Case C-181/19, Jobcenter Krefeld: The End of the Union Citizenship as Previously Understood?

2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 47-64
Author(s):  
Jaan Paju

The European Court of Justice has taken a restrictive approach vis-à-vis economically inactive Union citizens ever since its rulings Brey and Dano. In a recent preliminary ruling, Case C-181/19 Jobcenter Krefeld, the Court confirms this approach with regard to social security benefits that resemble social assistance. Such benefits fall, just as the Court in held in Brey and Dano, under the Citizenship Directive and can be made dependent upon a right to reside. Thereby, the Court holds that the Citizenship Directive overrule Regulation 883/2004, that coordinates social security benefits, and its equal treatment principle which rule out additional residence requirements. However, the Court clarifies that if there is a right to reside on basis of Regulation 492/2011, such a right overrides the more restrictive right to reside that follows from the Citizenship Directive. Different standards seem to apply to economically active Union citizens and economically inactive Union citizens. Challenges lie ahead for the Member States' administrations as different authorities apply the respective Union law instruments.

2006 ◽  
Vol 7 (5) ◽  
pp. 505-524 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marlene Schmidt

On 22 November 2005, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) delivered a judgement in a preliminary ruling procedure from the Arbeitsgericht München (Labour Court Munich), answering questions concerning the interpretation of Clauses 2, 5 and 8 of the Framework Agreement on fixed-term contracts, put into effect by Council Directive 1999/70/EC of 28 June 1999, and as regards the construction of Article 6 of Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation. Essentially, the Arbeitsgericht wanted to know whether a statutory provision exempting employees of 52 years of age and older from limitations to the conclusion of fixed-term contracts was compatible with Community law.


Author(s):  
Nigel Foster

This chapter examines the procedural law of the European Union (EU), focusing on Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). It explains that Article 267 is the reference procedure by which courts in member states can endorse questions concerning EU law to the European Court of Justice (CoJ). Under this Article, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has the jurisdiction to provide preliminary rulings on the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions, bodies, offices, or agencies of the Union and on the interpretation of the Treaties.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Bridgette K. McLellan

<p>European Union citizenship was established by the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992. Intended to fall within the exclusive prerogative of the Member States, it soon became clear that the autonomy of Member States to determine matters relating to nationality would be restricted by the ever-expansive reach of the European Court of Justice. As such, the European Court of Justice transformed the law on citizenship in the 2010 case of Rottmann where measures affecting or depriving the rights conferred and protected by the European Union were held to fall within the scope ratione materiae of European Union law. While Rottmann affirmed the law as to the deprivation of European Union citizenship, it left unanswered the question whether the acquisition of nationality also falls within the scope of European Union law. This paper aims to identify and analyse the law arising post-Rottmann to determine whether the acquisition of nationality could fall within the scope of European Union law. It shall then analyse whether fundamental principles of European Union law, namely the principle of proportionality, could be applied in order to regulate the conditions imposed by Member States in relation to the acquisition of nationality.</p>


2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 81-106
Author(s):  
Catarina Vieira Peres

In March this year, the European Court of Justice (hereinafter “CJ”) answered the first preliminary question regarding the Private Enforcement Directive (“Directive”).1 One might expect this decision2 to remain relevant for the next few years, as it sheds some light on the rather intricate issue of the Directive’s temporal application. The CJ explains what rules are applicable to actions for damages regarding infringements which occurred prior either to the Directive’s adoption or to its implementation in the respective Member States. The case is also of major interest since it illustrates the role that the principle of effectiveness can play when applied alongside Articles 101 or 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”).3 Finally, albeit not expressly addressed, the case is also of interest regarding the controversial issue of parent company liability in private enforcement, where it represents a novelty in the Portuguese legal order.


1999 ◽  
Vol 58 (2) ◽  
pp. 399-412 ◽  
Author(s):  
Catherine Barnard ◽  
Bob Hepple

THE preliminary ruling by the European Court of Justice in the Seymour-Smith and Perez case about the scope and meaning of indirect discrimination has done little to clarify this perplexing concept. The ruling does not tell the thousands of short-service employees whose claims were stayed pending the litigation whether the qualifying period of two years’ continuous service for the right not to be unfairly dismissed is contrary to Community law. Nor does it provide clear standards by which disparate impact is to be tested, nor the relevant time for assessing the legality of an allegedly discriminatory measure, nor the conditions for establishing objective justification. More generally, these proceedings under Article 177 (now Article 234) of the EC Treaty reveal a failure by the Court to perform its function of facilitating the national court in interpreting and applying Community equality law in a way which would be consistent and uniform throughout the Union.


Author(s):  
Peter HILPOLD

Abstract The judgment by the German Constitutional Court (‘BVerfG’) of 5 May 2020 has caused a stir all over Europe. The relationship between the BVerfG and the European Court of Justice (‘ECJ’) has never been an easy one, especially after the Solange judgment of 1974. The Solange jurisprudence has, however, not only been synonymous with conflict and rivalry but also for dialogue and, eventually, mutual respect. With the PSPP judgment, this dialogue seemed to have found an end, while by the order of 29 April 2021 the BVerfG appears to have returned to a more conciliatory tone. Nonetheless, the disruption between Karlsruhe and Luxembourg persists. In this article, the PSPP judgment will be examined in detail, presenting it as the last step of long, contorted jurisprudence. It will be shown that the rupture that occurred in May 2020 was technically unnecessary and rather the result of deep-rooted cultural conflict with a clear economic background. The legal reasoning on both sides—that of the BVerfG and that of the PSPP judgment's most outspoken critics—is problematic at best. While for the time being the BVerfG seems to have learnt the lesson from the conflict provoked by its own judgment, the underlying, substantive conflict is still unresolved. It will be shown that this conflict can only be solved on a political level. Thereby, cultural pre-concepts will have to be overcome. Uncompromising reliance on a national ‘popular spirit’ (Volksgeist) will not offer a way out but neither will, for the time being, exclusive reference to a European Volksgeist ignoring Member State realities. The ‘weighing and balancing’ the BVerfG has missed in the previous Weiss ECJ preliminary ruling (again on the PSPP programme) will have to take place on a far broader scale.


Teisė ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 79 ◽  
pp. 48-64
Author(s):  
Agnė Limantė

Atmesdamas privačių subjektų teikiamus tiesioginius ieškinius dėl ES teisės aktų panaikinimo (SESV 263 straipsnis), Europos Sąjungos Teisingumo Teismas dažnai atkreipia dėmesį į prejudicinio sprendimo procedūros (SESV 267 straipsnis) teikiamas galimybes. Straipsnyje vertinama prejudicinio sprendimo procedūra Europos Sąjungos Teisingumo Teisme kaip alternatyva tiesioginiams ieškiniams dėl ES teisės akto panaikinimo, daugiausia dėmesio skiriant prejudicinių sprendimų trūkumams, dėl kurių šis alternatyvus ES teisės aktų teisėtumo kontrolės instrumentas ne visada garantuoja teisę į teisminę gynybą arba kelia gynybos veiksmingumo klausimų.When dismissing direct actions for annulment (Article 267 TFEU) European Court of Justice often refers to preliminary ruling procedure (Article 267 TFEU) as an alternative way to seek judicial review of EU legal act. Taking this into account, the present article examines preliminary ruling procedure in the European Court of Justice as an alternative to direct actions for annulment, the main attention paying to the shortcomings which result in failure in some cases to provide judicial protection or to ensure effective judicial protection.


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