SHAPEIoT: Secure Handshake Protocol for Autonomous IoT Device Discovery and Blacklisting using Physical Unclonable Functions and Machine Learning

This paper proposes a new lightweight handshake protocol implemented on top of the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) that can be used in device discovery and ensuring the IoT network security by autonomously managing devices of any computational complexity using whitelisting and blacklisting. A Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) is utilized for the session key generation in the proposed handshake protocol. The CoAP server performs real-time device discovery using the proposed handshake protocol, and anomaly detection using machinelearning algorithms to ensure the security of the IoT network. To the best of our knowledge, the presented PUF-based handshake protocol is the first to performs blacklisting and whitelisting. Whitelisted IoT devices not displaying anomalous behavior can join and remain in the IoT network. IoT devices that display anomalous behavior are autonomously blacklisted by the CoAP server and are either disallowed from joining the IoT network or are removed from the IoT network. Simulation results show that amongst the five machine learning algorithms studied, the stacking classifier displays the highest overall anomaly detection accuracy of 99.98%. Based on the results of the network simulation performed, the CoAP server is capable of blacklisting malicious IoT devices within the network with perfect accuracy.

A Systematic Approach to Formal Analysis of QUIC Handshake Protocol Using Symbolic Model Checking

As a newly proposed secure transport protocol, QUIC aims to improve the transport performance of HTTPS traffic and enable rapid deployment and evolution of transport mechanisms. QUIC is currently in the IETF standardization process and will potentially carry a significant portion of Internet traffic in the emerging future. An important safety goal of QUIC protocol is to provide effective data service for users. To aim this safety requirement, we propose a formal analysis method to analyze the safety of QUIC handshake protocol by using model checker SPIN and cryptographic protocol verifier ProVerif. Our analysis shows the counterexamples to safety properties, which reveal a design flaw in the current protocol specification. To this end, we also propose and verify a possible fix that is able to mitigate these flaws.

A Cryptographic Analysis of the TLS 1.3 Handshake Protocol

We analyze the handshake protocol of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol, version 1.3. We address both the full TLS 1.3 handshake (the one round-trip time mode, with signatures for authentication and (elliptic curve) Diffie–Hellman ephemeral ((EC)DHE) key exchange), and the abbreviated resumption/“PSK” mode which uses a pre-shared key for authentication (with optional (EC)DHE key exchange and zero round-trip time key establishment). Our analysis in the reductionist security framework uses a multi-stage key exchange security model, where each of the many session keys derived in a single TLS 1.3 handshake is tagged with various properties (such as unauthenticated versus unilaterally authenticated versus mutually authenticated, whether it is intended to provide forward security, how it is used in the protocol, and whether the key is protected against replay attacks). We show that these TLS 1.3 handshake protocol modes establish session keys with their desired security properties under standard cryptographic assumptions.

Using a Warm Hand-Off Approach to Enroll African American Caregivers in a Multi-Site Clinical Trial: The Handshake Protocol

“Testing Tele-Savvy” was a three-arm randomized controlled trial that recruited participants from four National Institute on Aging (NIA)–funded Alzheimer’s Disease Centers with Emory University serving as the coordinating center. The enrollment process involved each center providing a list of eligible caregivers to the coordinating center to consent. Initially, the site proposed to recruit primarily African American caregivers generated a significant amount of referrals to the coordinating center, but a gap occurred in translating them into enrolled participants. To increase the enrollment rate, a “Handshake Protocol” was established, which included a warm handoff approach. During preset phone calls each week, the research site coordinator introduced potential participants to a culturally congruent co-investigator from the coordinating center who then completed the consent process. Within the first month of implementation, the team was 97% effective in meeting its goals. This protocol is an example of a successful, innovative approach to enrolling minority participants in multi-site clinical trials.

Stateless Re-Association in WPA3 Using Paired Token

In Wi-Fi Protected Access 3 (WPA3), a secure connection is established in two sequential stages. Firstly, in the authentication and association stage, a pairwise master key (PMK) is generated. Secondly, in the post-association stage, a pairwise transient key (PTK) is generated from PMK using the traditional 4-way handshake protocol. To reduce the heavy load of the first stage, PMK caching can be used. If the client and AP are previously authenticated and have a PMK cache, the first heavy stage can be skipped and the cached PMK can be used to directly execute the 4-way handshake. However, PMK caching is a very primitive technology to manage shared key between a client and AP and there are many limitations; AP has to manage a stateful cache for a large number of clients, cache lifetime is limited, etc. Paired token (PT)is a new secondary credential scheme that provides stateless pre-shared key (PSK) in a client-server environment. The server issues a paired token (public token and secret token) to an authenticated client where the public token has the role of signed identity and the secret token is a kind of shared secret. Once a client is equipped with PT, it can be used for many symmetric key-based cryptographic applications such as authentication, authorization, key establishment, etc. In this paper, we apply the PT approach to WPA3 and try to replace the PMK caching with the one-time authenticated key establishment using PT. At the end of a successful full handshake, AP securely issues PT to the client. Then, in subsequent re-association requests, the client and AP can compute the same one-time authenticated PMK using PT in a stateless way. Using this kind of stateless re-association technology, AP can provide a high performance Wi-Fi service to a larger number of clients.

Stateless Reassociation in WPA3 Using Paired Token

In WPA3 secure connection is executed in two sequential stages. Firstly, in authentication and association stage a pairwise master key (PMK) is generated. Secondly, in post-association stage a pairwise transient key (PTK) is generated from PMK using the traditional 4-way handshake protocol. To reduce the heavy computation of the first stage PMK caching can be used. If client and AP are previously authenticated and has PMK cache, client can skip the first heavy stage and reuse the cached PMK to directly execute the 4-way handshake. But PMK caching is a very primitive technology to manage shared key between client and AP and there are many limitations; AP has to manage stateful cache for multiple clients, cache lifetime is limited, etc. Paired token (PT) \cite{LZ} is a new secondary credential scheme that provides stateless pre-shared key (PSK) in client-server environment. Server issues paired token (public token and secret token) to authenticated client where public token has the role of signed identity and secret token is a kind of shared secret. Once client is equipped with PT, it can be used for many symmetric key based cryptographic applications such as authentication, authorization, key establishment, etc. In this paper we apply the PT approach to WPA3 and try to replace the PMK caching with the one-time authenticated key establishment using PT. At the end of the authentication and association stage AP securely issues PT to client. Then in reassociation stage client and AP can compute the same one-time authenticated PMK from PT in stateless way and compute PTK using the traditional 4-way handshake protocol. Using this kind of stateless reassociation technology AP can provide high performance service to huge number of clients.