Realism and Anti-Realism in Young Carnap

The rejection of metaphysical questions is a constant in Carnap’s thought. The first part of the paper delves into the question of the basic tenets of Carnap’s anti-metaphysics. Tying up to the accounts of authors like Michael Friedman and Werner Sauer, the author examines the relation between verificationism and so-called logical criteria, arguing not only that verificationism is secondary, but that the integration of both instruments in Carnap’s early philosophy faces difficulties. The second part focuses on the application of these instruments to the realism/idealism dispute. The author tries to show that Carnap’s position in the Aufbau is neither neutral in regard to traditional aspects of this dispute nor stable in itself, but (in different respects) involves concessions to both realism and idealism. In historical perspective, it is shown that almost all of the issues of the famous protocol-sentence debate are already present in unfolding young Carnap’s treatment of the problem of realism.

Similarities, Differences, and Missed Connections between Thomas S. Kuhn, Gaston Bachelard and the Continental Historiography of Science

According to the American philosopher, Michael Friedman, while triggering the so-called “historical turn,” Kuhn reinstated the history of science as perhaps the most important object for the philosophy of science. In this paper, I show that this reinstatement is rather a rehabilitation of the philosophical and epistemological uses of the history of science, something already present in the continental historiography of science in the first half of the twentieth century, and especially in Gaston Bachelard’s work. In this sense, I undertake a review of the European history and philosophy of science during that period, paying special attention to Gaston Bachelard as one of the leading representatives of the French historical epistemology of the 1930s. I conclude with the late and quite problematic reception of Bachelard’s thought in the early work of Thomas S. Kuhn. My thesis is this strand may help to outline what is continental history and philosophy of science.

Quine’s Structural Holism and the Constitutive A Priori

Recent work on the structure of scientific theories has assigned a significant role to a priori principles in the formulation of scientific theories. For example, Michael Friedman has argued that theories possess an asymmetrical structure, with mathematical and logical principles presupposed in the very formulation of empirical laws. He further argues that Quine’s depiction of human knowledge as a ‘web of belief’, cannot capture this structure nor the constitutive role played by a priori principles in enabling the formulation of empirical statements and laws. This chapter argues that properly understood Quine’s ‘structural holism’ can capture this asymmetrical structure of scientific theories, but fails to address Friedman’s concern with constitutive a priori principles as coordinating the abstract mathematical component of scientific theories with sensible experience. However, once this difference is located in their different perspectives on scientific theories, the chapter argues that their views be seen as complementary rather than opposed.

Una reevaluación del convencionalismo geométrico de Poincaré

anet Folina ha propuesto una interpretación del convencionalismo de Poincaré frente a Michael Friedman y Robert DiSalle. Ambos afirman que la propuesta de Poincaré queda refutada por la relatividad general, por suponer una noción restrictiva de los principios a priori. Folina sostiene que el convencionalismo de Poincaré no resulta contradictorio con la relatividad general, en cuanto permite una noción relativizada de los principios a priori. Pretendemos mostrar que la estrategia de Folina es ineficaz, por cuanto Poincaré no puede explicar el papel de la variedad de Riemann en la relatividad general. Concluiremos que la tentativa de reconstruir el desarrollo de la relatividad general a partir de la filosofía de Poincaré puede constituir un obstáculo para comprender la radicalidad del cambio que la relatividad generó en las relaciones entre física y geometría.