Frederick II of Hohenstaufen and modern ecology

Emperor Frederick II’s early thirteenth-century book on falconry, De arte venandi cum avibus, is probably the most famous single source for scholars who survey the state-of-the-art in natural sciences in medieval times. Most of the research on his book has focused on the marginal illustrations featuring about 80 bird species. However, the book contains a large amount of ethological, ecological, morphological and faunistic knowledge about bird fauna. Frederick was also one of the first to conduct experiments with birds. Here, we describe the ornithological experiments and observations of Frederick and evaluate them from the perspective of modern ecology. In many contexts, Frederick expressed criticism of Aristotle and his work Liber Animalium. Frederick’s observation upon the geographical variation of species was partially in contrast to the Aristotelian typological or essentialist species concept. This is an important finding from the point of view of the western history of biology. De arte venandi cum avibus demonstrates Frederick’s deep knowledge of the ecology, morphology and behaviour of birds. This knowledge he gained via his long practice with falconry. The love of falconry made Frederick an early proponent of empiricism, and De arte venandi cum avibus was actually the most important achievement of empirical zoology in the thirteenth century.

Evolutionary theories and the philosophy of science

Philosophical theories proceeding from the history of physical-mathematical sciences are hardly applicable to the analysis of biosciences and evolutionary theory, in particular. This article briefly reconstructs the history of evolutionary theory beginning with its roots in the 19th century and up to the ultracontemporary concepts. Our objective is to outline the dynamics of Darwinism and anti-Darwinism from the perspective of the philosophy of science. We begin with the arguments of E. Mayr against the applicability of T. Kuhn’s theory of scientific revolutions to the history of biology. Mayr emphasized that Darwin’s publication of the Origin of Species in 1859 caused a genuine scientific revolution in biology, but it was not a Kuhnian revolution. Darwin coined several theories comprising a complex theoretical system. Mayr defined five most crucial of these theories: evolution as such, common descent of all organisms including man, gradualism, the multiplication of species explaining organic diversity, and, finally, the theory of natural selection. Distinguishing these theories is of great significance because their destiny in the history of biology substantially differed. The acceptance of one theory by the majority of the scientific community does not necessarily mean the acceptance of others. Another argument by Mayr proved that Darwin caused two scientific revolutions in biology, which Mayr referred to as the First and Second Darwinian Revolutions. The Second Darwinian Revolution happened already in the 20th century and Mayr himself was its active participant. Both revolutions followed Darwin’s concept of natural selection. The period between these two revolutions can be in no way described as “normal science” in Kuhnian terms. Our reconstruction of the history of evolutionary theory support Mayr’s anti-Kuhnian arguments. Furthermore, we claim that the “evolution of evolutionary theory” can be interpreted in terms of the modified research programmes theory by Imre Lakatos, though not in their “purity”, but rather modified and combined with certain aspects of Marxian-Hegelian dialectics.

Making enemies with media

This article examines the role of media technology in determining preconstitutive enemies of the political order. To do so, it analyzes how discipline-specific methods of enemy detection, analysis, and neutralization correspond to different media environments. Media have a diagnostic and prescriptive significance: not only do they locate enemies that conform to their own unique standards of measurement, they also offer reprogramming resources that accentuate their own peculiar biases and capacities. Episodes in the history of biology and psychology are examined for evidence of this media logic.