Part II The Member State Reports on Transposition of the Directive, 4 Cyprus

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ioannidou Maria
Keyword(s):  
Law Enforcement ◽  
Member State ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
The State ◽  
Parent Company ◽  
Private Enforcement ◽  
Dominant Position ◽  
Binding Force ◽  
Competition Law Enforcement ◽  
Abuse Of Dominant Position

This chapter examines how the Antitrust Damages Directive has been transposed in Cyprus. It begins with a discussion of the transposition procedure, focusing on the Cypriot competition regime as well as the state of private enforcement in Cyprus. In particular, it provides an overview of the law currently in force against anticompetitive agreements and abuse of dominant position, the Protection of Competition Law of 2008 (13(I)/2008), as amended in 2014 (Law 41(I)/2014) (Cypriot Competition Act), and the provisions relevant to private competition law enforcement. The chapter then considers the history and the different steps of the transposition process before describing the scope of the transposition measure. It also analyses the different provisions of the Cypriot Damages Act and issues that arose during the transposition, such as parent company liability, the binding force of decisions of competition authorities of other Member States, and presumption and quantification of damage caused by cartels or other antitrust infringements.

Part II The Member State Reports on Transposition of the Directive, 15 Portugal

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ferro Miguel Sousa
Keyword(s):  
Member State ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Parent Company ◽  
Private Enforcement ◽  
Public Enforcement ◽  
Member States ◽  
Joint Liability ◽  
General Overview ◽  
Binding Force ◽  
Opt Out

This chapter analyzes the transposition of the Antitrust Damages Directive in Portugal. It first provides a general overview of the transposition procedure, focusing on the unified Bill that was adopted by the Plenary of the Parliament on 20 April 2018 and configured as the Transposition Act. It then describes the scope of private enforcement of competition law in Portugal before considering specific issues that arose from the transposition of the Directive, such as those relating to rights to pre-trial discovery, partial centralization of private enforcement at the specialized Court, access to evidence, time-barring deadlines, protecting failed settlement talks, the binding force of public enforcement decisions, concepts of undertaking and parent company liability, the presumed proportion of responsibility for joint liability, the quantification of damages, the Portuguese opt-out regime (actio popularis), and the effect on trade between Member States.

Part II The Member State Reports on Transposition of the Directive, 7 Greece

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ioannidou Maria
Keyword(s):  
Law Enforcement ◽  
Member State ◽  
Dispute Resolution ◽  
Plenary Session ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Legal Order ◽  
Binding Force ◽  
Joint And Several Liability ◽  
Competition Law Enforcement ◽  
Collective Redress

This chapter focuses on the transposition of the Antitrust Damages Directive in Greece. It begins with a discussion of the transposition procedure, focusing on the Greek private competition law enforcement landscape. In particular, it considers the country’s Damages Act transposing the Damages Directive in the Greek legal order, adopted by Parliament (plenary session) on 14 March 2018, and the level of private competition litigation in Greece. The factors that partly explain the delay in the transposition of the Damages Directive by the Greek legislature are also examined. The chapter goes on to describe the substantive and temporal scope of the Damages Act as well as specific issues that arose during the transposition, including those relating to limitation periods, the binding force of decisions of other Member States, joint and several liability, parent company liability, presumption and quantification of damages by cartels, access to evidence, collective redress, and consensual dispute resolution.

Chimera of domestic antitrust: Institute of collective dominance in Russia

2021 ◽  
pp. 68-88
Author(s):  
A. E. Shastitko ◽  
K. A. Ionkina
Keyword(s):  
Law Enforcement ◽  
Market Analysis ◽  
Legal Norm ◽  
Economic Regulation ◽  
Dominant Position ◽  
Oligopoly Theory ◽  
Russian Version ◽  
Competition Law Enforcement ◽  
Abuse Of Dominant Position ◽  
Collective Dominance

The paper defines the features of the collective dominance institute in Russia as well as the relation between collective dominance and oligopoly in the spheres of law and economic theory. The article evaluates the grounds and consequences of the collective dominance legal norm application; it suggests an approach to examining the relation between effects and expected results of this legal norm application and outlines the potential ways to harmonize the best international practices of the collective dominance norm application with the existing economic standards of product market analysis for the purpose of competition law enforcement. Results of the oligopoly theory and the Russian version of collective dominance institution key elements comparison show: the collective dominance institution concept is inadequately applied to identify individual abuse of dominant position due to possible law enforcement errors. The Russian version of collective dominance institution reflects one fundamental tendency intrinsic to Russian antitrust: examined more closely, law enforcement, which is de jure aimed at protecting competition, appears to be economic regulation, which de facto can lead to competition restriction. One of the possible structural alternatives for the collective dominance institution reforming is based on presumption of the need to analyze the joint impact exerted by a group of undertakings on the market.

Part I EU Competition Law Private Enforcement and the Antitrust Damages Directive, 2 Promotion and Harmonization of Antitrust Damages Claims by Directive 2014/104/EU?

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rodger Barry ◽  
Ferro Miguel Sousa ◽  
Marcos Francisco
Keyword(s):  
Law Enforcement ◽  
Dispute Resolution ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Private Enforcement ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
Legal Basis ◽  
Member States ◽  
Competition Law Enforcement ◽  
Eu Competition Law

This chapter explains the contents and goals of the Antitrust Damages Directive (Directive 2014/104/EU), the corollary of the EU’s policy towards the promotion and facilitation of private enforcement of competition law. It first traces the evolution in EU competition law enforcement and policy that led to the adoption of the Directive before considering the goals of the Directive in more detail, namely to provide rules for the effective compensation of victims of antitrust infringements and to harmonize some rules concerning damages claims. It then examines the Directive’s legal basis under EU Law as well as substantive provisions, including those relating to compensatory principles, quantification of harm, and consensual dispute resolution. The chapter goes on to highlight neglected issues, limitations, and inherent biases regarding the scope and nature of the Directive’s rules and concludes with an analysis of issues arising from implementation of the Directive in Member States.

Part II The Member State Reports on Transposition of the Directive, 8 Hungary

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nagy Csongor István
Keyword(s):  
Member State ◽  
Civil Law ◽  
Civil Procedure ◽  
Judicial System ◽  
Parent Company ◽  
Private Enforcement ◽  
Binding Force ◽  
Collective Redress ◽  
Right Of Return ◽  
System P

This chapter examines the transposition of the Antitrust Damages Directive in Hungary. It begins with an overview of the transposition procedure, focusing on the Hungarian private enforcement landscape and the transposition process. In particular, it considers how the provisions implementing the Directive were built into the Hungarian Competition Act (HCA), creating a special regime that departs in certain aspects from the general principles of Hungarian civil law and civil procedure (e.g., access rules, calculation of damages). The chapter goes on to discuss the scope of the Hungarian implementing provisions as well as specific issues that arose during the transposition, including those relating to time-barring deadlines, binding force of decisions of other Member States, parent company liability, presumption and quantification of damages by cartels or other antitrust infringements, distribution of liability between co-infringers and right of return between co-infringers, access rules, collective redress, and organization of the judicial system.

Skanska: are jurisdiction challenges now an impossible undertaking?

2019 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 97-103
Author(s):  
Andrew Leitch
Keyword(s):  
Law Enforcement ◽  
Member State ◽  
National Court ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
The Public ◽  
Competition Law Enforcement ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
Industrial Solutions

Claimants in private damages actions following on from European Commission cartel decisions are often faced with a choice of jurisdiction in which to pursue their claims. However, seising jurisdiction in the national court of a desired Member State can require the claim to be pursued against an anchor defendant that is not an addressee of a Commission decision. This may, in the English courts, give rise to various disputes as to the role of that non-addressee defendant in the cartel and, accordingly, whether a claim can in fact be sustained as against that defendant. The Court of Justice's recent judgment in Vantaan Kaupunki v Skanska Industrial Solutions potentially relieves claimants from the burden of having to establish that the non-addressee defendant participated in, or implemented, the cartel in order to sustain a claim against it, by holding that it is entire undertakings that are liable for compensation in private damages actions. The Skanska judgment harmonizes the scope of liability under the public and private spheres of EU competition law enforcement and has potentially significant ramifications for competition litigation in the English courts.

Modelling Public and Private Enforcement

2020 ◽  
Vol 37 (1) ◽  
pp. 9-24
Author(s):  
Kit Barker
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Law Enforcement ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
The United States ◽  
Regulatory Agencies ◽  
Private Enforcement ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
Competition Law Enforcement ◽  
Public And Private Enforcement ◽  
Moral Economic

Achieving a workable, hybrid model of competition law enforcement that is sensitive to both instrumental and non-instrumental ends and which commands broad, cross-jurisdictional support always struck me as a tall order. For one thing, it required a keen understanding of the nature of competition law wrongs, which sit awkwardly at the turnstile between public and private law. The enforcement processes of competition law have also evolved in very different social and historical contexts, the United States being an environment in which regulatory agencies have historically been regarded with scepticism (if not downright distrust) and Europe being a centralised bureaucracy in which they have tended to be regarded as the paradigm. Most challengingly of all, the project required a theory of ‘holism’ capable of explaining how it is possible to reconcile complex moral, economic and social objectives within a singular enforcement system, or (more accurately) within a linked network of distinct law enforcement systems.

scholarly journals PENEGAKAN HUKUM PERSAINGAN USAHA DI INDONESIA MELALUI HARMONISASI PUBLIC ENFORCEMENT DAN PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT [Competition Law Enforcement in Indonesia through the Harmonization of Public Enforcement and Private Enforcement]

Law Review ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 342
Author(s):  
Carissa Christybella Wijaya ◽  
Micheline Hendrito ◽  
Monica Patricia Aripratama ◽  
Udin Silalahi
Keyword(s):  
Law Enforcement ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Private Enforcement ◽  
Compensation Mechanism ◽  
Public Enforcement ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
Competition Law Enforcement ◽  
Public And Private Enforcement ◽  
Civil Courts ◽  
Compensation Payments

<div class="WordSection1"><p><em>KPPU (Commission for the Supervision of Business Competition) as the authority for business competition law in Indonesia still has many shortcomings. This is related to the KPPU’s failure to accommodate compensation payments to victims of business competition law violations. This can happen because Indonesia has only provided room for public enforcement to be implemented. In public enforcement, compensation payments are not paid directly to consumers who have suffered losses but instead come into the state treasury. This article discusses the compensation mechanism that should be received by victims of competition law violations through private enforcement, which is a mechanism for enforcing competition law by using the regulations of the Competition Law in civil courts to demand compensation. This research was conducted with the aim of creating a healthy business competition climate through the enforcement of private enforcement in Indonesia by implementing harmonization between public and private enforcement. In this article, the Authors used normative juridical method and refers to statutory and comparative approaches. The research method used is juridical normative with a statute approach, a case approach, and a comparative legal approach. The results and conclusions of this study are that the KPPU's failure to provide compensation for compensation to victims of business competition violations encourages the need to implement private enforcement in Indonesia which is harmonized with the previous mechanism, namely public enforcement.</em></p><p><strong>Bahasa Indonesia Abstrak: </strong>KPPU (Komisi Pengawas Persaingan Usaha) sebagai lembaga otoritas dalam hukum persaingan usaha di Indonesia masih memiliki banyak kekurangan. Salah satunya terkait dengan kegagalan KPPU dalam mengakomodir pembayaran ganti rugi kepada korban pelanggaran hukum persaingan usaha. Hal ini dapat terjadi karena selama ini Indonesia hanya memberikan ruang bagi <em>public enforcement</em> untuk diterapkan. Dalam <em>public enforcement</em>, pembayaran ganti rugi tidak dibayarkan langsung kepada konsumen yang dirugikan melainkan masuk ke dalam kas negara. Oleh sebab itu, terdapat sebuah urgensi untuk mengalihfungsikan fungsi kompensasi dari KPPU kepada pelaku usaha melalui <em>private enforcement</em>, yaitu sebuah mekanisme penegakan hukum persaingan usaha dengan menggunakan regulasi UU Persaingan Usaha di peradilan perdata untuk menuntut ganti rugi. Penelitian ini dilakukan dengan tujuan untuk menciptakan iklim persaingan usaha yang sehat melalui ditegakkannya <em>private enforcement</em> di Indonesia dengan menerapkan harmonisasi antara <em>public enforcement</em> dan <em>private enforcement</em>. Metode penelitian yang digunakan, yaitu yuridis normatif dengan pendekatan undang-undang, pendekatan kasus, dan pendekatan komparatif hukum. Hasil dan kesimpulan dari penelitian ini adalah kegagalan KPPU dalam memberikan kompensasi ganti rugi kepada korban pelanggaran persaingan usaha mendorong perlu diterapkannya <em>private enforcement</em> di Indonesia yang diharmonisasikan dengan mekanisme sebelumnya, yaitu <em>public enforcement.</em></p></div>

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