate client access to supports through NDIS budgets and meaningful participation in decision-making. A survey was completed by forty-five social workers, and in-depth semi-structured interviews were conducted with five of these participants. The findings identify how social workers have responded to the shortfalls of the NDIS by the following: interpreting information for clients; assisting service users to navigate complex service provision systems; supporting clients through goal setting, decision-making and implementation of action plans; and adopting case management approaches. The incorporation of social work services into the NDIS service model is proposed in order to facilitate meaningful choice and self-determination associated with purchasing power.


1995 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 56-63 ◽  
Author(s):  
Erich H. Loewy

In this paper, I want to try to put what has been termed the “care ethics” into a different perspective. While I will discuss primarily the use of that ethic or that term as it applies to the healthcare setting in general and to the deliberation of consultants or the function of committees more specifically, what I have to say is meant to be applicable to the problem of using a notion like “caring” as a fundamental precept in ethical decision making. I will set out to examine the relationship between theoretical ethics, justice-based reasoning, and care-based reasoning and conclude by suggesting not only that all are part of a defensible solution when adjudicating individual cases, but that these three are linked and can, in fact, be mutually corrective. I will claim that using what has been called “the care ethic” alone is grossly insufficient for solving individual problems and that the term can (especially when used without a disciplined framework) be extremely dangerous. I will readily admit that while blindly using an approach based solely on theoretically derived principles is perhaps somewhat less dangerous, it is bound to be sterile, unsatisfying, and perhaps even cruel in individual situations. Care ethics, as I understand the concept, is basically a non- or truly an anti-intellectual kind of ethic in that it tries not only to value feeling over thought in deliberating problems of ethics, but indeed, would almost entirely substitute feeling for thought. Feeling when used to underwrite undisciplined and intuitive action without theory has no head and, therefore, no plan and no direction; theory eventuating in sterile rules and eventually resulting in action heedlessly based on such rules lacks humanity and heart. Neither one nor the other is complete in itself. There is no reason why we necessarily should be limited to choosing between these two extremes.


Author(s):  
Naomi Creutzfeldt

This chapter discusses what individual justice means in the realm of administrative justice. The standards of justice and fairness that apply in administrative decision-making need consideration from the perspective of the service user. Should the administrative justice system serve the citizen or the state? What role do individual service users have in the design, use, and evaluation of more bureaucratic systems of redress? Different notions of justice, as they relate to primary decision-making processes, have been described through various models. This chapter provides a set of tools with which to study the subject and argues for the importance of user voice and perceptions of fairness in the provision of a more citizen-focussed justice.


2018 ◽  
Vol 72 (2) ◽  
pp. 459-487
Author(s):  
Pietro Chierichetti

Abstract What is a paribhāṣā? How does it work in Śrautasūtra-texts? This paper tries to examine these questions and to trace a story of the paribhāṣās in the Śrautasūtras, giving some indications for future researches. Often translated as “meta-rule”, paribhāṣā is a primary derivative from the Sanskrit root “bhāṣ”, which means “to talk”, with the prefix “pari”, which means “around”, “beyond”. The term indicates a specific discourse “around” or “beyond” something. Therefore, it represents the link with the context, a hybrid element placed between text and context. A paribhāṣā is an explanation, an element around discourse that acts as a frame for what is said: it is a rule that is valid in a wider context than that of the object under analysis, that goes “beyond” discourse. It is a unique opportunity to glance at the ritual in itself, at the “ritual string”, in opposition to every “discourse of the ritual”. This rule’s validity is put into effect through the other rules expressed within the text, in other words it is a meta-rule. However, the subject of the relationship between paribhāṣās and the texts of the śruti is still uncharted territory: the categorizations that have so far been suggested are weak or not useful, and need stronger foundations. The present paper pretends to be a first step in this direction.


Symmetry ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (11) ◽  
pp. 557 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jiaru Li ◽  
Fangwei Zhang ◽  
Qiang Li ◽  
Jing Sun ◽  
Janney Yee ◽  
...  

The subject of this study is to explore the role of cardinality of hesitant fuzzy element (HFE) in distance measures on hesitant fuzzy sets (HFSs). Firstly, three parameters, i.e., credibility factor, conservative factor, and a risk factor are introduced, thereafter, a series of novel distance measures on HFSs are proposed using these three parameters. These newly proposed distance measures handle the relationship between the cardinal number and the element values of hesitant fuzzy set well, and are suitable to combine subjective and objective decision-making information. When using these functions, decision makers with different risk preferences are allowed to give different values for these three parameters. In particular, this study transfers the hesitance degree index to a credibility of the values in HFEs, which is consistent with people’s intuition. Finally, the practicability of the newly proposed distance measures is verified by two examples.


1980 ◽  
Vol 25 (5) ◽  
pp. 381-385
Author(s):  
Jean-Charles Crombez

The questionnaire on continuing education by the Canadian Psychiatric Association's Council on Education and Professional Liaison, sent in 1978 to all Canadian psychiatrists, raises in the author's mind, in spite of his participation in its establishment, the question of the philosophy behind it. Indeed, seeing signs of a greater problem, he identifies the need for two studies, one dealing with the “object”, the other with the “relationship”. Not elaborating on the first one (description of patients and techniques) which is well known, he describes the second as the knowledge and significance of the encounter (that of two persons inevitably and structurally linked). This “area of relations” paradoxically given too little value in the teaching of psychiatry, is more analogical than logical, more intuitive than deductive, more perceptual than intellectual, and more multifactorial than linear. Yet, this dimension of the encounter (whether individual, familial, group or co-therapy) should take place in conjunction with the objective approach, but the latter occurs alone too often. In order to give to this field of relationship a scientific status of its own, and to reintroduce the techniques instead of using them as guard-rails, proper techniques or methods should be employed or developed if necessary. This includes on the one hand the learning of different levels of awareness and the widening of our perceptual, sensorial, intuitive and analogical capacities. (This would allow for an experience of the fundamental relationship between fields that are apart symptom-wise: dream and awakening, physical and psychic, interior and exterior, fantasy and reality, representations and objects, and so on.) On the other hand this leads us to increase our capacity to listen, to abandon ourselves and to get involved, and to “conceive” a presence within the relationship. Finally, there is this learning of how to observe oneself in a situation, of how to look at what is going on within the encounter (and it is in that very position and this very questioning that the concept of neutrality can be understood, not in the legendary phlegm of impenetrability). This can be done within an “experiential” teaching: for the therapist this means the experience and the study of his own involvement, either with a patient or in groups. Another method is supervision, not as “super”-vision but rather as “inter-discovery” and not as control but rather as “ex-pression.” Working in small groups with colleagues where one can enquire about others’ experiences without any normative goal and with an open attitude is desirable. Another tool would be professional meetings, but not in their current form which is not adapted to the field of the relationship. And so on. The author sees a fundamental necessity for these two fields of the “object” and the “relationship” to be taught conjointly, and neither one nor the other to be excluded from the psychiatrist's training; which is not the case at present. The “field of the object” implies an effort at objectifying, defining variables, causes, using experimental methodology, and a more quantitative analysis. The “field of the relationship” implies positions that are often opposed to this. This contradiction seems necessary and inevitable within every person. One tendency is to make ourselves believe that we avoid this contradiction by pretending to total objectivity: that of scientific psychiatry and clear logic. Finally the author returns to the questionnaire that, precisely in its form, is too uniquely meant for an objective teaching: teaching of diagnoses, illnesses, chart controls, patient controls, teaching through questionnaires, case presentations, putting emphasis on articles or textbooks. This proposed method is adapted for teaching persons considered as entities; and learning techniques considered as reified tools. This is exactly the classical stream of university courses and specialty examinations. This reinforces the illusion. There is also the danger, via the “credit” game, that it will strengthen the already strong tendency to mere objectifying of the subject, of the therapist and of science; that it will privilege a normative vision; and discredit certain essential and humanistic dimensions.


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