The main question here is how logic is to be conceived. Borrowing terms from Warren Goldfarb, two conceptions are considered: universalism, schematicism. There is also a perhaps third conception. Borrowing a term from Frege, it is called the Verschmelzung conception. A question, then, is what conception fits the ‘logic’ expressed in Begriffsschrift in Grundgesetze v. I. The answer is, ‘strictly speaking neither’. Grundgesetze is an unfolding of the idea that the law-likeness of being true is, in first instance, at the level of Bedeutung. This creates a predicament for Frege, which he deals with only partly successfully. Frege sees himself as unfolding an insight that the laws of truth operate in first instance at the level of Bedeutung. His elaboration, however, makes for serious problems.
Review: Warren Goldfarb’s Deductive Logic
