The Italian Constitutional Court Strengthens the Dialogue with the European Court of Justice Lodging for the First Time a Preliminary Ruling in an Indirect ('Incidenter') Proceeding

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefano Civitarese Matteucci
Author(s):  
Peter HILPOLD

Abstract The judgment by the German Constitutional Court (‘BVerfG’) of 5 May 2020 has caused a stir all over Europe. The relationship between the BVerfG and the European Court of Justice (‘ECJ’) has never been an easy one, especially after the Solange judgment of 1974. The Solange jurisprudence has, however, not only been synonymous with conflict and rivalry but also for dialogue and, eventually, mutual respect. With the PSPP judgment, this dialogue seemed to have found an end, while by the order of 29 April 2021 the BVerfG appears to have returned to a more conciliatory tone. Nonetheless, the disruption between Karlsruhe and Luxembourg persists. In this article, the PSPP judgment will be examined in detail, presenting it as the last step of long, contorted jurisprudence. It will be shown that the rupture that occurred in May 2020 was technically unnecessary and rather the result of deep-rooted cultural conflict with a clear economic background. The legal reasoning on both sides—that of the BVerfG and that of the PSPP judgment's most outspoken critics—is problematic at best. While for the time being the BVerfG seems to have learnt the lesson from the conflict provoked by its own judgment, the underlying, substantive conflict is still unresolved. It will be shown that this conflict can only be solved on a political level. Thereby, cultural pre-concepts will have to be overcome. Uncompromising reliance on a national ‘popular spirit’ (Volksgeist) will not offer a way out but neither will, for the time being, exclusive reference to a European Volksgeist ignoring Member State realities. The ‘weighing and balancing’ the BVerfG has missed in the previous Weiss ECJ preliminary ruling (again on the PSPP programme) will have to take place on a far broader scale.


2014 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 147-165 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dietrich Murswiek

The European Central Bank's (ECB) program of purchasing government bonds, the OMT program (Outright Monetary Transactions Program), which was announced on 6 September 2012, is illegal. With this program, the ECB transgresses its powers. This is the central message of the Federal Constitutional Court's decision from 14 January 2014. However, the decision is not final. The Federal Constitutional Court has suspended the trial and has referred the matter to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) for a preliminary ruling. Only after the ECJ has examined the compatibility of the OMT program with European law will the Federal Constitutional Court pronounce its final judgment.


Teisė ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 113 ◽  
pp. 80-107
Author(s):  
Paulius Griciūnas

The judicial dialogue between the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania and the European Court of Justice is analyzed in this article. The variety of opinions, arguments, and the evolution of the approaches regarding the right or obligation of the Constitutional Court to refer for a preliminary ruling are researched. Major events in the evolution were two referrals by the Constitutional Court in 2007 and 2017; both of these decisions to refer for the preliminary ruling are compared, and the similarities and differences analyzed. The potential of a preliminary ruling in the constitutional jurisprudence is demonstrated, with an emphasis on the indirect control of the legality of EU acts and the national identity clause.


2014 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 107-110 ◽  
Author(s):  
Udo Di Fabio

On 7 February 2014 in the OMT Case, the German Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe referred a question about the interpretation of Treaty law to the European Court of Justice for the first time. The question was whether the European Central Bank exceeded its mandate when it declared, in September 2012, that it was prepared to make emergency, unlimited purchases of specific states' bonds. Some view the referral as a genuflection acknowledging the judicial superiority of European Union jurisprudence. Has the Karlsruhe Court relinquished its role as “the final arbiter” and thereby surreptitiously bid farewell to the German sovereignty that the same Senate of the Constitutional Court so vigorously endorsed in the Lisbon Treaty Case in 2009?


Author(s):  
Francisco Balaguer Callejón ◽  
Rafael Bustos Gisbert ◽  
Ascensión Elvira Perales ◽  
José Martín y Pérez de Nanclares ◽  
Javier Matía Portilla ◽  
...  

 En esta encuesta un grupo de Catedráticos de Derecho Constitucional contestan un conjunto de preguntas sobre el rol del Tribunal de Justicia de la Unión Europea como actor de la constitucionalidad, especialmente en los casos en los que un Tribunal Constitucional nacional presenta una cuestión prejudicial ante el Tribunal de Justicia de la Unión Europea, y las consecuencias que ello trae consigo en el orden constitucional tradicionalmente vinculado al Estado nacional soberano.In this academic survey a group of Constitutional Law Professors answer some questions about the role of the European Court of Justice as a constitutional actor, especially when a national constitutional court raises a preliminary ruling before the Court of Justice of the European Union, and its consequences in the traditional constitutional order.


Author(s):  
Tania Pantazi

The increase in short-term rentals via online platforms has captured the attention of scholars and regulators. Short-term letting is now considered a considerable alternative to traditional tourist accommodation contracts, challenging matters such as conditions in the housing market and consumer protection. Online platforms, such as Airbnb, Booking.com , Expedia and Tripadvisor, now provide offers for short-term accommodation contracts along with traditional accommodation options (hotels, hostels, apartments). The recent decision of the European Court of Justice in Joined cases C-724/18 and C-727/18 addresses for the first time the issue of regulation of short-term rentals in Member States and evaluates a national authorization scheme in light of the Services Directive. The present paper provides a brief background of European regulation affecting short-term rentals and discusses the judgment and its implications for future developments.


2004 ◽  
Vol 6 ◽  
pp. 1-34
Author(s):  
Anthony Arnull

The purpose of this article is to consider the effect of the draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe on the European Court of Justice (ECJ). At the time of writing, the future of the draft Constitution is somewhat uncertain. Having been finalised by the Convention on the Future of Europe in the summer of 2003 and submitted to the then President of the European Council, it formed the basis for discussion at an intergovernmental conference (IGC) which opened in October 2003. Hopes that the text might be finalised by the end of the year were dashed when a meeting of the IGC in Brussels in December 2003 ended prematurely amid disagreement over the weighting of votes in the Council. However, it seems likely that a treaty equipping the European Union with a Constitution based on the Convention’s draft will in due course be adopted and that the provisions of the draft dealing with the ECJ will not be changed significantly. Even if either assumption proves misplaced, those provisions will remain of interest as reflecting one view of the position the ECJ might occupy in a constitutional order of the Union.


Author(s):  
Nigel Foster

This chapter examines the procedural law of the European Union (EU), focusing on Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). It explains that Article 267 is the reference procedure by which courts in member states can endorse questions concerning EU law to the European Court of Justice (CoJ). Under this Article, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has the jurisdiction to provide preliminary rulings on the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions, bodies, offices, or agencies of the Union and on the interpretation of the Treaties.


2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (6) ◽  
pp. 1471-1490
Author(s):  
François-Xavier Millet ◽  
Nicoletta Perlo

A preliminary reference on the part of the Constitutional Council was, in several respects, not to be expected. It was debatable whether it would consider itself as a “court or tribunal” within the meaning of Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and, therefore, whether it would refer a case to the European Court of Justice (CJEU) at all. The French constitutional court could also have resorted to theacte clairdoctrine so as to escape from their obligation to ask for the interpretive guidance of the CJEU. However, the main reason why a reference was not awaited by legal actors lies in the limited jurisdiction of the Constitutional Council. Until the introduction in 2008 of the so-called QPC, that is,question prioritaire de constitutionnalité(the Priority Preliminary Reference mechanism on issues of constitutionality), theConseil constitutionnelhad a very limited jurisdiction compared to its European counterparts. Its main mission was to assess the conformity of parliamentary bills and treaties with the Constitution and only with the Constitution. Its review could only take placeex ante, between the adoption and the promulgation of a text. By opening the way to anex postreview of statutes with regard to the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution, the QPC brought about a major change in the French adjudication system: statutes are no longer immune from constitutional challenge once they are in force. However, treaties and other international or European commitments are no parameters of constitutional review. TheConseil constitutionnelmade this clear in 1975 and never seriously changed track, despite minor qualifications to the rule. In their seminalIVGruling on the Voluntary Interruption of Pregnancy Act, they held that it was not up to them to review the compatibility of bills with treaties, in spite of Article 55 of the Constitution. Consequently, the task of the constitutional judges does not go beyond the assessment of laws with regard to the Constitution. This is the main reason that explains why, on the face of it, theConseil constitutionnelwas unlikely to refer a case to the CJEU. Why would it seek the interpretation or ask for the review of a European text if this text is immaterial for it and if the yardstick of its examination is the Constitution and only the Constitution? Yet, it happened. For the first time, theConseilreferred a case to the CJEU on 4 April 2013. Although this is undoubtedly a major legal breakthrough, we will see in due course that this is probably more arévolution de palaisthan a true revolution in French constitutional law.


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