News at the Bell and a Level Playing Field

We provide initial evidence that stock exchange procedures around closing auctions advantage speed traders at the expense of auction participants. We show that, on Nasdaq and NYSE Arca, 4:00 pm earnings releases result in informed trading in the continuous regular-hour session in the short window between 4:00 pm and the closing auction; this trading subsequently moves closing prices in the direction of the earnings news. The ability of speed traders to submit 4:00 pm-news orders to the auction through the continuous session earns them up to 1.5% profit and creates an unlevel playing field because most auction participants are not allowed to cancel their orders. When stock exchanges recommended that firms delay disclosures until after the market close, those with higher institutional ownership were more likely to do so voluntarily. Our study has implications regarding the timing of information releases and the design of the closing process.

Essays on the Vietnam Stock Market

<p>This thesis consists of three substantive studies about the Vietnam stock market. In particular, I study the asymmetric information, corporate governance (CG) practices, and foreign investment of publicly listed companies in Vietnam, presented in Chapters 2, 3, and 4, respectively. In Chapter 2, I investigate the effectiveness of a market surveillance system (MSS) on improving the market quality of the Vietnam stock market, as measured by liquidity and informed trading level. I find that market liquidity decreased after the introduction of the MSS, and that the effect is more pronounced for small firms. Although informed trading, on average, does not change significantly after the MSS, subsample analysis indicates a significant decrease in informed trading among large and liquid firms. In Chapter 3, I investigate the relationship between firms’ CG practices and informed trading. I find a negative relationship between the two variables. Firms with better CG practices have a lower level of informed stock trading. Moreover, a natural experiment on a shock of firms’ CG practices generated by the CG policies shows that the negative relationship between CG practices and informed trading is a causal one, in which a change in the former causes a change in the latter. In another analysis around the implementation of the MSS, I find that the implementation of the surveillance system affects the relationship between the two variables, and this effect is driven by large and liquid firms. In Chapter 4, I investigate whether foreign investors in the Vietnam stock market are informed about firms’ performance. Using the residuals of foreign investor ownership as a measure of the abnormal foreign investor holding, I find that the abnormal foreign investor holding is positively correlated with firm performance in the following one year. I also find a positive correlation between abnormal foreign investor holding and the stock returns in the next three quarters. These findings indicate that foreign investors are informed about the firms up to a one-year period.</p>

Essays on the Vietnam Stock Market

<p>This thesis consists of three substantive studies about the Vietnam stock market. In particular, I study the asymmetric information, corporate governance (CG) practices, and foreign investment of publicly listed companies in Vietnam, presented in Chapters 2, 3, and 4, respectively. In Chapter 2, I investigate the effectiveness of a market surveillance system (MSS) on improving the market quality of the Vietnam stock market, as measured by liquidity and informed trading level. I find that market liquidity decreased after the introduction of the MSS, and that the effect is more pronounced for small firms. Although informed trading, on average, does not change significantly after the MSS, subsample analysis indicates a significant decrease in informed trading among large and liquid firms. In Chapter 3, I investigate the relationship between firms’ CG practices and informed trading. I find a negative relationship between the two variables. Firms with better CG practices have a lower level of informed stock trading. Moreover, a natural experiment on a shock of firms’ CG practices generated by the CG policies shows that the negative relationship between CG practices and informed trading is a causal one, in which a change in the former causes a change in the latter. In another analysis around the implementation of the MSS, I find that the implementation of the surveillance system affects the relationship between the two variables, and this effect is driven by large and liquid firms. In Chapter 4, I investigate whether foreign investors in the Vietnam stock market are informed about firms’ performance. Using the residuals of foreign investor ownership as a measure of the abnormal foreign investor holding, I find that the abnormal foreign investor holding is positively correlated with firm performance in the following one year. I also find a positive correlation between abnormal foreign investor holding and the stock returns in the next three quarters. These findings indicate that foreign investors are informed about the firms up to a one-year period.</p>

Tick Size and Informed Trading: Evidence from the Taiwanese Stock Market

We adopt the Sand&aring;s model for order-book equilibrium to examine informed trading on the Taiwanese stock market, a purely order-driven call-auction market. We find that adverse-selection cost is low for well-known stocks with high liquidity and low volatility, but cost is high for monitoring the order books of those stocks. Our empirical results show that the impact of adverse selection is greatest at the beginning of each trading day and that informed traders engage in stealth trading, supporting the stealth trading hypothesis. Finally, with the special tick size rules on the market, both adverse-selection cost and monitoring cost decline as tick size decreases.

Foreign Investment and Stock Price Informativeness: Evidence From the Shanghai (Shenzhen)–Hong Kong Stock Connect

This article investigates the impact of heterogeneous foreign investment on home market stock price informativeness. Evidence from China’s nascent A-share market shows non-segmented foreign investment reduces firms’ stock return synchronicity, while segmented foreign investment does not. Using the Shanghai (Shenzhen)–Hong Kong Stock Connect program as a natural experiment that exogenously increases non-segmented foreign ownership, we find that synchronicity drops significantly for program stocks relative to the control stocks. Our results are most consistent with an “informed trading” explanation, rather than a “learning” or “governance” explanation. These results have policy implications for stock market liberalization programs.