The Art of Living Well: Moral Experience and Virtue Ethics. By PaulvanTongeren. Translated by Thomas Heij. Pp. viii, 187. Bloomsbury Academic: London, NY, 2020, $70.00 US hardcover; $34.95 US softcover; $18.87 US ebook.

2021 ◽  
Vol 62 (3) ◽  
pp. 602-603
Author(s):  
Louis Groarke
2016 ◽  
Vol 44 (2) ◽  
pp. 183-185
Author(s):  
Laurence Hegan
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Susan B. Levin

Transhumanists urge us to pursue the biotechnological heightening of select capacities, above all, cognitive ability, so far beyond any human ceiling that the beings with those capacities would exist on a higher ontological plane. Because transhumanists tout humanity’s self-transcendence via science and technology, and suggest that bioenhancement may be morally required, the human stakes of how we respond to transhumanism are unprecedented and immense. In Posthuman Bliss? The Failed Promise of Transhumanism, Susan B. Levin challenges transhumanists’ overarching commitments regarding the mind, brain, ethics, liberal democracy, knowledge, and reality in a more thoroughgoing and integrated way than has occurred thus far. Her critique shows transhumanists’ notion of humanity’s self-transcendence into “posthumanity” to be pure, albeit seductive, fantasy. Levin’s philosophical conclusions would stand even if, as transhumanists proclaim, science and technology supported their vision of posthumanity. They offer breezy assurances that posthumans will emerge if we but allocate sufficient resources to that end. Yet, far from offering theoretical and practical “proof of concept” for the vision that they urge upon us, transhumanists engage inadequately with cognitive psychology, biology, and neuroscience, often relying on questionable or outdated views within those fields. Having shown in depth why transhumanism should be rejected, Levin defends a holistic perspective on living well that is rooted in Aristotle’s virtue ethics but adapted to liberal democracy. This holism is thoroughly human, in the best of senses. We must jettison transhumanists’ fantasy, both because their arguments fail and because transhumanism fails to do us justice.


Author(s):  
Sarah E. Fredericks

A vignette about environmentalist Colin Beavan’s experience of and reflection on environmental guilt and shame introduces the texture of these moral emotions experienced by many everyday environmentalists and sets the stage for the ensuing analysis. Taking this moral experience seriously reveals underexplored motivations and hindrances to environmental action, guilt, and shame. Reflection on these moral emotions challenges many modern ethical assumptions and forms the basis of the three main ethical arguments of the book: that collectives as well as individuals have guilt, shame, and responsibility; that some individuals and collectives should feel guilt and shame for environmental degradation including climate change; and that, given the consequences of guilt and shame, they should not be intentionally induced unless a number of conditions, which can be fostered through rituals, are met. These conditions are also necessary to respond to unintentionally elicited guilt and shame. To set the stage for these theoretical and practical arguments, the Introduction names the ethical values which influence the text and the disciplinary resources from social psychology; ethical pragmatism; virtue ethics; and religious studies, especially ritual theory, used in the project. It also delineates the scope of the book as the Western developed world, particularly the United States, and environmental guilt and shame, of which climate change is the main example.


Philosophy ◽  
1994 ◽  
Vol 69 (269) ◽  
pp. 291-316 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christipher Cordner

‘Virtue ethics’ is prominent, if not pre-eminent, in contemporary moral philosophy. The philosophical model for most of those urging a ‘virtues approach’ to ethics is of course Aristotle. Some features, at least, of the motivation to this renewed concern with Aristotelian ethical thought are fairly clear. Notoriously, Kant held that the only thing good without qualification is the good will; and he then made it difficult to grasp what made the will good when he denied that it could be its preoccupation with or attention to anything in the world. The idea of the good will then seems to be an idea of something which transcends the world, and therefore to be no easier to make sense of, or to believe in, than Plato′s form of the good is usually thought to be. The first obvious attraction of Aristotle′s ethics, then—at least to those of an empiricist or worldly cast of mind—is that it promises an understanding of the ethical which locates that robustly within the world. Aristotle′s virtues are real this-worldly existences. They are, moreover, qualities whose place in our lives seems to be explained readily, and attractively, in Aristotelian terms. Moral virtue is essentially connected with eudaimonia, a concept variously construed as happiness, as living well, or even as flourishing. Morality is important because of the contribution it makes to the living of a fully human life. And a ‘fully human’ life is characterizable in what modernity calls ‘humanist’, or sometimes ‘naturalistic’, terms: it requires no invocation of transcendence or other-worldliness.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-8
Author(s):  
Susan B. Levin

Optimally, would decisions be reached by reason alone? Would existence be better if we felt only pleasure, having excised the capacity to experience anything deemed unpleasant? Are key societal challenges we face rooted in human biology, to which, therefore, we should look for solutions? Such questions draw our attention to contending values and aspirations in today’s debate over human enhancement. The stakes of how this debate turns out are highest for transhumanism, whose proponents urge humanity’s self-transcendence via science and technology. In this introduction, Susan B. Levin states that Posthuman Bliss? The Failed Promise of Transhumanism will challenge transhumanists’ views of the mind, brain, ethics, liberal democracy, knowledge, and reality in a thoroughgoing and integrated way. Against the backdrop of this critique, the author will defend a perspective on living well that incorporates insights from Aristotle’s virtue ethics but is adapted to the ideas and promise of liberal democracy.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document