Symbolic victories and strategic risk

This article studies the rational side of symbolic victories. It opens with the broad question, why are some battles more significant than others? Extending the literature on bargaining and war, it argues that a belligerent can deliberately increase strategic risk in order to communicate its strength. By increasing the information a battle conveys, the belligerent artificially creates the conditions for a symbolic victory. In short, strategic risk becomes a useful, costly signal. This claim is developed in a formal model in which players choose between more and less dangerous military options. Under most conditions, a symbolic equilibrium exists in which both strong- and weak-type players are able to signal their types after only one round. This equilibrium’s rapid information flow is unusual in the rationalist literature: typically, strong types must wait to signal effectively. The article goes on to establish that, when the prior probability a player is strong is sufficiently small, this symbolic equilibrium uniquely satisfies the intuitive criterion. It then applies the model to two famous episodes from military history, the Doolittle Raid of WWII and the battles of Cannae and Capua of the Second Punic War. For both, it highlights how actors deliberately manipulate strategic risk to communicate with adversaries, allies, and their own publics.

Keeping Your Friends Close, but Acquaintances Closer: Why Weakly Allied States Make Committed Coalition Partners

Why do states join wartime coalitions despite the absence of a salient threat or strong ties to the coalition leader? We argue states make unexpectedly high contributions to coalition warfare as a costly signal of their desire for a stronger relationship with the coalition leader. Conventional theories insufficiently explain why states without immediate security interests or strong ties to the lead state over-contribute relative to their capacity. Using newly compiled data on troop contributions to the war in Afghanistan (2001–2014), we find states are most likely to contribute a higher share of their armed forces when their relationship with the US has unrealized alliance potential. States with under-performing alignments leave substantial room for subsequent gains to be had from signaling their commitment to the leading coalition actor. Our finding helps explain why states risk the costs of war—casualties and domestic accountability—by participating in coalition warfare.

Trickle-Round Signals: When Low Status Is Mixed with High

Trickle-down theories suggest that status symbols and fashion trends originate from the elites and move downward, but some high-end restaurants serve lowbrow food (e.g., potato chips, macaroni and cheese), and some high-status individuals wear downscale clothing (e.g., ripped jeans, duct-taped shoes). Why would high-status actors adopt items traditionally associated with low-status groups? Using a signaling perspective to explain this phenomenon, the authors suggest that elites sometimes adopt items associated with low-status groups as a costly signal to distinguish themselves from middle-status individuals. As a result, signals sometimes trickle round, moving directly from the lower to the upper class, before diffusing to the middle class. Furthermore, consistent with a signaling perspective, the presence of multiple signaling dimensions facilitates this effect, enabling the highs to mix and match high and low signals and differentiate themselves. These findings deepen the understanding of signaling dynamics, support a trickle-round theory of fashion, and shed light on alternative status symbols.

Negotiating peacekeeping consent: Information and peace outcomes

The mixed record on civil war termination shows that it is a difficult task, one fraught with uncertainty and risk. Gaining consent for peacekeeping is one strategy policymakers and scholars forward to reduce these concerns. Formal and informal work argues that allowing peacekeeping serves as a costly signal of peaceful intentions; however, these models treat peacekeeping costs as exogenous. I argue that peacekeeping costs have an endogenous element and use consent for peacekeeping missions as a proxy measure. Three conclusions are evident. It is difficult to determine whether belligerents are insincere actors in a peace process or merely distrustful, but consent can tell us whether a ceasefire is precarious and therefore more likely to fail; peacekeeping is difficult but meaningful under some conditions, and reliable information can be taken from negotiating, not just war-fighting. These results qualify the extent to which peacekeeping, with its changing emphasis on consent, can improve its outcomes.

Do letters to shareholders inform or mislead? Insights from insider trading

Empirical studies consistently provide evidence that investors perceive qualitative disclosures as useful because they have significant effects on analysts' forecast revisions and a firm's share price. But these results leave unanswered the question of whether managers write qualitative disclosures to inform or mislead investors. Based on the signaling theory, we consider two actions by the same manager: one (insider trading) is a costly signal whilst the other (qualitative disclosure) is the cheap signal. We then verify whether they are coherent. We investigate the content and the verbal tone of the Letter of Shareholders and the insider trading from its author before and after the letter's date of release and find that the costly signal (the insider trading) is not coherent with the cheap signal (the disclosure). This finding indicates that managers do not use qualitative disclosures to offer incremental information but that they might use them to mislead investors.

Hiding in Plain Sight: Pseudonymity and Participation in Legal Mobilization

How and when do people participate in sustained collective action via the courts? Previous research highlights group identity or resources and political opportunities but overlooks civil procedural rules’ effects beyond the courtroom. This article explores how rules regarding privacy shape individuals’ decisions about sustained participation. Fears of exposing one’s identity deter participation, especially in the context of public trials. Yet, a paired comparison of litigation by victims of hepatitis C-tainted blood products in Japan and Korea reveals that court-supervised privacy protections, which were available in Japan but not in Korea, facilitate plaintiffs’ participation inside and outside the courtroom. They ease plaintiff recruitment and enhance claimants’ credibility. Counterintuitively, they also let claimants strategically shed pseudonymity to send a costly signal about their commitment to the cause. Theorizing “pseudonymous participation” as an understudied mode of activism between full exposure and anonymity demonstrates that seemingly technical aspects of law have significant political consequences.

Killing for God? Factional Violence on the Transnational Stage

Why are some factions fighting for greater national self-determination (SD) more violent than others? While previous explanations of violence in these disputes have focused on the number of factions, their internal structures, and power distributions among factions, we find many factions that do not follow the expectations of these theories. In this article, we center on religious ideology, its unique transnational character, and the opportunity it creates for political elites from competing factions within the same SD movement to mobilize support. We argue that “religious factions” have a greater incentive to use violence than other factions. Violence serves as a costly signal, and it can be used to demonstrate a faction’s religious credentials to transnational networks and contacts, as they compete with each other on the international stage for the same potential benefactors. We code original data on the religious ideology of factions. We find that an increasing number of religious factions is associated with increased religious faction use of violence. Furthermore, our findings point to a critical insight: it is not religious ideology, but competition between religious factions, that generates violence.