Developing a Technological Tool for Managing Complex Environmental Incidents1

1999 ◽  
Vol 1999 (1) ◽  
pp. 839-842
Author(s):  
Steve Wischmann ◽  
Lome Thomas ◽  
Jim Gynther

ABSTRACT This paper will discuss the U.S. Coast Guard's response to the need for technological solutions to the incident management challenges posed by oil spills and hazardous material releases. Additionally, this paper will examine some of the difficulties presented by technology itself; that is to say, technological tools come with both implicit and explicit ramifications that must be understood and overcome in order to fully harness the potential contained within such capabilities. With the advent of both the public and Congress demanding increasingly effective spill response and fiscal conservancy, the Coast Guard has sought technological innovations to enhance its ability to coordinate and manage complex, multi-agency response operations. Through the development of the On-Scene Command and Control (OSC2) system, the Coast Guard intends to bring the potential leverage of computer-based technology to the Incident Command System (ICS) by harnessing the advantages of large-screen display, relational databases, and a Geographic Information System (GIS) for mapping response resources and activities. The decision-support and resource tracking advantages produced by OSC2 are expected to contribute mightily to improve performance within the Unified Command/ICS organization. However, the challenges posed by the implementation of OSC2 cannot be ignored. Factors ranging from human resource inhibitions and training requirements to blending individual technical components into a seamless whole must be considered when technological tools are designed, developed, and employed. Technology is not inherently good or bad, but remains always contextual—it is dependent on the intervening factors introduced by the human condition in which it is imagined and then utilized. This paper will discuss these issues and describe the key elements in achieving the success of OSC2 as one of the Coast Guard's spill response management tools.

2008 ◽  
Vol 2008 (1) ◽  
pp. 1051-1055
Author(s):  
K. Moore

ABSTRACT On January 12, 2007 the MIV TONG CHENG, a 485 ft. Chinese flag break bulk vessel loaded with cargo and 130,000 gallons of oil, en route to the Panama Canal, notified Coast Guard Sector Honolulu that it had suffered damage to its #2 cargo hold and the hold was full of seawater. Located 700 miles from the nearest port (Honolulu), the vessel'S pumps were unable to keep up with the flooding, and with 26 personnel on board, the vessel advised it was diverting to Honolulu for emergency repairs. As the vessel proceeded toward Honolulu, its decreasing speed, the presence of two additional cargo ships in escort and the discovery of an oil sheen trailing the vessel raised significant concerns over the threat this posed to Hawaii. At stake in allowing the vessel a safe haven were the pristine shorelines of the Hawaiian Islands and potential crippling of the port'S vital lifeline to commercial marine traffic, its only source of sustenance. A myriad of issues had to be addressed as the vessel made preparations to come into Honolulu Harbor and a multi-agency, international Unified Command was established. The Unified Command, using the Incident Command System, managed the various contingencies from search and rescue of the crew if the ship were lost, to the potential discharge of 130,000 gallons of fuel. A risk-based decision process was employed to weigh the off-shore response challenges against the near-shore risks while taking into account the remoteness and sensitive marine environment of the Hawaiian Islands. This paper provides insight into the dynamic and complex response and the incident management teams decisions regarding allowing this vessel in distress to enter a critical and environmentally sensitive port. The vessel was successfully repaired and allowed to depart Hawaii. This case is a classic example of proper decision making and risk balancing for a critical safe refuge request.


1997 ◽  
Vol 1997 (1) ◽  
pp. 743-746 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael de Bettencourt

ABSTRACT An act of terrorism resulting in an oil spill triggers a unique set of response considerations that bring diverse agencies together under crisis conditions. To manage such incidents effectively, a systematic approach is needed to standardize incident response, command, and control methods and to better define the planning process for these demanding scenarios. The National Interagency Incident Management System-Incident Command System (NIIMS-ICS) is the common denominator that has been adopted by the United States Coast Guard for oil spill response. This paper highlights recommendations to adopt the NIIMS-ICS nationally for combined law enforcement and environmental response incidents to ensure efficient and effective response methods.


1997 ◽  
Vol 1997 (1) ◽  
pp. 972-972 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph J. Leonard

ABSTRACT In October 1994, southeast Texas experienced some of its worst flooding ever. Near Houston, the raging waters of the San Jacinto River caused a pipeline to rupture, spilling vast quantities of gasoline. When this gasoline found an ignition source, the river became a devastating conflagration. The Coast Guard immediately activated its incident command system (ICS) with a unified command to direct response activities. Lessons learned following the San Jacinto River incident will improve future response activities and serve as the foundation for the adoption of the National Interagency Incident Management System (which includes the ICS) by the Coast Guard and the state of Texas.


2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 (1) ◽  
pp. 419-430
Author(s):  
Lea Gibson ◽  
Jeff Westervel ◽  
Yvonne Addassi

ABSTRACT: The Office of Spill Prevention and Response (OSPR) is tasked with preventing, preparing for, and responding to oil spills impacting state waters throughout California. A key component of prevention and preparedness is a robust training program that ensures worker safety and provides the necessary skills to work effectively. As a response organization, OSPR must also verify that its staff is appropriately qualified to assume specified positions within the Incident Command System, in order to achieve the best protection of California’s natural resources, as well as to maintain credibility with stakeholders and partners within the Unified Command. To achieve these training and response objectives, OSPR established a program that includes a dedicated Response Qualifications and Certifications Unit, identification of training needs based on job classification, development of a tracking database, a comprehensive task book system consistent with the framework instituted by the U.S. Coast Guard and the Federal Emergency Management Agency, succession planning, and ongoing evaluations to measure the effectiveness of OSPR’s training program. The Response Qualifications and Certifications Unit collaborates with local, State, and Federal agencies, as well as private entities, to develop and provide advanced online, classroom, and hands-on training courses. This paper will outline the successes, complications, and ongoing challenges in establishing OSPR’s training and qualifications program, as well as plans for the future of the program.


2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 (1) ◽  
pp. 2253-2259
Author(s):  
Kasey Talbot ◽  
Jeff Dauzat

ABSTRACT Hurricane Isaac made landfall on August 29, 2012 over Louisiana, lingering overhead for more than 60 hours. While most were concerned with surviving the 80+ mph winds and ensuing storm surge and floods, Coast Guard members statewide knew there would be no calm after the storm; instead it would be a grueling fight to restore the port to normalcy. The slow moving storm caused grounded deep draft vessels and barges, spilled oil, releases of hazardous materials (HAZMAT), and damage to various buildings and infrastructures. U.S. Coast Guard Sector New Orleans integrated local, states, and federal agencies into a Unified Command structure to coordinate limited resources post-storm. Within Sector New Orleans, the Incident Management Division (IMD) made it their primary mission to mitigate any substantial threats of oil discharges or HAZMAT releases and ensure proper cleanup. On September 2, 2012, IMD utilized the Incident Command System (ICS) to establish a Marine Environmental Response (MER) Incident Management Team (IMT) to achieve their post storm mission. The MER IMT consisted of 200 personnel, of which 60 were Coast Guard members, and included representatives from the National Strike Force, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS), National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality (LDEQ), Louisiana Oil Spill Coordinator's Office (LOSCO), Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries (LDWF), and three Oil Spill Removal Organizations (OSROs); together the team collected 4500 barrels of oily water and 1200 HAZMAT containers, deployed over 11,000 feet of containment boom, and federalized three pollution projects. The MER IMT was disestablished on September 28, 2012 leaving Sector New Orleans IMD to maintain complete management of the ongoing federalized projects, “Fantome”, “Map Drilling”, and “Gulf South”. The projects included oil discharges in adjacent waterways of two oil production/storage facilities, oil discharges from fixed facility barges, and oil discharges from a storage platform along the marsh shoreline. Sector New Orleans executed $9.5 million in Oil Spill Liability Trust Funds towards emergency response efforts and successfully restored safety to the public health, welfare, environment, and maritime community.


1995 ◽  
Vol 1995 (1) ◽  
pp. 761-765
Author(s):  
William Boland ◽  
Pete Bontadelli

ABSTRACT The Marine Safety Division of the 11th Coast Guard District and the California Office of Oil Spill Prevention and Response are pursuing new avenues to assure that federal, state, and local efforts in California achieve the goals of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 and the Lempert-Keene-Seastrand Oil Spill Prevention and Response Act of 1990. Coordination of the seven California area committees, publishing detailed area contingency plans, and the implemention of a memorandum of agreement on oil spill prevention and response highlight recent cooperative successes. In 1994 a joint Coast Guard/state/industry incident command system task force drafted an ICS field operations guide and incident action plan forms that meet National Interagency Incident Management System and fire scope ICS requirements.


1999 ◽  
Vol 1999 (1) ◽  
pp. 937-932
Author(s):  
Meredith Austin

ABSTRACT At 10:30 p.m. on January 22, 1998, Coast Guard Marine Safety Unit (MSU) Galveston, Texas received notification of a sudden pressure drop within the High Island Pipeline System (HIPS), indicating a possible break in the pipeline, approximately 55 miles from Galveston in the Gulf of Mexico. The Coast Guard, Responsible Party, and State of Texas established a Unified Command to respond to the incident. At 3:15 p.m. on January 23, the M/V Red Seagull, located approximately 60 miles from Galveston, reported oil around her hull. The Federal Incident Commander established a second Unified Command, using Coast Guard members of the HIPS response, augmented by personnel from other Coast Guard units, the second Responsible Party and the state of Texas. As the level of activity for each of the responses changed, so did the Incident Command structure. The responses were a success due to the Unified Command's understanding of the Incident Command System, and the willingness to bring in additional personnel from other sources as necessary.


2003 ◽  
Vol 2003 (1) ◽  
pp. 167-173
Author(s):  
Michael R. Moore ◽  
Thomas C. Miller ◽  
George L. Boone ◽  
Rendall B. Farley

ABSTRACT Salvage operations must be conducted with the utmost concern for the safety of personnel, as well as protection of the marine environment, and property. Due to the highly dynamic circumstances involved in salvage operations, there is no standard or foolproof method for responding to a casualty. Therefore, contingency planning and pre-established relationships with industry become indispensable to ensure that informed decision making, maximum responder cooperation and optimum asset coordination. Inherent in contingency planning is having an understanding that the role of the Captain of the Port (COTP) / Federal On-Scene Coordinator (FOSC) during a salvage response is multifaceted. While the COTP/FOSC has federal responsibilities to protect people, property, and the environment, it is achieved only through close coordination of multiple responding agencies, the response/salvage community and their resources. This successful coordination is greatly facilitated through an understanding of FOSC roles and proper use of the Incident Command/Unified Command (ICS/UC) System. This paper also describes the assets and authorities available to the COTP/FOSC during a salvage response, the triggers and overriding issues that would initiate full or partial federalization.


1997 ◽  
Vol 1997 (1) ◽  
pp. 737-742
Author(s):  
LT Tina M. Burke ◽  
LT John P. Flynn

ABSTRACT In recent years, the usefulness of the incident command system (ICS) has received much attention. Much of the oil industry and several government agencies involved in all types of emergency response have been using ICS for many years. In addition, the U.S. Coast Guard formally adopted the national interagency incident management system (NIIMS) ICS as the response management system of choice in February of 1996. The response to the tank barge North Cape grounding was a complex multiagency effort that brought with it many of the issues and problems responders face when dealing with crisis situations. This paper describes the ICS-based organization that was established to respond to the major North Cape oil spill, analyzes the organization compared to standard ICS, and discusses how the ICS framework and principles contributed to the success of the response. It also explains how closer conformity to standard ICS could have remedied many of the issues that later surfaced as lessons learned, resulting in improved response efficiency. The North Cape response provides a vivid example of how ICS is a helpful management tool that, if rigorously learned and applied in a widespread fashion, can greatly enhance the nation's oil spill response posture.


1997 ◽  
Vol 1997 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-8
Author(s):  
Gary L. Ott ◽  
LCDR David C. Stalfort

ABSTRACT “No two spills are alike” is an important maxim in oil spill response that requires planners and responders alike to remain adaptable in their thinking regarding response actions. The majority of oil spills are small and can usually be addressed adequately within the confines of a rigid response management system. However, a large spill is not simply a “scaling up” of a routine, small spill. Large spills require input from many more stakeholders, public outrage is intensified, and often difficult decisions on environmental, economic, and emotional tradeoffs are necessary. As a result, a catastrophic spill requires responders to have more than the equipment-focused organizational skills that are satisfactory during routine spills. Complex spills require responders to have advanced interpersonal skills such as team building, risk communication, and organizational problem solving. It is very difficult, however, to evaluate the responder's grasp of these skills and ability to implement them, even though these skills are so critical to the success of a large spill response. The skills that often ensure success for small, frequently occurring spills are not the only skills required for success in a large, complex spill incident. On the federal level, the area contingency planning process was established to plan for, respond to, and evaluate the adequacy of response capability in a given area. Currently, area contingency plans consist primarily of boiler-plate language, reference materials such as lists of resources, notification procedures, and general incident command system information, all written to satisfy the format required by the guidelines (U.S. Coast Guard, 1992). What is usually missing, however, is a useful discussion by the area committee on how responders might work together to solve problems and on detailed “how to” strategies for preventing a bad situation from getting worse. As a result, the requirement that there be an “assessment of the effectiveness of the plan” (Public Law 101-380, 1990 and 1992) may not be able to take into account an evaluation of the problem-solving and communications skills of the response organization, which is necessary for both the public perception and the reality of a successful complex spill response. Our objective is to demonstrate how a four-step, scenario-based approach to training, contingency planning, and exercises can improve the response management system's (RMS) performance and ability to succeed. If the area committee is trained with an outward focus on stakeholder needs, develops a scenario-based contingency plan with its stakeholders, and exercises its response organization using these scenario-based processes, it will improve the effectiveness of a response to a major, complex spill.


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