Democratic Intellect: Freeing Thought for the Democracy To-come

<p><b>The core argument of this thesis is on the aporetic moment/space of decision and the poetics of the to-come in John Milton's works, with the fundamental importance of the individual. For Milton, this moment/space is radically critical and free, and individually problematic, which goes beyond the usual private/public space even though the public aspects and responsibilities of the person's decision demonstrate exceptional significance in the form of public enactment. In Milton's terms, the experience of such an aporetic moment/space of decision is indispensible for those who want to become a "fit reader" and develop the essential qualities and attributes. I will argue that Milton has always written with the desire to highlight and exemplify the absolute singularity of such a moment and experience throughout his life and works, both prose and poetry.</b></p> <p>The thesis will represent its arguments in two sections. The first section, through a consideration of Derrida's arguments in his works (in particular: "The Laws of Reflection: Nelson Mandela, in Admiration," "The Future of the Profession or the Unconditional University," "Force of Law: 'The Mystical Foundation of Authority,'" and "This Strange Institution Called Literature") together with a selection of Milton's writings, mainly prose (including: Areopagitica, Eikonoklastes, The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates, and Paradise Lost), will examine and identify possible continuities and convergences between the two writers. Such an intimate juxtaposition and close reading of their works has promisingly offered recognition of continuities, convergences, and affinities in their thought in terms of the qualities and attributes of the "fit reader" and the "democratic intellect." In the opening five chapters, the interactive reading highlights fundamental questions and notions for both writers, including the question of exemplarity or singularity, the notion of public space without conditions, the question of justice beyond the law, the critique of violence, and the question of literature as a lawless institution, providing me with the essential terminology to formulate new interpretations of Milton's works, in particular, Paradise Regained and Samson Agonistes.</p> <p>The second part of the thesis uses the conceptions and terms developed in the opening chapters to read the two late poems, Paradise Regained and Samson Agonistes, as singular examples of Milton's fit reader, the aporetic moment/space of decision, and the poetics of the to-come by setting out the general comparative points between them. The focus of my arguments in these chapters will be on the hypothesis that Paradise Regained and Samson Agonistes are both demonstrating the aporetic moment/space of decision - confusingly replete with uncertainties, complexities, and indeterminacies - and the dominant poetics of the to-come as well as arguing for the singularity of the moment, decision, and enactment of the decision in each poem. I will argue that Paradise Regained and Samson Agonistes provide outstanding exemplifications of Milton's notion of the "fit reader" developing similar qualities and attributes in common with Derrida's "democratic intellect."Milton's works represent the aporetic moment/space of decision as an ongoing process; it is a singular moment in which uncertainties and indeterminacies produce unresolvable choices, but where a decision must nonetheless be made; it is a moment of "trial" the result of which cannot be known to the individual "fit reader" in advance. Milton's late poems, Paradise Regained and Samson Agonistes, explore the critical significance of this moment and demonstrate that no certain, fixed, pre-programmed, or predetermined model or frame can be applied to the resolution of aporetic moments of decision in different times, places, and contexts. The "fit reader" is one who radically and critically reads and re-reads aporetic situations, full of inescapable indeterminacies and unresolved choices, and expresses his individual judgement in the singular form of a true decision (not calculation) to advance the possibilities of truth, justice, and humanity.</p>

Democratic Intellect: Freeing Thought for the Democracy To-come

<p><b>The core argument of this thesis is on the aporetic moment/space of decision and the poetics of the to-come in John Milton's works, with the fundamental importance of the individual. For Milton, this moment/space is radically critical and free, and individually problematic, which goes beyond the usual private/public space even though the public aspects and responsibilities of the person's decision demonstrate exceptional significance in the form of public enactment. In Milton's terms, the experience of such an aporetic moment/space of decision is indispensible for those who want to become a "fit reader" and develop the essential qualities and attributes. I will argue that Milton has always written with the desire to highlight and exemplify the absolute singularity of such a moment and experience throughout his life and works, both prose and poetry.</b></p> <p>The thesis will represent its arguments in two sections. The first section, through a consideration of Derrida's arguments in his works (in particular: "The Laws of Reflection: Nelson Mandela, in Admiration," "The Future of the Profession or the Unconditional University," "Force of Law: 'The Mystical Foundation of Authority,'" and "This Strange Institution Called Literature") together with a selection of Milton's writings, mainly prose (including: Areopagitica, Eikonoklastes, The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates, and Paradise Lost), will examine and identify possible continuities and convergences between the two writers. Such an intimate juxtaposition and close reading of their works has promisingly offered recognition of continuities, convergences, and affinities in their thought in terms of the qualities and attributes of the "fit reader" and the "democratic intellect." In the opening five chapters, the interactive reading highlights fundamental questions and notions for both writers, including the question of exemplarity or singularity, the notion of public space without conditions, the question of justice beyond the law, the critique of violence, and the question of literature as a lawless institution, providing me with the essential terminology to formulate new interpretations of Milton's works, in particular, Paradise Regained and Samson Agonistes.</p> <p>The second part of the thesis uses the conceptions and terms developed in the opening chapters to read the two late poems, Paradise Regained and Samson Agonistes, as singular examples of Milton's fit reader, the aporetic moment/space of decision, and the poetics of the to-come by setting out the general comparative points between them. The focus of my arguments in these chapters will be on the hypothesis that Paradise Regained and Samson Agonistes are both demonstrating the aporetic moment/space of decision - confusingly replete with uncertainties, complexities, and indeterminacies - and the dominant poetics of the to-come as well as arguing for the singularity of the moment, decision, and enactment of the decision in each poem. I will argue that Paradise Regained and Samson Agonistes provide outstanding exemplifications of Milton's notion of the "fit reader" developing similar qualities and attributes in common with Derrida's "democratic intellect."Milton's works represent the aporetic moment/space of decision as an ongoing process; it is a singular moment in which uncertainties and indeterminacies produce unresolvable choices, but where a decision must nonetheless be made; it is a moment of "trial" the result of which cannot be known to the individual "fit reader" in advance. Milton's late poems, Paradise Regained and Samson Agonistes, explore the critical significance of this moment and demonstrate that no certain, fixed, pre-programmed, or predetermined model or frame can be applied to the resolution of aporetic moments of decision in different times, places, and contexts. The "fit reader" is one who radically and critically reads and re-reads aporetic situations, full of inescapable indeterminacies and unresolved choices, and expresses his individual judgement in the singular form of a true decision (not calculation) to advance the possibilities of truth, justice, and humanity.</p>

Justice, Law, and the Educative Power: Revisiting ‘Force of Law’

This paper examines Jacques Derrida's analysis of Walter Benjamin's ‘Critique of Violence’ in the context of their respective theories of the university. Whereas Derrida foregrounds the complex ways that the university and law are intertwined, Benjamin claims that the ‘educative power’ stands removed from the law by identifying the university with ‘divine violence’. ‘Force of Law’ not only questions the possibility of a neutral, pre-legal space that Benjamin's theory warrants, ‘Force of Law’ also draws attention to the laws structuring the colloquia that gave rise to Derrida's text. This paper claims that Derrida's analysis of justice, law, violence, and justesse is thus informed by a theory of the university, and that the ways in which Derrida's theory of law stands opposed to Benjamin's parallels the ways in which Derrida's theory of the university questions Benjamin's understanding of the ‘educative power’. This paper concludes by drawing attention to the demand posed by the absence of justice in the academy. Although the laws of the academy produce justesse in the present, this negatively affirms justice in the future, which cannot wait.

Pensar la violencia. Los lectores de Benjamín.

In what follows the reader will find an exposition of Benjamin's text For a Critique of Violence, the interpretation made by Derrida, Honneth, Žižek, among others, as well as Bernstein's comment on those readings. Derrida has associated the Benjamin text with the "final solution", grouping it into the forms of thought that justify or make possible acts similar to those facts. Honneth looks for an affable outlet, turning towards a proposal for a cultural revolution. Žižek associates the resentment that humans experience to explain historical events, which are examples of pure or divine violence, which are caused by love that seeks good. Bernstein will accept the reading of Derrida, which he considers a product of imagination. He appreciates Honneth's performance, he finds it enlightening. He rejects the idea of reducing guilt to the conscience of the person responsible for violent acts, who silently and autonomously judges himself for the acts committed, seems to him inadmissible; he considers that violence should be a community discussion supported by fallibilist pluralism.

Pacifism in International Relations

The aim of this chapter is to explore the contribution of pacifism to international relations (IR), and in particular to demonstrate its relevance to discussions around peacebuilding, statebuilding, and peace formation. The chapter argues that despite its currently subjugated status within IR, as a form of theory rooted in a real-world critique of violence and its effects and in the historical practices of peacemaking and nonviolent resistance, pacifism is ideally placed to offer insights and suggestions for both practitioners and theorists of peacebuilding. The chapter begins by explaining what pacifism is, its main types and approaches, and offers a brief outline of the history and legacy of pacifism in IR, some of the main objections to pacifism, and some answers given by pacifists to these criticisms. The chapter goes on to explore what pacifism can contribute to IR by way of, first, a critique of violence, power, and just war theory and, second, positive contributions to discussions of power and agency, security, civilian protection, peacebuilding, statebuilding, and peace formation. The chapter makes the case that pacifism is a credible and insightful approach to IR that should be taken far more seriously than it is. Moreover, the current historical juncture provides an ideal moment for the return of pacifism to IR, although there are a number of serious challenges it will first have to surmount.

Confronting the gated community: Towards a decolonial critique of violence beyond the paradigm of war

This article investigates the works of Dussel, Maldonado-Torres, and Mbembe as representatives of a tendency in the field of decolonial thought to assume the templates of warfare and the camp as the archetypal registers of violence in the contemporary world. Identifying this focus as the remnant of a Eurocentric vocabulary (the paradigm of war), the article proposes a shift from the language of warfare predominant in the field to a language of welfare. The article turns to the gated community (GC), instead of the camp, and the imperatives of (re)creation, instead of the logics of elimination, as new templates with which to make sense of modern/colonial violence. Moving beyond militaristic imagery, the analysis shows a form of violence that emerges as a response to the endless search for a life of convenience inside the walls of the GC. To this end, the article advances the concept of the dialect of disarrangement, the enforced but uneasy encounter between two subjectivities that inhabit the GC: the patrons (the homeowners who consume the easy life) and servants (the racialised service staff). In the GC, violence emerges in attempts to respond to this (in)convenient encounter via misrepresentations of both patrons and servants as out of their place.

Die Gewalt des Rechts

The modern idea of the rule of law is based on the assertion that with the establishment of law as a central instrument of control, the incidence of violence within society could be reduced. This understanding of law is radically questioned by Walter Benjamin in his essay "Critique of Violence" and by certain poststructural authors; for them law itself is entangled in a violent momentum. This study reconstructs the discourse between Walter Benjamin, Jaques Derrida, Giorgio Agamben, and Christoph Menke on the violence of law and reflects on it from a legal perspective. In doing so, it addresses both – the philosophy of law as well as jurisprudence interested in basic principles of law.