AUTOMATED ICS: A FRAMEWORK FOR SUCCESS

2001 ◽  
Vol 2001 (2) ◽  
pp. 1033-1034
Author(s):  
Don Costanzo
Keyword(s):  
Poster Presentation ◽  
Action Plan ◽  
Rapid Change ◽  
Response Effort ◽  
Incident Command System ◽  
Incident Command ◽  
Integrated Automation ◽  
Road Map ◽  
Response Organization ◽  
Over Time

ABSTRACT Over the years, many organizations have attempted to automate the Incident Command System (ICS). These attempts have ranged from computerizing T-cards to a nationwide spill operations system. Over time, these systems have had varying degrees of success. While certain inherent reasons exist for not automating ICS, they are outweighed by the tremendous potential of successful automation. The need to produce documentation, the integration of ICS sections, and the rapid change of information all lend themselves to automation. Successful ICS automation does not start with computerizing ICS forms. The hey to automating ICS is to automate both ICS and response processes. In a response effort, many separate and distinct processes occur daily. The requisitioning of resources, the planning and application of the response organization, cost accounting, and the development of an Incident Action Plan (IAP) occur many times during an incident. This paper describes a framework for automating and integrating these processes. This framework offers organizations a road map for successful ICS automation. The poster presentation includes a software demonstration that illustrates the benefits of integrated automation.

Area Contingency Plan Scorecard: Determining A Plan's Ability To Achieve “Critical Success Factors”

2001 ◽  
Vol 2001 (1) ◽  
pp. 623-631 ◽  
Author(s):  
David C. Haynes ◽  
Gary L. Ott
Keyword(s):  
Critical Success Factors ◽  
Success Factors ◽  
Contingency Planning ◽  
Incident Command System ◽  
Incident Command ◽  
Contingency Plan ◽  
Critical Success ◽  
Response Organization ◽  
Effectiveness And Efficiency ◽  
The U.S

ABSTRACT Can an Area Contingency Plan (ACP) embody a response organization's potential for success? Can the response effectiveness and efficiency of an ACP be measured through expert evaluation? On a scale of low, medium, or high, how well does an ACP predict a response community's ability to achieve certain “Critical Success Factors”? Intuitively, Area Committees know that area contingency planning should better prepare a response community for effective and efficient spill response—accomplishing Critical Success Factors. Yet, at present, ACPs are generally evaluated on their conformance to a prescribed format rather than their ability to achieve Critical Success Factors. Likewise, the future holds that ACPs will be evaluated on their conformance to the U.S. Coast Guard's newly developed Incident Command System (ICS) format. However, a basic analytical method is needed to determine whether an ACP has the necessary planning elements that can be internalized and implemented to enhance and, if utilized appropriately, produce a truly successful response. This paper describes an analytical evaluation technique that uses a recently developed ACP scorecard process. Using the scorecard approach, the authors will score a number of ACPs from across the nation to determine each plan's potential (probability) for a response organization to achieve predefined Critical Success Factors.

Spill of National Significance Exercise 1997: Testing a New Organizational Concept1

1999 ◽  
Vol 1999 (1) ◽  
pp. 567-571
Author(s):  
Mark O'Malley
Keyword(s):  
Coast Guard ◽  
Federal State ◽  
Hazardous Substance ◽  
Response Effort ◽  
The Public ◽  
Incident Command ◽  
Critical Issues ◽  
Response Organization ◽  
Effective Organization ◽  
National Significance

ABSTRACT Following the Exxon Valdez spill, the need for an effective organization to manage a spill of such magnitude was readily apparent. The publication of a revised NC? reflected this need by defining a Spill of National Significance (SONS) as a spill that, because of its severity, size, location, or actual or potential impact on the public health and welfare or the environment, the necessary response effort is so complex that it requires extraordinary coordination of federal, state, local, and responsible party (RP) resources to contain and clean up the discharge. The U.S. Coast Guard adopted the Incident Command System (ICS) as the response management organization for oil and hazardous substance incidents in 1996. An integral part of ICS is the Area Command concept, which provides a level of strategic management and support for the existing Federal On-Scene Coordinator (FOSC) response organization. This concept was evaluated for its suitability at a SONS exercise held on 16–18 September 1997 in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and Washington, D.C. The exercise was also designed to assess interagency policy and cooperation with regard to emergency response by having the participants deliberate on critical issues in a collegial setting, as opposed to a stress-elevating, oil spill equipment deployment and command center organization drill. This paper examines the makeup of the unique design of the exercise and discusses several issues that arose during the exercise.

UNIQUE LOGISTICS DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED DURING RESPONSE TO THE M/V SELENDANG AYU STRANDING AND BREAK UP

2008 ◽  
Vol 2008 (1) ◽  
pp. 1175-1183 ◽  
Author(s):  
John J. Gallagher ◽  
Nancy A. Gudonis
Keyword(s):  
Ad Hoc ◽  
Oil Spills ◽  
Weather Conditions ◽  
Lessons Learned ◽  
Response Effort ◽  
Incident Command ◽  
Response Organization ◽  
Rugged Topography ◽  
Local Populace ◽  
Transport Problems

ABSTRACT The response to the MIV SELENDANG AYU stranding, breakup and oil spill in the Aleutian Islands presented unique logistics challenges for the response organization. Conducted over the best part of two years in an environment described as containing “some of the harshest weather conditions Alaska has to offer,” the response effort was heartily tested by both location and setting of the operation. The coincidental opening of the largest fishery in the U.S. nearby, weeks after the casualty, placed significant pressures on matters from the very inception. Added to this, the limited availability of traditional indigenous OSRO support as well as the extreme distances to sources of resource supply and receptors for recovered oil and associated wastes further encumbered the effort and posed extraordinary logistics and transport problems. With one important element of logistics, the rugged topography and lack ground access to impacted shorelines complicated the establishment of reliable and effective communications between incident command and response forces in the field presenting challenges of their own. A key to dealing effectively with the unique array of problems presented by the situation was the development and implementation of an overall logistics plan adapted to and workable under the unusual constraints posed. Lessons learned included the realization that there still exist areas in the world and/or prevailing conditions that, even with the advanced capabilities provided by current technology, ad-hoc augmentation, resourcefulness and ingenuity to make things work are still important assets. Because of the unavailability of major OSRO support, we were also obligated to create our own OSRO to be capable of fielding the forces necessary effect the major shoreline cleanup effort when the time came to do that. Most importantly, the results demonstrated that maritime oil spills can be effectively dealt with in even the most hostile and remote locations. A significant factor helping achieve these results was the outstanding cooperation between and support by all of the elements involved in the response including both the Federal and State on Scene Coordinators, the local populace and, most importantly, the Aleut stakeholders of the impacted areas.

scholarly journals THE NATIONAL RESPONSE SYSTEM: WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?1

1993 ◽  
Vol 1993 (1) ◽  
pp. 67-72
Author(s):  
Richard C. Johnson
Keyword(s):  
Management System ◽  
Management Practices ◽  
Response Effort ◽  
Effective Response ◽  
Incident Command System ◽  
Incident Command ◽  
Response System ◽  
National Response ◽  
National Significance ◽  
Sound Management

ABSTRACT The response to the Exxon Valdez incident showed that the nation needs to be better prepared to respond to a spill of that magnitude. In research conducted on the Valdez response, several inadequacies were noted in the National Response System (NRS). A key deficiency identified was the critical need for a standardized management system to direct the response effort more effectively and efficiently. The most pressing question for preparedness planners in improving the NRS is “where do we go from here?” In answering this question, planners must address another question, “how long is it going to take?” There has been widespread failure to put existing knowledge into practice. To fill the management void identified in the NRS, it is imperative that a response management system be adopted as soon as possible. Once adopted, it can be modified and refined to provide a more effective response. The system proposed in this paper uses the sound management practices of an incident command system and modifies and/or expands these practices to fit onto the foundation built by the NRS. This response management system could be used for all spills from minor ones to large, catastrophic spills of national significance (SONS).

Pre-Disaster Established Trust and Relationships: Two Major Factors Influencing the Effectiveness of Implementing the ICS

2018 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ray Chang ◽  
Joseph Trainor
Keyword(s):  
Disaster Response ◽  
Action Plan ◽  
Qualitative Interviews ◽  
Successful Implementation ◽  
Incident Command System ◽  
Incident Command ◽  
Factors Influencing ◽  
Major Factors ◽  
Goals And Objectives ◽  
Selection Of

Abstract Since the establishment of the Incident Command System (ICS), many discussions have centered on its design, using the failure or success of disaster response to evaluate the effectiveness of this system. However, even prior to implementation, there are certain pre-conditions that must be first satisfied by responders. Two major factors underlying these pre-conditions, that strongly influence the eventual design and consequent functioning of the ICS, are pre-disaster established trust and relationships. This research utilizes qualitative methods to explore the importance of pre-disaster established trust and relationships in the implementation of the ICS. Twenty-eight in-depth qualitative interviews were completed and analyzed. From looking at how ICS users make a variety of different decisions regarding the establishment of the incident command, the setting up of overall response goals and objectives, the implementation of the Incident Action Plan, the selection of new ICS leaders, and the working arrangements made with volunteers, it can be observed that relationship and trust are two very important factors that dictate the successful implementation of the ICS. Based on this analysis, three conclusions could be drawn in this research: (1) any thorough evaluation of the ICS should also include an analysis of any existing pre-conditions, (2) future ICS training should cover strategies to build relationships and trust between response organizations, and (3) additional research should be conducted to understand other factors that influence the implementation of the ICS at scene of disaster.

A Logistical Response to the Grounding of the M/T Shogun1

1999 ◽  
Vol 1999 (1) ◽  
pp. 1103-1105
Author(s):  
Joseph Scott Masterson ◽  
Jerome Harrison Hilton
Keyword(s):  
Emergency Management ◽  
Poster Presentation ◽  
Oil Spill ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Incident Command System ◽  
Incident Command ◽  
Remote Location ◽  
Unified Command ◽  
Responsible Party

ABSTRACT On November 6, 1997, the M/T Shogun ran aground off the coast of Rota, an island in the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas Islands. The resulting successful salvage response, which lasted 9 days, prevented the occurrence of a major oil spill in a pristine island environment. The response was managed by a Unified Command established under the Incident Command System (ICS) and consisted of the responsible party, U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), and the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas Islands Emergency Management Office (EMO). Logistical problems, which can be directly attributed to the remote location of the island, were identified and ultimately drove almost every aspect of the response. The Logistics Section, however, repeatedly found solutions to these problems allowing the Unified Command to mount a successful response. This poster presentation seeks to display the remoteness of Rota's location, the logistical difficulties encountered during the response, and the methods used by the Unified Command to successfully overcome them.

Organizing for Response: The Unresolved Problem

1991 ◽  
Vol 1991 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-33 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ruth E. Cohn ◽  
William A. Wallace ◽  
John R. Harrald
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Current Trend ◽  
External Environment ◽  
Incident Command System ◽  
Unresolved Problem ◽  
Incident Command ◽  
Initial Strategy ◽  
Response Organization ◽  
The Creation

ABSTRACT During the critical hours immediately following a significant spill, responders must perform three functions: determine the initial strategy and tactics, mobilize resources, and create the response organization. This paper examines the processes of creating and managing a smoothly functioning response organization. The current trend toward the creation of highly centralized response organizations based on the Incident Command System is criticized, based on research that demonstrates the need for a decentralized, flexible decision-making structure during a crisis. Research that examines the role of the external environment and organizational culture in the creation of effective crisis management organizations is identified. The formation of decision-centered organizations that effectively use decision-making groups is discussed. Until and unless these issues are better understood and addressed by disaster researchers and managers, organizing for response will remain an unresolved problem.

Changes in the Use of Incident Command System in the U.S. Coast Guard1

2003 ◽  
Vol 2003 (1) ◽  
pp. 1175-1178
Author(s):  
Kristy Plourde ◽  
Tim Deal ◽  
Doug Lincoln
Keyword(s):  
Oil Spill ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
Incident Management ◽  
Incident Command System ◽  
Incident Command ◽  
Job Aids ◽  
Is Implementation ◽  
Implementation Program ◽  
Response Organization ◽  
The U.S

ABSTRACT Incident Command System (ICS) is a proven multi-contingency response management system that is flexible and provides improved interoperability with other organizations. The U.S. Coast Guard adopted the use of ICS in oil spill responses well before 2001, but the U.S. Coast Guard announced and published is implementation plan for use of ICS Coast Guard-wide in February 2001. This paper will discuss how the U.S. Coast Guard has been moving forward with a phased ICS implementation program and will discuss some of the new tools that have been established. In the Atlantic and Pacific regions, the U.S. Coast Guard has established Incident Management Assist Teams (IMATs), which are a group of trained and experienced personnel who exercise and deploy as a team. These IMATs have been developed to support local U.S. Coast Guard Incident Commanders in their response organization on large incidents. The U.S. Coast Guard has begun work on an ICS qualification system with Position Task Books (PTBs), qualification tracking, and instructor qualifications and continues to move forward with ICS training programs. The U.S. Coast Guard published the Incident Management Handbook (IMH) in April 2001. This handbook incorporated the oil spill Field Operations Guide (FOG) and included information for other types of incidents including Hazardous Materials, Terrorism, and Search and Rescue. The U.S. Coast Guard has also published job aids to help personnel in specific ICS positions. While the U.S. Coast Guard recognizes that implementation of ICS in its organization will take some time, it continues to move forward. This will only improve the way the U.S. Coast Guard responds to incidents.

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