Differentiating spiritual experiences from mental disorders

Author(s):  
Leonardo Machado ◽  
Alexander Moreira-Almeida

It is not uncommon for patients with mental disorders to have symptoms with religious or spiritual (R/S) contents, and, on the other hand, spiritual experiences often involve psychotic-like phenomena. This frequently creates difficulties in differentiating between a non-pathological R/S experience and a mental disorder. Clinical differentiation between a non-pathological R/S experience and a mental disorder with R/S content brings risks in both extremes: to pathologize normal R/S experience (promoting iatrogenic suffering) or neglecting pathological symptoms (delaying proper treatment). In order to mitigate these risks, this chapter will gather the best current scientific evidence and propose clinical guidelines to help the distinction between R/S experiences and mental disorders with R/S content. Scientific studies in people who have spiritual experiences should be encouraged, especially investigations of the phenomenology, neurobiology, precipitants, and outcomes in order to enlarge the empirical base needed to advance the criteria for this differential diagnosis.

1898 ◽  
Vol 12 (10) ◽  
pp. 1232-1237
Author(s):  
A. Doran

Abstracts. Review of Obstetric and Gynecological literature: English.Alban Doran. Ovarian Tumors, Simulating inflamed Ovaries . (The Edinburgh med. Journ., May 1898, p.p. 449-460). Ovarian tumors or inflammation? (resp. differential diagnosis of these diseases).Despite the thousands of ovarian tumors produced everywhere, the differential diagnosis between cysts and small, solid tumors of the ovary has not yet been sufficiently clarified. Many excise all ovarian tumors that come across; it is not rare that the ovary swelling is caused only by its inflammation, which, with proper treatment, would have passed without an operation. It happens that an ovarian tumor, before it rises from the small pelvis upwards, becomes painful, which is caused by a disease of the uterus or another ovary and may cause an error in the diagnosis. On the other hand, the growth of the ovarian tumor in the small pelvis, with the coincidence of the elongation of the uterus and abundant regulation, gives a reason to take the ovarian tumor for the uterine fibroid. With the aim of contributing to the best diagnosis in such cases, Boran provides 6 history of diseases and discusses the features they represent.


Author(s):  
Andreas Heinz

In the introduction, a philosophically informed concept of mental disorders is presented. In order to define a clinically relevant mental malady, it suggests to focus on functional impairments relevant for human survival and the individually harmful consequences resulting from these dysfunctions. While this approach generally defines what can count as a mental disorder, it does not help to understand the neurobiological underpinnings of specific disorders. Traditional disease categories, on the other hand, do not reflect current neurobiological research. With respect to neurobiological lay based disease classifications, it is suggested to assess alterations of basic mechanisms of decision making and reward related learning, which cut across established nosological boundaries. For example, dopamine-dependent reinforcement learning is altered in psychotic, affective and addictive disorders.


Author(s):  
George Graham

The basic claims of the chapter are, first, that mental disorders are not best understood as types of brain disorder, even though mental disorders are based in the brain. And, second, that the difference between the two sorts of disorders can be illuminated by the sorts of treatment or therapy that may work for the one type (a mental disorder) but not for the other type (a brain disorder). In the discussion some of the diagnostic implications and difficulties associated with these two basic claims are outlined.


2011 ◽  
Vol 26 (S2) ◽  
pp. 1993-1993
Author(s):  
G. Meynen

IntroductionMental disorders are often considered to be able to undermine a person's moral responsibility, at least in some respect. Yet, it is unclear exactly how mental disorders would be capable of compromising a person's responsibility. Sometimes, it is suggested that mental disorders undermine responsibility via some detrimental effect on free will.ObjectivesEstablishing to what extent the effect of mental disorder on moral responsibility might be due to an effect on free will, and to what extent other factors might play a role.AimsProviding an analysis of the concept of free will and assessing the relevance of the elements of this concept with respect to mental disorders. Second, establishing what other - not free will related - factors might be relevant to the intuition that mental disorders can undermine responsibility.MethodsConceptual analysis with respect to free will and moral responsibility on the one hand and specific features of mental disorders on the other.ResultsSome of the responsibility-undermining features of mental disorders could have to do primarily with free will related issues. However, for some other aspects it is less clear. In fact, they might be more epistemic in nature instead of having to do with free will.ConclusionsThe possible effects of mental disorders on moral responsibility are likely to involve also other than free will related factors.


CNS Spectrums ◽  
1998 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 23-35 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tanya Simuni ◽  
Matthew B. Stern

AbstractParkinson's disease (PD) is one of the most common neurodegenerative diseases. The last 5 years have been marked by rapid developments in understanding the pathophysiology of PD as well as by the introduction of a number of new drugs for symptomatic treatment of the disease. On the other hand, the diagnosis of PD is still made purely on clinical grounds. Due to continuing advances in therapy, it is increasingly important to recognize PD in its earliest stages and to distinguish it from other causes of parkinsonism, for which prognosis and response to treatment differ. This article reviews the epidemiology of PD and then elaborates on the diagnosis and differential diagnosis.


2021 ◽  
pp. medethics-2021-107347
Author(s):  
Abeezar I Sarela

The General Medical Council renewed its guidance on consent in 2020. In this essay, I argue that the 2020 guidance does not advance on the earlier, 2008 guidance in regard to treatments that doctors are obliged to offer to patients. In both, doctors are instructed to not provide treatments that are not in the overall benefit, or clinical interests, of the patient; although, patients are absolutely entitled to decline treatment. As such, consent has two aspects, and different standards apply to each aspect. To explore this paradigm, I propose the reconceptualisation of consent as a person’s freedom to achieve treatment, using Amartya Sen’s approach. Sen explains that freedom has two aspects: process and opportunity. Accordingly, a patient’s freedom to achieve treatment would comprise a process for the identification of proper treatment, followed by an opportunity for the patient to accept or decline this treatment. As per Sen, the opportunity aspect is to be assessed by the standard of public reason, whereas the standard for the process aspect is variable and contingent on the task at hand. I then use this reconceptualised view of consent to analyse case law. I show that senior judges have conceived the patient’s opportunity to be encompassed in information, which is to be decided by public reason. On the other hand, the process aspect relies on the private reason of medical professionals. Given the nature of professionalism, this reliance is inescapable, and it is maintained in the case law that is cited in both guidances.


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