Decimating an Oligopoly: Study of how Jio Telecoms conquered the Indian Network Industry

One of the most debatable and informational business contemplates is that of how Reliance Jio took over a commercial center control by BSNL, the latter who is uncertain of staying alive these days. Among a concise range, viable ways were utilized by Jio and the awkward obstacles looked at by BSNL lead to the creation of one the biggest network providers in India and furthermore made an exceptionally beneficial organization go to obligation. The paper expects to reveal the components and factors for BSNLs ruin and the manner in which it influenced the insights of telephone clients inside the nation. This paper furthermore reveals insight into Jio selling its SIM card without charge and the undeniable reality that not charging any money for a long time since its release changed the total telephone-charge structure in the nation. It’s a comprehensive report on the monetary, political, and psychological ways utilized by a shiny new organization known as Jio and its uncommon impacts until now, where Jio holds over half piece of the pie. The discoveries of this examination are masterminded get into terms of the effect on the all-out scope of endorsers in accordance with the Telecom Statistics India Reports from 2019.T

Civil Law Protection of Network Virtual Property

<p>With the rapid development of science and technology, the form of property is not confined to the traditional concept of real life any more, and it also includes network virtual property. Besides, economic benefits are considerable as the network industry grows, which makes trading of virtual property a very common behavior in the real word. In such situation, there are various disputes concerned with virtual property emerging. However, relevant research and legislation can’t make breakthroughs as virtual property has vague legal status, complicated process of identification, and different definitions as well as unsolved legal protection method in academic field. Compared with the development of the network industry, legislation in the scope of virtual property has lagged far behind, which is hard to be the theoretical basis for solving disputes.</p><p>By analyzing the attributes of virtual property, and combining relevant cases with research results, the author seeks to put forward the protection rules of virtual property in line with the current situation in China, with civil law protection as the core. Possible further researches and prospects on protecting virtual property are also discussed in this article.</p>

Models of Regulation as Tool for Risk Elimination in Network Industry Markets in Slovakia

In Slovakia in the recent period of time we have seen an intensive discussion concerning the effectiveness of the price regulation methods in Network Industries and the objectivity and the labour social effectiveness of The Regulatory Office for Network Industries, as well. It is understandable as network industries in fact ensure the production and distribution of energy sources which play a key role in an effective operation of the developed economies. The discussions are usually focused on the question of a reasonable profit of the network industries companies and on the other hand on the question of prices which are determined by the reasonable and generally acceptable costs of their production. In relation with objectification and increases in nationwide operation effectiveness of natural monopolies in network industries† on the market the role of regulation mechanisms is increasing. Its aim is the closest approximation of proportions between price and level of network industry products supply to the situation which would occur in the conditions of market competition. In the paper we will analyze analytical scheme for monopoly price regulation – rate of return regulation.

Umsetzung des Nagoya Protokolls in EU- und nationales Recht - Transposition of the Nagoya Protocol into EU- and National Law

The Nagoya Protocol against biopiracy is an important achievement in international biodiversity politics. This book presents an alternative concept of how the protocol could have been better transposed into EU and member states law. In contrast to the concept of ‘due diligence’ in the EU Regulation No. 511/2014, the proposal links checking for legal acquisition of biological material to the existing use of regulations on biological material in the EU and its member states (‘piggybacking’). The merits of this are twofold. (1) The book keeps the idea alive that a different form of transposition, which is less bureaucratic and ensures more compliance, is possible. (2) In judicial terms, the study portrays the complex landscape of user regulations on biological resources. Beyond the simple individual authorisation of usage, multiform regulations exist which correspond to the structure of the modern, international network industry.

Codetermination, Price Competition and the Network Industry

This research develops a tractable two-stage non-cooperative game with complete information describing the behaviour of price-setting firms that must choose to be profit maximisers or bargainers under codetermination in a network industry with horizontal product differentiation. The existing theoretical literature has already shown that codetermination might arise as the endogenous market outcome in a strategic competitive quantity-setting duopoly. In sharp contrast with this result, the present article shows that codetermination does never emerge as a Nash equilibrium in a price-setting non-network duopoly. Then, it aims at highlighting the role of network externalities in determining changes of paradigm of the game and letting codetermination become a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium when prices are strategic substitutes or strategic complements. This equilibrium may be Pareto efficient. Results allow distinguishing between mandatory codetermination and voluntary codetermination. The article also proposes a model of endogenous codetermination according to which every firm may choose to bargain with its own corresponding union bargaining unit only whether the firm’s bargaining strength is exactly the profit-maximising one. The equilibrium outcomes emerging in this case range from a uniform Nash equilibrium, in which both firms are codetermined, to mixed Nash equilibria, in which only one of them chooses to be codetermined. These results are ‘network depending’ and do not hold in a non-network duopoly.