Evasion, Engagement, and the Laws of War

Wars of Law ◽  
2018 ◽  
pp. 243-256
Author(s):  
Tanisha M. Fazal

This concluding chapter provides a brief summary of the book, but focuses on three policy issues facing international humanitarian lawmakers today. First, drawing on evidence provided in Chapter 2, this chapter asks whether military personnel have been participating in ongoing debates over the laws of war regarding cyber warfare and lethal autonomous weapons systems. Second, the chapter draws out “the secessionists’ dilemma,” wherein secessionists are told by the international community to behave a certain way, but are rarely rewarded for good behaviour. And third, the chapter delves into the book’s contrasting findings regarding the declining use of peace treaties in interstate war and their increasing use in civil war. The chapter concludes by arguing that the development of international humanitarian law, while generating some perverse incentives, is likely a net good, but that future caution is warranted.

Daedalus ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 146 (1) ◽  
pp. 71-82 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tanisha M. Fazal

Most wars today are civil wars, but we have little understanding of the conditions under which rebel groups might comply with the laws of war. i ask three questions in this essay: What do the laws of war require of rebels, or armed nonstate actors (ansas)? To what extent are rebels aware of the laws of war? Under what conditions do rebel groups comply with international humanitarian law? i argue that the war aims of rebel groups are key to understanding their relationship with the laws of war. In particular, secessionist rebel groups – those that seek a new, independent state – are especially likely to comply with the laws of war as a means to signal their capacity and willingness to be good citizens of the international community to which they seek admission.


Author(s):  
Tilman Rodenhäuser

Analysing the development of the concept of non-state parties to an armed conflict from the writings of philosophers in the eighteenth century through international humanitarian law (IHL) treaty law to contemporary practice, three threads can be identified. First, as pointed out by Rousseau almost two and a half centuries ago, one basic principle underlying the laws of war is that war is not a relation between men but between entities. Accordingly, the lawful objective of parties cannot be to harm opponents as individuals but only to overcome the entity for which the individual fights. This necessitates that any party to an armed conflict is a collective, organized entity and not a loosely connected group of individuals. Second, de Vattel already stressed that civil war is fought between two parties who ‘acknowledge no common judge’ and have no ‘common superior’ on earth....


2021 ◽  
pp. 237-258
Author(s):  
S. Kate Devitt

The rise of human-information systems, cybernetic systems, and increasingly autonomous systems requires the application of epistemic frameworks to machines and human-machine teams. This chapter discusses higher-order design principles to guide the design, evaluation, deployment, and iteration of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS) based on epistemic models. Epistemology is the study of knowledge. Epistemic models consider the role of accuracy, likelihoods, beliefs, competencies, capabilities, context, and luck in the justification of actions and the attribution of knowledge. The aim is not to provide ethical justification for or against LAWS, but to illustrate how epistemological frameworks can be used in conjunction with moral apparatus to guide the design and deployment of future systems. The models discussed in this chapter aim to make Article 36 reviews of LAWS systematic, expedient, and evaluable. A Bayesian virtue epistemology is proposed to enable justified actions under uncertainty that meet the requirements of the Laws of Armed Conflict and International Humanitarian Law. Epistemic concepts can provide some of the apparatus to meet explainability and transparency requirements in the development, evaluation, deployment, and review of ethical AI.


2013 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 271-292 ◽  
Author(s):  
HENRY SHUE

AbstractA person with moral commitments can respect International Humanitarian Law (IHL) only if the permissions granted by it do not depart radically from their basic morality, but the features of contemporary war require considerable departures from morality in the content of any rules applicable to war. The features of the contemporary international political arena, in turn, and especially the dominant interpretation of sovereignty, require that IHL be the same for all parties. But, contrary to the arguments of some influential analytic philosophers, such ‘symmetry’ in the laws need not involve their content's departing excessively from basic morality. Insisting on the same rules for all, however, leads to the problem that, other things equal, the more stringent the content of a set of rules, the greater the temptation on the part of self-interested parties to flout the rules. However, a hard-headed view of IHL requires no concessions to terrorists or anti-terrorists.


2015 ◽  
Vol 48 (1) ◽  
pp. 55-80 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kubo Mačák

This article presents the case for a progressive interpretation of the notion of military objectives in international humanitarian law (IHL), bringing computer data within the scope of this concept. The advent of cyber military operations has presented a dilemma as to the proper understanding of data in IHL. The emerging orthodoxy, represented by the 2013Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare, advances the argument that the intangible nature of data renders it ineligible to be an object for the purposes of the rules on targeting in IHL. This article, on the contrary, argues that because of its susceptibility to alteration and destruction, the better view is that data is an object within the meaning of this term under IHL and thus it may qualify as a military objective. The article supports this conclusion by means of a textual, systematic and teleological interpretation of the definition of military objectives found in treaty and customary law. The upshot of the analysis presented here is that data that does not meet the criteria for qualification as a military objective must be considered a civilian object, with profound implications for the protection of civilian datasets in times of armed conflict.


2021 ◽  
pp. 185-210
Author(s):  
Michiel Hofman

This chapter recounts how Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) failed to turn the tide against the attacks on hospitals through its approach of naming and shaming the perpetrators of hospital bombings. It speculates that the failure to stop the attacks was either caused by the way in which the international humanitarian law (IHL) is wired to provide exemption for warring parties or MSF’s inability to deliver consistent messages necessary to generate pressure on offending nations. It also mentions the Syrian government’s denial of assistance to the population and disrespect to the laws of war that centered the state as both perpetrator and aid responder. The chapter looks at the Syrian government’s ability to deny and allow access to services that served to amplify its control and project its sovereignty. It elaborates how the Syrian state centered its own sovereign control by being the focus of diplomatic efforts to ensure humanitarian access.


2019 ◽  
pp. 297-304
Author(s):  
Knut Traisbach

This chapter is a comment on a reflection by Frédéric Mégret on the limits of the laws of war. It proposes a jurisprudence of limits that focuses less on absolute ideals but on the compromising and enabling space ‘in-between’ these absolutes. Relying on Hannah Arendt’s views on different conceptions of humanity, the comment critically engages with a thinking in terms of inherent opposing interests and oscillations between them. A conception of limits as reproducing inherent absolutes is disabling and passive. Instead, limits can be understood as facilitating a space that enables us to judge and to act, also through compromise. International humanitarian law and international human rights law, perhaps more than other areas of international law, depend on preserving and actively seeking this politically relevant space.


2012 ◽  
Vol 94 (886) ◽  
pp. 533-578 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cordula Droege

AbstractCyber warfare figures prominently on the agenda of policymakers and military leaders around the world. New units to ensure cyber security are created at various levels of government, including in the armed forces. But cyber operations in armed conflict situations could have potentially very serious consequences, in particular when their effect is not limited to the data of the targeted computer system or computer. Indeed, cyber operations are usually intended to have an effect in the ‘real world’. For instance, by tampering with the supporting computer systems, one can manipulate an enemy's air traffic control systems, oil pipeline flow systems, or nuclear plants. The potential humanitarian impact of some cyber operations on the civilian population is enormous. It is therefore important to discuss the rules of international humanitarian law (IHL) that govern such operations because one of the main objectives of this body of law is to protect the civilian population from the effects of warfare. This article seeks to address some of the questions that arise when applying IHL – a body of law that was drafted with traditional kinetic warfare in mind – to cyber technology. The first question is: when is cyber war really war in the sense of ‘armed conflict’? After discussing this question, the article goes on to look at some of the most important rules of IHL governing the conduct of hostilities and the interpretation in the cyber realm of those rules, namely the principles of distinction, proportionality, and precaution. With respect to all of these rules, the cyber realm poses a number of questions that are still open. In particular, the interconnectedness of cyber space poses a challenge to the most fundamental premise of the rules on the conduct of hostilities, namely that civilian and military objects can and must be distinguished at all times. Thus, whether the traditional rules of IHL will provide sufficient protection to civilians from the effects of cyber warfare remains to be seen. Their interpretation will certainly need to take the specificities of cyber space into account. In the absence of better knowledge of the potential effects of cyber warfare, it cannot be excluded that more stringent rules might be necessary.


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