scholarly journals Evolutionary theories and the philosophy of science

2021 ◽  
Vol 37 (2) ◽  
pp. 229-246
Author(s):  
Georgy S. Levit ◽  
◽  
Uwe Hossfeld ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Natural Selection ◽  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Evolutionary Theory ◽  
History Of Biology ◽  
Darwinian Revolution ◽  
Common Descent ◽  
Scientific Revolutions ◽  
Research Programmes ◽  
History Of ◽  
Mathematical Sciences

Philosophical theories proceeding from the history of physical-mathematical sciences are hardly applicable to the analysis of biosciences and evolutionary theory, in particular. This article briefly reconstructs the history of evolutionary theory beginning with its roots in the 19th century and up to the ultracontemporary concepts. Our objective is to outline the dynamics of Darwinism and anti-Darwinism from the perspective of the philosophy of science. We begin with the arguments of E. Mayr against the applicability of T. Kuhn’s theory of scientific revolutions to the history of biology. Mayr emphasized that Darwin’s publication of the Origin of Species in 1859 caused a genuine scientific revolution in biology, but it was not a Kuhnian revolution. Darwin coined several theories comprising a complex theoretical system. Mayr defined five most crucial of these theories: evolution as such, common descent of all organisms including man, gradualism, the multiplication of species explaining organic diversity, and, finally, the theory of natural selection. Distinguishing these theories is of great significance because their destiny in the history of biology substantially differed. The acceptance of one theory by the majority of the scientific community does not necessarily mean the acceptance of others. Another argument by Mayr proved that Darwin caused two scientific revolutions in biology, which Mayr referred to as the First and Second Darwinian Revolutions. The Second Darwinian Revolution happened already in the 20th century and Mayr himself was its active participant. Both revolutions followed Darwin’s concept of natural selection. The period between these two revolutions can be in no way described as “normal science” in Kuhnian terms. Our reconstruction of the history of evolutionary theory support Mayr’s anti-Kuhnian arguments. Furthermore, we claim that the “evolution of evolutionary theory” can be interpreted in terms of the modified research programmes theory by Imre Lakatos, though not in their “purity”, but rather modified and combined with certain aspects of Marxian-Hegelian dialectics.

Towards a History of Biology in the Twentieth Century: Directed Autobiographies as Historical Sources

1988 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 77-89 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicholas Russell
Keyword(s):  
Biological Sciences ◽  
Twentieth Century ◽  
History Of Biology ◽  
Physical Sciences ◽  
Historical Sources ◽  
Darwinian Revolution ◽  
Significant Development ◽  
Relative Neglect ◽  
History Of ◽  
Scientists And Engineers

Interest in contemporary scientific history has concentrated on physics and engineering and its most obvious growth has been in America. By contrast, there has been a relative neglect of the biological sciences, especially in Great Britain. This concern with contemporary scientific history has been an autonomous growth among physical scientists and engineers. There has not yet been any significant development of an historical dimension among modern biologists. Most of those who do study the history of biology are concerned with natural history in the nineteenth century and before, with the largest group concentrating on the Darwinian Revolution. Students of the history of twentieth century biology are just beginning to emerge, but may find themselves uniquely disadvantaged compared with observers of the sciences from earlier centuries, or even of the physical sciences and engineering in the twentieth century, unless certain things are done rather quickly.

Homology

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stéphane Schmitt
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Theory ◽  
Comparative Anatomy ◽  
Life Sciences ◽  
History Of Biology ◽  
Theoretical Context ◽  
New Meanings ◽  
History Of ◽  
Primitive Structure ◽  
Animal Anatomy ◽  
The Way

This article examines how the concept of homology is used as an expression of generality in the life sciences. Throughout its long history, homology expressed a quest for generality in the understanding of animal anatomy by suggesting that a diversity of forms resulted from modifications of a single ‘primitive’ structure. However, the meaning of this quest as well as the practices associated with it changed considerably with the different theoretical context of the life sciences. Thus, homology was an element of continuity in the history of biology and played a central role in some developments, particularly the emergence of evolutionary theory. This article first considers the use of homology in pre-transformist comparative anatomy and how it paved the way for the conceptualization of evolutionary theory before discussing the rise of new meanings of homology in genetics.

scholarly journals Fossils with Feathers and Philosophy of Science

2019 ◽  
Vol 68 (5) ◽  
pp. 840-851 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joyce C Havstad ◽  
N Adam Smith
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Evolutionary History ◽  
Scientific Practice ◽  
Scientific Evidence ◽  
Thomas Kuhn ◽  
Karl Popper ◽  
Scientific Debate ◽  
Evolutionary Origins ◽  
Research Programmes ◽  
History Of

AbstractThe last half century of paleornithological research has transformed the way that biologists perceive the evolutionary history of birds. This transformation has been driven, since 1969, by a series of exciting fossil discoveries combined with intense scientific debate over how best to interpret these discoveries. Ideally, as evidence accrues and results accumulate, interpretive scientific agreement forms. But this has not entirely happened in the debate over avian origins: the accumulation of scientific evidence and analyses has had some effect, but not a conclusive one, in terms of resolving the question of avian origins. Although the majority of biologists have come to accept that birds are dinosaurs, there is lingering and, in some quarters, strident opposition to this view. In order to both understand the ongoing disagreement about avian origins and generate a prediction about the future of the debate, here we use a revised model of scientific practice to assess the current and historical state of play surrounding the topic of bird evolutionary origins. Many scientists are familiar with the metascientific scholars Sir Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn, and these are the primary figures that have been appealed to so far, in prior attempts to assess the dispute. But we demonstrate that a variation of Imre Lakatos’s model of progressive versus degenerative research programmes provides a novel and productive assessment of the debate. We establish that a refurbished Lakatosian account both explains the intractability of the dispute and predicts a likely outcome for the debate about avian origins. In short, here, we offer a metascientific tool for rationally assessing competing theories—one that allows researchers involved in seemingly intractable scientific disputes to advance their debates.

scholarly journals КУНОВЕ ИДЕЈЕ НАУЧНИХ РЕВОЛУЦИЈА И ОБЈЕКТИВНОСТ НАУКЕ

TEME ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 845
Author(s):  
Katarina Tomašević ◽  
Sanela D Andrić ◽  
Srđan M Milašinović
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Twentieth Century ◽  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Scientific Knowledge ◽  
Normal Science ◽  
Scientific Revolutions ◽  
New Concepts ◽  
Gradual Process ◽  
The Sixties ◽  
History Of

Kun’s The structure of the scientific revolutions triggered the avalanche of criticism and represents the most conducive and most critical work of the sixties until the eighties of the twentieth century in which the problems of understanding scientific knowledge are discussed. The development of science was understood as a gradual process during which the stages of normal science and scientific revolutions are being shifted. Boldly, by introducing new concepts in the history of philosophy of science, he has received many opponents, but also many followers. In this paper, we tried to present Kun's understanding of the progress in the science and criticism of his greatest opponents, with a reference to the scientific revolutions in social sciences. We also tried to answer the question of whether the scientific revolutions have been depleted and what is happening with the objectivity of science.

What’s Forgotten About The Structure of Scientific Revolutions?

2021 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 323-339
Author(s):  
Jouni-Matti Kuukkanen
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
History Of Science ◽  
Historical Record ◽  
Philosophy Of History ◽  
First Century ◽  
Historical Events ◽  
Scientific Revolutions ◽  
The Past ◽  
Structure Of Scientific Revolutions ◽  
History Of

Abstract Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions is a classic, and it is certainly not forgotten. However, an essential aspect about it has been neglected. That is, Kuhn’s Structure is a book in philosophy of history in the sense that Structure attempts gives an account of historical events, focuses on the whole of the history of science and stipulates a structure of the history of science to explain historical events. Kuhn’s book and its contribution to the debates about the progress of science and the contingency and inevitability of the history of science shows why and how philosophy of history is relevant for the history and philosophy of science. Its successful integration of historical and philosophical aspects in one account makes it worthwhile reading also for philosophers of history in the twentieth-first century. In particular, it raises the question whether the historical record can justify philosophical views and comprehensive syntheses of the past.

To Outdo Kuhn: on Some Prerequisites for Treating the Computer Revolution as a Revolution in Mathematics

2019 ◽  
Vol 56 (3) ◽  
pp. 169-185
Author(s):  
Vladislav A. Shaposhnikov ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
History Of Mathematics ◽  
General Tendency ◽  
Ian Hacking ◽  
Clear Cut ◽  
Scientific Revolutions ◽  
History Of ◽  
New Framework

The paper deals with some conceptual trends in the philosophy of science of the 1980‒90s, which being evolved simultaneously with the computer revolution, make room for treating it as a revolution in mathematics. The immense and widespread popularity of Thomas Kuhn’s theory of scientific revolutions had made a demand for overcoming this theory, at least in some aspects, just inevitable. Two of such aspects are brought into focus in this paper. Firstly, it is the shift from theoretical to instrumental revolutions which are sometimes called “Galisonian revolutions” after Peter Galison. Secondly, it is the shift from local (“little”) to global (“big”) scientific revolutions now connected with the name of Ian Hacking; such global, transdisciplinary revolutions are at times called “Hacking-type revolutions”. The computer revolution provides a typical example of both global and instrumental revolutions. That change of accents in the post-Kuhnian perspective on scientific revolutions was closely correlated with the general tendency to treat science as far more pluralistic and transdisciplinary. That tendency is primarily associated with the so-called Stanford School; Peter Galison and Ian Hacking are often seen as its representatives. In particular, that new image of science gave no support to a clear-cut separation of mathematics from other sciences. Moreover, it has formed prerequisites for the recognition of material and technical revolutions in the history of mathematics. Especially, the computer revolution can be considered in the new framework as a revolution in mathematics par excellence.

scholarly journals Bez geniuszów, bez cudów — w kolektywie. Głos w dyskusji nad nową książką Wojciecha Sadego

2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 41-49
Author(s):  
Marek Woszczek
Keyword(s):  
Early Modern ◽  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Critical Philosophy ◽  
Fine Grained ◽  
Scientific Revolutions ◽  
History Of

The paper indicates how an original Fleckian core of Wojciech Sady’s methodology significantly weakens some popular presentations of the history of empirical sciences (especially the so-called scientific revolutions), which are founded on a myth of a ‘lonely genius’ and ‘miraculous ideas’. Sady rightly emphasizes the collective-cognitive character of processes shaping the theoretical breakthroughs in physics, however he unnecessarily contends that there is some determinism behind them. In order to understand their dynamics, one needs the fine-grained historical-sociological analyses concerning the factors which regulate the work of the research collectives (also the early modern ones), but the widespread individualistic myths make that task much harder, even in a field of critical philosophy of science. It is suggested that the Fleckian perspective is also quite crucial in explaining the seemingly paradoxical waves of antiscientific sentiments which are clearly visible in the hypertechnological societies.

scholarly journals Alfred Russel Wallace’s Intelligent Evolution and Natural Theology

Religions ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (6) ◽  
pp. 316
Author(s):  
Michael A. Flannery
Keyword(s):  
Twentieth Century ◽  
Natural Selection ◽  
Natural Theology ◽  
Common Descent ◽  
History Of ◽  
Important Object ◽  
Do So

Alfred Russel Wallace’s conception of evolution and its relation to natural theology is examined. That conception is described as intelligent evolution—directed, detectably designed, and purposeful common descent. This essay extends discussion of the forces and influences behind Wallace’s journey from the acknowledged co-discoverer of natural selection, to include his much lesser known position within the larger history of natural theology. It will do so by contextualizing it with an analysis of Darwin’s metaphysical commitments identified as undogmatic atheism. In this sense, David Kohn’s thesis that Darwin was the “last of the natural theologians” is revised to suggest that Wallace deserves to be included within the larger context of the British natural theologians in a surprisingly Paleyan tradition. As such, an important object of this essay is to clear away the historical fog that has surrounded this aspect of Wallace. That “fog” is composed of various formal historical fallacies that will be outlined in the penultimate section. Once described, explained, and corrected, Wallace becomes an enduring figure in carrying the British tradition of natural theology into the twentieth century and beyond.

Evolutionary theory and social science

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elliott Sober
Keyword(s):  
Natural Selection ◽  
Evolutionary Theory ◽  
Cultural Change ◽  
Biological Evolution ◽  
Evolutionary Process ◽  
Research Programme ◽  
Human Mind ◽  
Psychological Traits ◽  
Research Programmes ◽  
Survival And Reproduction

Ideas from evolutionary theory impinge on the social sciences in two ways. First, there is the research programme of sociobiology, which attempts to demonstrate the impact of biological evolution on important features of human mind and culture. Second, there is the idea that biological evolution provides a suggestive analogy for the processes that drive cultural change. Both research programmes have tended to focus on the idea of natural selection, even though the theory of biological evolution considers processes besides selection. Sociobiology attempts to show that the following conditional helps explain psychological traits just as it applies to traits of morphology and physiology: if a trait varies in a population, makes a difference for the survival and reproduction of individuals, and is influenced by genetic factors, then natural selection will lead the trait to change its frequency in the population. Models of cultural evolution are built on an analogous conditional: if a set of alternative ideas are found in a culture, and people tend to find some of these ideas more attractive than others, then the mix of ideas in the culture will change. Sociobiology and the understanding of cultural change as an evolutionary process are approaches that have a history and both will continue to be explored in the future. Each is a flexible instrument, which may be better suited to some tasks than to others, and may be handled well by some practitioners and poorly by others. As a consequence, neither can be said to be ‘verified’ and ‘falsified’ by their track records to date.

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