Declaring War and Peace

Wars of Law ◽  
2018 ◽  
pp. 1-10
Author(s):  
Tanisha M. Fazal
Keyword(s):  
Civil Wars ◽  
Laws Of War ◽  
War And Peace ◽  
The Past ◽  
Rebel Groups ◽  
Peace Treaties

This chapter introduces the argument of the book: that the proliferation of the laws of war over the past 150 years has incentivized states to evade the laws of war, and secessionist rebel groups to engage with the laws of war. This argument will be developed via investigation of four main questions: (1) why have states stopped declaring war in their wars with each other?; (2) why have states stopped concluding peace treaties in their wars with each other?; (3) why have secessionist groups stopped declaring independence formally?; and, (4) why is there an increase in peace treaties concluding civil wars?

International Recognition, Compliance Costs, and the Formalities of War

Wars of Law ◽  
2018 ◽  
pp. 38-71
Author(s):  
Tanisha M. Fazal
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Civil Wars ◽  
International Community ◽  
Laws Of War ◽  
War And Peace ◽  
Compliance Costs ◽  
Interstate War ◽  
Rebel Groups ◽  
International Recognition ◽  
Peace Treaties

This chapter develops the main arguments of the book, focusing on how belligerents in interstate and civil war have reacted to the development of the laws of war detailed in Chapter 2. States involved in interstate war are perversely incentivized to evade the laws of war as these laws have proliferated. Thus, they are decreasingly likely to engage the formalities of war, specifically declarations of war and peace treaties. Secessionist rebel groups fighting civil wars aim to please the international community, and therefore are decreasingly likely to declare independence formally, generally likely to avoid targeting civilians, and increasingly likely to conclude peace treaties.

Wars of Law

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tanisha M. Fazal
Keyword(s):  
Case Studies ◽  
Civil Wars ◽  
Unintended Consequences ◽  
Peace Treaty ◽  
Laws Of War ◽  
Independent State ◽  
Interstate War ◽  
Rebel Groups ◽  
Step Over ◽  
Peace Treaties

This book assesses the unintended consequences of the proliferation of the laws of war. In 1856 there was one codified law of war. In 2018, there are over 70 such laws, and they place increasing constraints on belligerents. This increase has generated significant consequences for the commencement, conduct, and conclusion of both interstate and civil wars. States fighting interstate wars today prefer not to step over any bright lines where the laws of war would apply unequivocally. Thus, these states have stopped declaring war and concluding peace treaties. Rebel groups – particularly, secessionists that seek their own independent state – by contrast, have increasingly engaged with the laws of war. Secessionists are relatively unlikely to target civilians, and there is an increasing rate of peace treaty usage in civil wars that contrasts with the decline in interstate war. This research is based on two new major original datasets as well as a series of case studies, and is particularly unusual in combining analysis of interstate and civil wars.

scholarly journals Leadership Changes and Civil War Agreements: Exploring Preliminary Links

2016 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 439-448 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carmela Lutmar ◽  
Lesley Terris
Keyword(s):  
Civil Wars ◽  
First Century ◽  
Peace Studies ◽  
War And Peace ◽  
War Termination ◽  
Rebel Groups ◽  
Interstate Disputes ◽  
Predominant Type ◽  
Leadership Changes ◽  
The Impact

AbstractThe emergence of civil wars as the predominant type of conflict in the twenty-first century has prompted scholars to reformulate and revisit many of the questions treated in the interstate conflict literature. One of these questions concerns the impact of leadership changes on policy decisions within the realm of war and peace. Studies have suggested that in interstate disputes, the coming to power of new leaders in one or both of the disputing governments increases the prospects of war termination. We argue that within the context of intrastate disputes this relationship is more complex and multilayered due to factors that are characteristic of rebel groups and civil wars. We suggest that leader overturns in rebel groups are likely to lead, under certain conditions to more, rather than less, hardline conflict positions, at least in the short term, thus hindering possible negotiation processes. We test our hypothesis on a dataset of leadership changes and agreements ending civil wars in Africa, 1975–2007.

The Proliferation and Codification of the Laws of War

Wars of Law ◽  
2018 ◽  
pp. 11-37
Author(s):  
Tanisha M. Fazal
Keyword(s):  
Content Analysis ◽  
Civil War ◽  
Laws Of War ◽  
Interstate War ◽  
The Past ◽  
Rebel Groups ◽  
Geneva Conventions ◽  
Legal Standing ◽  
History Of

This chapter makes three arguments in presenting a history of the development of the laws of war governing belligerent conduct. First, the laws of war have increased dramatically in number over the past 150 years. Second, military participation in international humanitarian lawmaking has similarly decreased dramatically. And third, the laws of war were designed by states and meant to govern interstate war; rebel groups in civil war are typically only mentioned with the purpose of denying them international legal standing. The analysis in this chapter is based on original content analysis of the commentaries to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions.

Rebellion, War Aims & the Laws of War

Daedalus ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 146 (1) ◽  
pp. 71-82 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tanisha M. Fazal
Keyword(s):  
Civil Wars ◽  
International Community ◽  
International Humanitarian Law ◽  
Humanitarian Law ◽  
Laws Of War ◽  
Nonstate Actors ◽  
Independent State ◽  
Rebel Groups ◽  
War Aims

Most wars today are civil wars, but we have little understanding of the conditions under which rebel groups might comply with the laws of war. i ask three questions in this essay: What do the laws of war require of rebels, or armed nonstate actors (ansas)? To what extent are rebels aware of the laws of war? Under what conditions do rebel groups comply with international humanitarian law? i argue that the war aims of rebel groups are key to understanding their relationship with the laws of war. In particular, secessionist rebel groups – those that seek a new, independent state – are especially likely to comply with the laws of war as a means to signal their capacity and willingness to be good citizens of the international community to which they seek admission.

Peace Treaties in Civil War

Wars of Law ◽  
2018 ◽  
pp. 217-242
Author(s):  
Tanisha M. Fazal
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Civil Wars ◽  
International Community ◽  
Main Argument ◽  
Rebel Groups ◽  
Do So ◽  
Peace Treaties

This chapter asks: why has the use of peace treaties to conclude civil wars increased in recent years? The main argument of the chapter is that the international community – which often provides critical support to both states and rebels fighting civil wars – has developed a taste for peace treaties. Rebel groups are likely to be willing to sign peace treaties because having a seat at the table accords them some legitimacy. States, while less interested in concluding peace treaties in civil wars, do so under pressure from the international community. But peace treaties are not always an inherent good in that they are not always associated with peace.

Peace Treaties in Interstate War

Wars of Law ◽  
2018 ◽  
pp. 131-160
Author(s):  
Tanisha M. Fazal
Keyword(s):  
Main Argument ◽  
Laws Of War ◽  
War And Peace ◽  
Interstate War ◽  
Highly Correlated ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Peace Treaties

This chapter investigates the declining use of peace treaties to conclude interstate war. The main argument of the chapter is that states have reacted to the proliferation of the laws of war by evading the formalities of war, including the use of peace treaties to end wars. The chapter’s findings support this argument, as well as extensions including the hypothesis that states that violate the laws of war during conflict are especially unlikely to conclude peace treaties. The chapter ends with a discussion of the relationship between declarations of war and peace treaties in interstate war, and finds that the use of these two formalities is highly correlated.

Stick Then Carrot: When Do Governments Give Amnesty during Civil War?

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lesley-Ann Daniels
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Civil Wars ◽  
Policy Choice ◽  
Strategic Choices ◽  
Rebel Groups ◽  
The Government

Abstract Governments grant amnesties to rebel groups during civil wars and this is a puzzle. Why would the government offer an amnesty, which can be interpreted as a signal of weakness? In certain circumstances, offering amnesty is a rational policy choice. Governments should give amnesties when they are winning: the risk of misinterpreted signals is lessened, costs are low, rebel groups are weakened, and so amnesty can be used instrumentally to encourage defection or division among foot soldiers or as an incentive to leaders. Therefore, the government capitalizes on its military advantage and offers amnesty in a “stick then carrot” tactic. Using a database of amnesties during conflicts from 1990 to 2011, the article shows that governments are more likely to give amnesties following high rebel deaths. The use of amnesty during conflict is nuanced and context is important when understanding strategic choices.

Economic Actors' Lobbying Influence on the Prospects for War and Peace

2013 ◽  
Vol 67 (4) ◽  
pp. 863-888 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen G. Brooks
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Direct Investment ◽  
Direct Investment ◽  
Global Economy ◽  
Economic Globalization ◽  
Economic Incentives ◽  
Special Interests ◽  
War And Peace ◽  
The Past ◽  
The Government

AbstractPolitical scientists and economists have long been interested in the role of special interests in the policymaking process. In the past few years, a series of important new books have argued forcefully that the lobbying activities of economic actors have an important influence on the prospects for war and peace. All of these analyses claim that whether economic actors enhance or decrease the likelihood of conflict ultimately depends on the domestic political balance between economic actors who have a strong vested interest in pushing for peace versus those that do not. I advance two contrary arguments. At least among the advanced states, I posit there are no longer any economic actors who will be favorable toward war and who will lobby the government with this preference. All of the identified mechanisms that previously contributed to such lobbying in these states have been swept away with the end of colonialism and the rise of economic globalization. In particular, I show that the current structure of the global economy now makes it feasible for foreign direct investment to serve as an effective substitute for conquest in a way that was not possible in previous eras. My second argument concerns those economic actors in advanced states with a preference for peace. I posit that it has become unnecessary for them to directly lobby the government to avoid war on economic grounds because economic globalization—the accumulation of decisions by economic actors throughout the globe—now has sufficiently clear economic incentives for leaders.

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