Introduction

Author(s):  
Andreas Heinz

In the introduction, a philosophically informed concept of mental disorders is presented. In order to define a clinically relevant mental malady, it suggests to focus on functional impairments relevant for human survival and the individually harmful consequences resulting from these dysfunctions. While this approach generally defines what can count as a mental disorder, it does not help to understand the neurobiological underpinnings of specific disorders. Traditional disease categories, on the other hand, do not reflect current neurobiological research. With respect to neurobiological lay based disease classifications, it is suggested to assess alterations of basic mechanisms of decision making and reward related learning, which cut across established nosological boundaries. For example, dopamine-dependent reinforcement learning is altered in psychotic, affective and addictive disorders.

Author(s):  
Leonardo Machado ◽  
Alexander Moreira-Almeida

It is not uncommon for patients with mental disorders to have symptoms with religious or spiritual (R/S) contents, and, on the other hand, spiritual experiences often involve psychotic-like phenomena. This frequently creates difficulties in differentiating between a non-pathological R/S experience and a mental disorder. Clinical differentiation between a non-pathological R/S experience and a mental disorder with R/S content brings risks in both extremes: to pathologize normal R/S experience (promoting iatrogenic suffering) or neglecting pathological symptoms (delaying proper treatment). In order to mitigate these risks, this chapter will gather the best current scientific evidence and propose clinical guidelines to help the distinction between R/S experiences and mental disorders with R/S content. Scientific studies in people who have spiritual experiences should be encouraged, especially investigations of the phenomenology, neurobiology, precipitants, and outcomes in order to enlarge the empirical base needed to advance the criteria for this differential diagnosis.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Timothy H Muller ◽  
James L Butler ◽  
Sebastijan Veselic ◽  
Bruno Miranda ◽  
Timothy E.J. Behrens ◽  
...  

Prefrontal cortex is crucial for learning and decision-making. Classic reinforcement learning (RL) theories centre on learning the expectation of potential rewarding outcomes and explain a wealth of neural data in prefrontal cortex. Distributional RL, on the other hand, learns the full distribution of rewarding outcomes and better explains dopamine responses. Here we show distributional RL also better explains prefrontal cortical responses, suggesting it is a ubiquitous mechanism for reward-guided learning.


2021 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 039-054
Author(s):  
Paul Tudorache

Similar to other fields, also in the military one, the Artificial Intelligence has become recently an evident solution for optimizing specific processes and activities. Therefore, this research paper aims to highlight the potential uses of Artificial Intelligence in the military operations carried out by the Land Forces. In this regard, analysing the framework of the operations process and applying suitable research methodology, the main findings are related to AI’s contributions in optimizing commander’s decisions during the progress of planning and execution. On the other hand, picturing the AI upgrated combat power of the Land Forces is another significant result of this study.


Theoria ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 63 (146) ◽  
pp. 36-55
Author(s):  
Bernard Matolino

Abstract The disagreement over what was responsible for arriving at consensual positions, in traditional African polities, is best captured in the classic debate between Kwasi Wiredu and Emmanuel Eze. The former holds that rational persuasion was the sole informant of decision-making while the latter argues that non-rational factors played a crucial role in securing a consensual decision. If Wiredu is correct then consensus could work in modern society as it can be argued that it does not rely on traditionalistic scaffoldings. If, on the other hand, Eze is correct, then consensus cannot work in modern largely urbanised Africa as its traditional underpinnings have largely disappeared. While Emmanuel Ani’s intervention in this debate is welcome for its earnest search for a system that could work, his support for Eze is not bold enough to undermine Wiredu’s rationalistic orientation in consensus.


Author(s):  
George Graham

The basic claims of the chapter are, first, that mental disorders are not best understood as types of brain disorder, even though mental disorders are based in the brain. And, second, that the difference between the two sorts of disorders can be illuminated by the sorts of treatment or therapy that may work for the one type (a mental disorder) but not for the other type (a brain disorder). In the discussion some of the diagnostic implications and difficulties associated with these two basic claims are outlined.


2011 ◽  
Vol 26 (S2) ◽  
pp. 1993-1993
Author(s):  
G. Meynen

IntroductionMental disorders are often considered to be able to undermine a person's moral responsibility, at least in some respect. Yet, it is unclear exactly how mental disorders would be capable of compromising a person's responsibility. Sometimes, it is suggested that mental disorders undermine responsibility via some detrimental effect on free will.ObjectivesEstablishing to what extent the effect of mental disorder on moral responsibility might be due to an effect on free will, and to what extent other factors might play a role.AimsProviding an analysis of the concept of free will and assessing the relevance of the elements of this concept with respect to mental disorders. Second, establishing what other - not free will related - factors might be relevant to the intuition that mental disorders can undermine responsibility.MethodsConceptual analysis with respect to free will and moral responsibility on the one hand and specific features of mental disorders on the other.ResultsSome of the responsibility-undermining features of mental disorders could have to do primarily with free will related issues. However, for some other aspects it is less clear. In fact, they might be more epistemic in nature instead of having to do with free will.ConclusionsThe possible effects of mental disorders on moral responsibility are likely to involve also other than free will related factors.


Games ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 76
Author(s):  
Marina Bannikova ◽  
Artyom Jelnov ◽  
Pavel Jelnov

This paper proposes a model of a legislature, formed by several parties, which has to vote for or against a certain bill in the presence of a lobbyist interested in a certain vote outcome. We show that the ease with which the lobbyist can manipulate a legislature decision increases with the number of elected parties, and, consequently, decreases with an electoral threshold. On the other hand, a lower electoral threshold increases the representativeness of a legislature. We combine these two effects in a notion of fairness. We show the existence of an electoral threshold that optimizes the fairness of a political system, which is close to 1–5%. Namely, the optimal threshold (in our sense) is close to thresholds that exist in most parliamentary democracies.


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