How people make inferences between disjunctions and conditionals is a current important question that can test existing main psychological accounts (mental logic, the probabilistic approach, the original and revised mental model theory) for propositional reasoning. In order to test these accounts, one experiment investigated how relations (material implication, subcontrariety, contradiction, and contrariety) between two basic components (A and C) in disjunctions (e.g., A or C; not-A or C) and conditionals (e.g., if not-A then C; if A then C) and inference directions (disjunction-to-conditional versus conditional-to-disjunction) between disjunctions and their corresponding conditionals affect human inferences between both. It was found that participants’ inferences were symmetric between the two inference directions in compatible relations and incompatible relations where two basic components were on different dimensions, but not in the other relations. Which of the two inference directions was easier depended on relations between two basic components, because some relations tended to elicit particular interpretations of premises and conclusions, or belief biases. The present overall response pattern is beyond all the existing accounts for inferences between disjunctions and conditionals. Inferences between disjunctions and conditionals are complex and so there may not be a unified account for them.