scholarly journals Legal Obstacles to Private Enforcement of Competition Law

2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 133-152
Author(s):  
Michal S. Gal ◽  
Rivi Dahan

Private enforcement of competition law serves many important goals, including deterrence of future anti-competitive harms and correction of past harms. This article sheds light on several potential legal obstacles to such enforcement which could prevent it from achieving its goals. The examples mainly build upon the experience of different jurisdictions with private litigation. It also suggests some possible solutions for dealing with or limiting such obstacles. As Europe is in the early stages of applying its Damages Directive and creating a private competition law enforcement regime, recognising – and possibly avoiding – obstacles to efficient private enforcement is both timely and important.

Author(s):  
Rodger Barry ◽  
Ferro Miguel Sousa ◽  
Marcos Francisco

This chapter explains the contents and goals of the Antitrust Damages Directive (Directive 2014/104/EU), the corollary of the EU’s policy towards the promotion and facilitation of private enforcement of competition law. It first traces the evolution in EU competition law enforcement and policy that led to the adoption of the Directive before considering the goals of the Directive in more detail, namely to provide rules for the effective compensation of victims of antitrust infringements and to harmonize some rules concerning damages claims. It then examines the Directive’s legal basis under EU Law as well as substantive provisions, including those relating to compensatory principles, quantification of harm, and consensual dispute resolution. The chapter goes on to highlight neglected issues, limitations, and inherent biases regarding the scope and nature of the Directive’s rules and concludes with an analysis of issues arising from implementation of the Directive in Member States.


Author(s):  
Ioannidou Maria

This chapter examines how the Antitrust Damages Directive has been transposed in Cyprus. It begins with a discussion of the transposition procedure, focusing on the Cypriot competition regime as well as the state of private enforcement in Cyprus. In particular, it provides an overview of the law currently in force against anticompetitive agreements and abuse of dominant position, the Protection of Competition Law of 2008 (13(I)/2008), as amended in 2014 (Law 41(I)/2014) (Cypriot Competition Act), and the provisions relevant to private competition law enforcement. The chapter then considers the history and the different steps of the transposition process before describing the scope of the transposition measure. It also analyses the different provisions of the Cypriot Damages Act and issues that arose during the transposition, such as parent company liability, the binding force of decisions of competition authorities of other Member States, and presumption and quantification of damage caused by cartels or other antitrust infringements.


2020 ◽  
Vol 37 (1) ◽  
pp. 9-24
Author(s):  
Kit Barker

Achieving a workable, hybrid model of competition law enforcement that is sensitive to both instrumental and non-instrumental ends and which commands broad, cross-jurisdictional support always struck me as a tall order. For one thing, it required a keen understanding of the nature of competition law wrongs, which sit awkwardly at the turnstile between public and private law. The enforcement processes of competition law have also evolved in very different social and historical contexts, the United States being an environment in which regulatory agencies have historically been regarded with scepticism (if not downright distrust) and Europe being a centralised bureaucracy in which they have tended to be regarded as the paradigm. Most challengingly of all, the project required a theory of ‘holism’ capable of explaining how it is possible to reconcile complex moral, economic and social objectives within a singular enforcement system, or (more accurately) within a linked network of distinct law enforcement systems.


Law Review ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 342
Author(s):  
Carissa Christybella Wijaya ◽  
Micheline Hendrito ◽  
Monica Patricia Aripratama ◽  
Udin Silalahi

<div class="WordSection1"><p><em>KPPU (Commission for the Supervision of Business Competition) as the authority for business competition law in Indonesia still has many shortcomings. This is related to the KPPU’s failure to accommodate compensation payments to victims of business competition law violations. This can happen because Indonesia has only provided room for public enforcement to be implemented. In public enforcement, compensation payments are not paid directly to consumers who have suffered losses but instead come into the state treasury. This article discusses the compensation mechanism that should be received by victims of competition law violations through private enforcement, which is a mechanism for enforcing competition law by using the regulations of the Competition Law in civil courts to demand compensation. This research was conducted with the aim of creating a healthy business competition climate through the enforcement of private enforcement in Indonesia by implementing harmonization between public and private enforcement. In this article, the Authors used normative juridical method and refers to statutory and comparative approaches. The research method used is juridical normative with a statute approach, a case approach, and a comparative legal approach. The results and conclusions of this study are that the KPPU's failure to provide compensation for compensation to victims of business competition violations encourages the need to implement private enforcement in Indonesia which is harmonized with the previous mechanism, namely public enforcement.</em></p><p><strong>Bahasa Indonesia Abstrak: </strong>KPPU (Komisi Pengawas Persaingan Usaha) sebagai lembaga otoritas dalam hukum persaingan usaha di Indonesia masih memiliki banyak kekurangan. Salah satunya terkait dengan kegagalan KPPU dalam mengakomodir pembayaran ganti rugi kepada korban pelanggaran hukum persaingan usaha. Hal ini dapat terjadi karena selama ini Indonesia hanya memberikan ruang bagi <em>public enforcement</em> untuk diterapkan. Dalam <em>public enforcement</em>, pembayaran ganti rugi tidak dibayarkan langsung kepada konsumen yang dirugikan melainkan masuk ke dalam kas negara. Oleh sebab itu, terdapat sebuah urgensi untuk mengalihfungsikan fungsi kompensasi dari KPPU kepada pelaku usaha melalui <em>private enforcement</em>, yaitu sebuah mekanisme penegakan hukum persaingan usaha dengan menggunakan regulasi UU Persaingan Usaha di peradilan perdata untuk menuntut ganti rugi. Penelitian ini dilakukan dengan tujuan untuk menciptakan iklim persaingan usaha yang sehat melalui ditegakkannya <em>private enforcement</em> di Indonesia dengan menerapkan harmonisasi antara <em>public enforcement</em> dan <em>private enforcement</em>. Metode penelitian yang digunakan, yaitu yuridis normatif dengan pendekatan undang-undang, pendekatan kasus, dan pendekatan komparatif hukum. Hasil dan kesimpulan dari penelitian ini adalah kegagalan KPPU dalam memberikan kompensasi ganti rugi kepada korban pelanggaran persaingan usaha mendorong perlu diterapkannya <em>private enforcement</em> di Indonesia yang diharmonisasikan dengan mekanisme sebelumnya, yaitu <em>public enforcement.</em></p></div>


2015 ◽  
Vol 8 (12) ◽  
pp. 259-272
Author(s):  
Ondrej Blažo

Slovak competition law enforcement can be characterized by infrequency of leniency applications and near absence of private enforcement. As a result, the adoption of the Damages D irective is not likely to cause substantial breakthrough in Slovakia, be it with respect to the rate of leniency applications or in private enforcement. A comprehensive amendment of Slovak competition law took place in 2014. Changes introduced therein reflected, among other things, the practice of the European Commission regarding access to its file. A new approach was also introduced towards damages claims submitted against leniency applicants. The paper will first consider the question whether it is necessary to further redesign these new Slovak rules because of the adoption of the Damages Directive, or if they have been successfully pre-harmonized. Along with changes to Slovak competition law, procedural rules for civil courts were also re-codified. Hence the second part of this analysis will focus on the question if a new civil procedure framework, including obligatory harmonization, could foster private enforcement of competition law. Summarizing the resulting answers, the third question focuses on who could benefit from further changes to Slovak legislation – final consumers or enterprises that are involved in the production chain. Finally, will changes in Slovak legislation driven by the Directive be coherent with its overall legal system, or will they appear to be an odd and peculiar piece of legislation?


2015 ◽  
Vol 8 (12) ◽  
pp. 215-236
Author(s):  
Zurab Gvelesiani

The goal of this article is to assess the role and perspectives of the private enforcement of competition law mechanism in Georgia. The discussion starts with a brief review of a number of major events that have occurred in Georgia in the last two decades, which have shaped its competition law. The paper provides next an assessment of the current stage of the development of Georgian competition legislation, the necessity for a private enforcement model as well as the rules and legal tools offered by existing Georgian law in that regard. Outlined are also a number of challenges that must be overcome in order for Georgia to develop a successful and effective private enforcement system. The examination is based on a wide range of Georgian legislation; the interpretations provided are supported by existing enforcement practice, views of experts and scholars, research studies, reports and surveys from various national and international organizations.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Polina Westerhoven

This book explores the issues surrounding cartel damage claims from an EU law perspective. It follows an analysis of the existing EU legal framework for private competition law enforcement with a thorough examination of the relevant rules on international jurisdiction. Against this background, the author focuses on the role of jurisdiction agreements in the area of private enforcement. The study covers both the choice of Member State courts as well as the prorogation of third state forums and provides an interesting perspective on the various questions that arise in this context. With regard to the highly debated issue of the interpretation of choice-of-court clauses, it highlights the need to observe the guidelines deriving from the Brussels I Regulation itself. It furthermore outlines the system applicable to third state prorogations and examines how to deal with situations in which the choice of a third state forum may lead to the circumvention of EU competition rules.


2003 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 107-135 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frank Montag ◽  
Andreas Rosenfeld

Abstract On 16th December 2002 the Council adopted Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 on the implementation of rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty. This Regulation will not only replace the 40-year-old Regulation 17/ 62 but constitutes a radical reform of EC competition law enforcement. The purpose of this article is to analyse the basic principles of the new Regulation and the implications for current and future competition proceedings.


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