News at the Bell and a Level Playing Field

We provide initial evidence that stock exchange procedures around closing auctions advantage speed traders at the expense of auction participants. We show that, on Nasdaq and NYSE Arca, 4:00 pm earnings releases result in informed trading in the continuous regular-hour session in the short window between 4:00 pm and the closing auction; this trading subsequently moves closing prices in the direction of the earnings news. The ability of speed traders to submit 4:00 pm-news orders to the auction through the continuous session earns them up to 1.5% profit and creates an unlevel playing field because most auction participants are not allowed to cancel their orders. When stock exchanges recommended that firms delay disclosures until after the market close, those with higher institutional ownership were more likely to do so voluntarily. Our study has implications regarding the timing of information releases and the design of the closing process.

Early Earnings Releases and the Role of Accounting Quality

More than half of U.S. public companies announce earnings before audit completion. We examine how accounting quality, as a measure of the ex-ante reliability of earnings, affects the decision to release earnings early. Using four proxies for accounting quality, we show that firms with higher accounting quality are more likely to release earnings before a completed audit, and that the association is stronger when market demand for timely earnings is high. We provide evidence that accounting quality remains important in the timing of earnings release even after controlling for other factors which affect earnings reliability, such as managerial ability, auditor tenure, and financial reporting problems in a prior period. Overall we emphasize the role of accounting quality in the complex process of when to release earnings relative to audit completion, and suggest that the importance of the audit in the earnings release decision varies based on firm-specific accounting quality.

Voluntary Disclosure of Disaggregated Balance Sheet and Cash Flow Information Around Restatements

We examine changes in voluntary disclosure of balance sheet and cash flow (BS/CF) information in earnings releases after restatement announcements. We consider these disclosures to be particularly relevant in the restatement context since they help investors interpret accruals and assess reporting quality at a time when information uncertainty is high. We find that BS/CF disclosures drop significantly for at least five quarters following restatement announcements, particularly for severe restatements and those restatements more likely to lead to litigation, and less for firms likely to benefit from reputation-repairing activities. We next consider the impact of BS/CF changes on earnings informativeness and find significantly lower post-restatement earnings response coefficients for firms ceasing BS/CF disclosure, but not otherwise. Overall, we argue that litigation concerns provide a strong disincentive for disclosure following restatement announcements. Our findings add to a growing literature on the importance of disaggregated BS/CF information in interpreting accruals.

Non-Earnings Conference Calls: Content, Determinants, and Consequences

I use computational linguistic techniques to study the content, determinants, and stock market consequences of conference calls that are not held in conjunction with quarterly earnings releases (hereafter, non-earnings conference calls). I find that large firms, loss firms, firms with more volatile earnings and returns, and firms with complex operations and a greater number of analysts following hold more non-earnings conference calls. Firms with volatile earnings and greater operational complexity discuss more earnings, investment, and market-related topics in non-earnings conference calls. These results are consistent with the notion that firms facing greater informational problems hold more non-earnings conference calls. I also find that controlling for other disclosure types, non-earnings conference calls incrementally explain quarterly abnormal stock returns, suggesting that they indeed help improve firms' information environment.

Does Industry Timing Ability of Hedge Funds Predict Their Future Performance, Survival, and Fund Flows?

This paper investigates hedge funds’ ability to time industry-specific returns and shows that funds’ timing ability in the manufacturing industry improves their future performance, probability of survival, and ability to attract more capital. The results indicate that the best industry-timing hedge funds in the manufacturing sector have the highest return exposure to earnings surprises. This, together with persistently sticky earnings surprises, transparent information environment in regards to earnings releases, and large post-earnings-announcement drift in the manufacturing industry, explain to a great extent why best-timing hedge funds can generate significantly larger future returns compared to worst-timing hedge funds.

SEC Comment Letters on Firms' Use of Non-GAAP Measures: The Determinants and Firms' Responses

SYNOPSIS This paper explores Securities and Exchange Commission comment letters that address firms' use of non-Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) measures in 10-Ks, 10-Qs, and earnings releases. We investigate the determinants of firms' receiving non-GAAP comments and the revisions to non-GAAP reporting undertaken by these recipients. Firms that experience poor GAAP performance and emphasize non-GAAP measures are more likely to receive non-GAAP comments. Recipients of non-GAAP comments are more likely than other reviewed firms to abandon non-GAAP measures in future filings. When recipients of non-GAAP comments continue to report non-GAAP measures, they provide more justifications for the use and reduce the prominence of these measures. However, higher non-GAAP earnings and GAAP earnings differentials do not appear to attract non-GAAP comments. In addition, the amount of non-GAAP exclusions does not decrease after the receipt of non-GAAP comments. Overall, our findings suggest that non-GAAP comments are effective in deemphasizing non-GAAP measures. JEL Classifications: M41, M48.

Bringing order to non-GAAP financial measures: SEC sues to enforce “equal-or-greater-prominence” requirement

Purpose This article examines the first action by the US Securities and Exchange Commission to enforce the “equal-or-greater-prominence” requirement of its rules governing the presentation by SEC-reporting companies, in their SEC filings and earnings releases, of financial measures not prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). Design/methodology/approach This article provides an in-depth analysis of the equal-or-greater-prominence rule and the SEC’s enforcement posture in the context of the SEC’s concern that some companies present non-GAAP financial measures in a manner that inappropriately gives the non-GAAP measures greater authority than the comparable GAAP financial measures. Findings Although the appropriate use of non-GAAP financial measures can enhance investor understanding of a company’s business and operating results, investors could be misled about the company’s GAAP results by disclosures that unduly highlight non-GAAP measures. The SEC’s enforcement action signals a focus on the manner in which companies present non-GAAP financial measures as well as on how they calculate the measures. Originality/value This article provides expert guidance on a major SEC disclosure requirement from an experienced securities lawyer.

Differential Interpretations and Earnings Quality

SYNOPSIS We investigate the association between earnings quality and investor disagreement regarding the valuation consequences of earnings announcements. A primary purpose of financial reporting, including periodic earnings releases, is to convey useful information to investors. However, earnings may be of low quality due to an inherent failure in the accounting process to accurately represent the economic entity, unintentional errors, or intentional manipulation on the part of management. We argue that low-quality earnings will be associated with more divergent opinions regarding the implication of the earnings signal (i.e., differential interpretations) and, thus, be reflected in their trading activity. We use two abnormal accrual measures and an earnings persistence measure as proxies for earnings quality. We proxy for differential interpretations using abnormal trading volume unrelated to returns and analyst forecast jumbling. Our results show that low earnings quality is associated with more differential interpretations of earnings announcements measures.