Structural Economic Vulnerability and the Utilization of Unilateral Trade Preferences: Does Development Aid Matter?

This article has investigated the effect of structural economic vulnerability on the utilization of non-reciprocal trade preferences (NRTPs) offered by the 'Quadrilaterals' and whether development aid flows alter this effect. It considers two major blocks of NRTPs, namely the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) programs and 'other trade preferences programs'. The analysis uses a panel dataset of 84 beneficiary countries of both NRTPs and development aid, over the period of 2002-2019. Results reveal that a rise in the level of structural economic vulnerability reduces the utilization rates of both GSP programs and other trade preference programs. At the same time, when the level of structural economic vulnerability falls, countries tend to use both blocks of NRTPs in a complementarity way. While development aid inflows foster the utilization of the two blocks of NRTPs, the increase of these resource inflows in the context of greater structural economic vulnerability leads beneficiary countries to strengthen the utilization of other trade preferences programs at the expense of the utilization of GSP programs. The implications of these results are discussed in the conclusion section of the article.

Effect of the Utilization of Non-Reciprocal Trade Preferences offered by the QUAD on Economic Complexity in Beneficiary Countries

This article aims to contribute to the nascent literature on the effect of non-reciprocal trade preferences (NRTPs) on industrialization in beneficiary countries. In so doing, it complements the few existing works on the effect of NRTPs on export product diversification by investigating the effect of NRTPs (both the Generalized System of Preferences- GSP programs- and other non-reciprocal trade preferences) offered by the QUAD countries on the level of economic complexity in beneficiary countries. The analysis has relied on 110 beneficiary countries of these NRTPs over the period 2002–2018, and made primarily use of the two-step system Generalized Methods of Moments estimator. The findings are quite interesting. First, beneficiary countries tend to use GSP programs (rather than other trade preferences) to achieve greater economic complexity, and the positive effect of the utilization of GSP programs on economic complexity is higher for high income beneficiary countries than relatively less advanced beneficiary countries. Second, both GSP programs and other non-reciprocal trade preferences are strongly complementary in promoting economic complexity in beneficiary countries, in particular if their usage reach high levels. Third, the utilization of NRTPs enhances economic complexity in countries that receive high foreign direct investment flows. Finally, development aid flows are strongly complementary with the utilization of NRTPs in fostering economic complexity in beneficiary countries, especially for high amounts of development aid. This suggests the need for preference-granting countries (that are also suppliers of development aid) to offer both generous NRTPs and higher development aid flows if those NRTPs are to be effective in expanding the manufacturing base in the beneficiary countries.Jel Classification: F13; F14; O14.

The Pursuit of Non-Trade Policy Objectives in EU Trade Policy

The European Union (EU) often conditions preferential access to its market on compliance with Non-Trade Policy Objectives (NTPOs), including human rights and labor and environmental standards. In this paper, we first systematically document the coverage of NTPOs across the main tools of EU trade policy: its (association and non-association) trade agreements and Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) programs. We then discuss the extent to which the EU can use these tools as a ‘carrot-and-stick’ mechanism to promote NTPOs in trading partners. We argue that, within trade agreements, the EU has limited scope to extend or restrict tariff preferences to ‘reward good behavior’ or ‘punish bad behavior’ on NTPOs, partly because multilateral rules require members to eliminate tariffs on substantially all trade. By contrast, GSP preferences are granted on a unilateral basis, and can thus more easily be extended or limited, depending on compliance with NTPOs. Our analysis also suggests that the commercial interests of the EU inhibit the full pursuit of NTPOs in its trade agreements and GSP programs.

The Spanish Attempt to Expand Unilateral Preferences

After The Hague summit of the European Council in 1969 Madrid calculated that Spain’s terms of access to the Common Market would feasibly improve after the signing ceremony of the 1970 Agreement. The Spanish government was determined to continue the negotiations with the EEC for new concessions. First, the Spanish government battled for the EEC to grant them the benefits of the Generalized System of Preferences, which the French defeated. Second, Madrid requested further preference in agricultural trade, to the point of reaching a quasi-membership status in the CAP, without EEC membership. Third, Madrid pretended to use trade with Eastern Europe and closer relations with the EFTA to place pressure on EEC governments. The three attempts were unsuccessful because, as Chapter 7 shows, no alternative to the EEC existed for Spain to guarantee outlets for Spanish agricultural and industrial produce.

Trump's Trade War: An Indian Perspective

This paper examines the implications of the Trump Administration's U.S. trade policy on U.S.–India relations and the Indian economy against the backdrop of strengthening political and strategic ties between the two countries, which have been strong since the beginning of this century. Trump's strategy of using tariffs as the bargaining chip in bilateral economic relations with India, while ignoring mutual geopolitical interests, has coincided with new protectionist tendencies in India under the Make in India strategy of the Modi government, setting the stage for a protracted bilateral trade dispute. U.S. safeguard duties on steel and aluminium have taken a toll on India's exports of these products to the United States, but these products account for a tiny share of India's total exports to the United States. The hard hit was Trump's termination of India's designation as a beneficiary developing nation under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). The GSP abolition is likely to have a much more significant effect on the Indian economy as exports under the program are heavily concentrated in the traditional labor-intensive industries. However, given the handsome mandate received by the Modi government at the May 2019 election and that the next election is four years away (2024), GSP abolition is unlikely to receive much weight in determining India's position in trade negotiations compared with the new protectionist policy stance stemming from the Make in India strategy. The WTO verdict on the U.S. complaint on India's manufacturing export subsidies, if upheld by the WTO Appellate body, would strengthen the U.S. position in negotiating a trade deal with India.